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TITLE **PSYCHOPHYSICAL PARALLELISM IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF G. DELEUZE**

AUTHOR **Martin
RUIZ**

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Psychophysical Parallelism

in the philosophy of G. Deleuze

By Martin Ruiz.
A Ph.D thesis for:
The University of Warwick,
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November 1997.

"War is the father of all."

Heraclitus, fragment 53

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Quotation Abbreviations

B = Bergsonism.

DR = Difference and Repetition.

F = The Fold.

FU = Foucault.

LS = The Logic of Sense.

M = Masochism.

NP = Nietzsche and Philosophy.

PS = Proust and Signs.

SP = Spinoza: Practical Philosophy.

WIP = What is Philosophy.

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Preface

The distinction between the mind and body, their relatedness and respective properties is perhaps the single most persistent problem that faces philosophical contemplation. Various models have been proposed in order to overcome this gaping duality: idealism, occasionalism, epiphenomenalism, behaviourism, etc.. The model proposed within this thesis corresponds to psychophysical parallelism - *a parallelism judged purely phenomenological* - wherein mind and body are conceived in terms of two aspects of an unconscious transcendental reality. Historically, philosophy has tended to prioritise one of the aspects over the other: Hegel and Marx serve to illustrate this point. As I will argue throughout this thesis, this transcendental reality - within which we will situate spontaneous creativity - is essentially double and subsists between the two extremes. The consequence of this duplicity is to negate the possibility of any reconciliation into an originary Being, but through which the extremes communicate and pass information. Furthermore, since reality is essentially double, we will be at pains to describe it from two perspectives: from the point of view of language *and* biology, and thereby avoid the tendency to prioritise. The ontological, therefore, will be described in terms of a virtual or potential being situated in neither the heights nor the depths, but staged upon a surface that slips in between the two extremes. This has the added consequence of grounding ethics in sensibility. However, this is not a reductionist programme, but a theory of the whole which functions in the manner of a cybernetic entity constituted upon fractal sedimentations.

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Michel Foucault's *Les Mots et les choses*, is badly translated into English as *The Order of Things*: more accurate would be *Words and Things*. This amended title finds confirmation in Foucault's analysis of R. Margritte: *Ceci n'est pas une pipe*. This paradoxical title opens upon a purely relational space between the thing itself and its name, thereby problematising the relation between signified and signifier in the manner of a Zen 'koan.' As Foucault writes: "Roussel's experiment is located in what could be called the 'tropological space' of vocabulary . . . It is not where the canonical figures of speech originate, but that neutral space within language where the hollowness of the word is shown as an insidious void."¹ This tropological space corresponds to the fissure within signification, and where words recover their fundamental freedom of metamorphosis. Within the hollowness of words we locate the essential duplicity - identity and otherness - which corrupts the ideality attributed to words and things, inscribing there the unerasable mark of the paradox. It is out of these originary experiences, or tropes, that the World is constructed, and where we locate the freedom, the locus of resistance, within that World. There exists therefore a number of paradoxes constitutive of what we call 'reality.' Borges affirms "that the number of fables or metaphors of which men's imagination is capable is limited, but that these few inventions can be all things for all men, like the Apostle."² Furthermore, these metaphors are not invented but given. Deleuze constructs his philosophy around a number of such paradoxes; we will describe four of these which for us constitute the characteristic aspects of his thought. A). The first paradox concerns

¹ M. Foucault, *Death and the Labyrinth*, p. 16.

² J. L. Borges, *Other Inquisitions*, p. 189.

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two interpretations of the world. As Borges tells us:

Coleridge observes that all men are born Aristotelian or Platonist. The latter know by intuition that the ideas are realities; the former, that they are generalisations; for the latter, language is nothing but a system of arbitrary symbols; for the former, it is the map of the universe. The Platonist knows that the universe is somehow a cosmos, an order, which, for the Aristotelian, may be an error or a figment of our partial knowledge. Across the latitudes and the ages, the two immortal antagonists change their name and language: one is Parmenides, Plato, Spinoza, Kant, Francis Bradley; the other is Heraclitus, Aristotle, Locke, Hume, William James.³

These two theses correspond to two fundamental ways of perceiving reality: Platonic realism and Aristotelian nominalism; the Forms and the categories; subject and object; intuition and intellectualism; idealism and materialism; magic and science; the universal and the particular; genus and species; the general and the individual. In actual fact, these extremes are coexistent and correspond to the two aspects from which the event is grasped; they are separable in abstract thought alone. A philosophy whose aim is to avoid both subjective and objective presupposition, slips in between Socratic height and Heraclitan depth and installs therein a pacifying surface. This 'meddling' is one of the most essential features that characterises Deleuzean philosophy: a sustained effort to expose the elevationism and reductionism that constitutes a history of philosophy. What is inaugurated in its place is difference and repetition: difference in itself as foundation and repetition for itself as ground. Deleuzean philosophy thereby conceives the transcendent in terms of the *disparate* and sufficient reason in terms of the *eternal return* of the same.

B). By describing the transcendental in terms of a disparate field populated by singularities, we conceive origination as the primordial Nothingness of the *creatio ex nihilo*. This nothingness must not be understood as an emptiness in the sense of Hegelian non-being, but

³ Ibid, p. 156.

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rather as a virtual potentiality out of which every substantial thing is engendered. Nihilism - the loss of faith in our highest values - means interpreting our value systems in terms of their transcendental origins, seeing nothing immutable in their arbitrary nature, and out of which the individual may derive an inventive motivation in order to reevaluate life through an act of self-creation. Nihilism means to eternally return to the transcendental source, to continually reevaluate anew, from one moment to the next. Such a goal implies an inhumanity, at least from the point of view of the circumspect consciousness. But to substitute the notion of the unconscious is itself problematic, since a certain awareness and optimality corresponds to this field. Rather, we will define it as aleatory - this notion is not as novel as it at first appears. Borges tells us in *Pascal's Sphere* that from Xenophanes to Parmenides, Empedocles, and Ptolemy, to Alain de Lille, to Copernicus, Bruno, Campanella, and Bacon, to Donne, Milton, and Pascal, to mention only a few of the best known, have all conceived the universe, and God, in terms of "an infinite sphere, the centre of which is everywhere, the circumference nowhere."⁴ Today we may say that God is the aleatory point within an ever expanding cosmic sphere. It is this notion of an aleatory point that solves the paradox of the uncreated creator; never where it is and always where it isn't, traversing the entire system in an instant. Omnipresent, omnipotent and omniscient. This notion of the aleatory constitutes the essential theme in Deleuzean philosophy, and describes what is there meant by non-anthropomorphic genesis. The aleatory point therefore must be understood as representing a certain harmony, better still a resonance, amongst the many disparate elements that constitute a given system. But this resonance is not the faculty of thought which is said to harmonise all the other faculties,

⁴ Ibid, p. 9.

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but rather subsists below the conscious threshold. From the point of view of language, it corresponds to the idea; from the point of view of the body, it corresponds to the organism. But this point itself is neither idea nor body, rather it represents the virtual order out of which ideas and bodies are engendered. This point is a dynamic stability: not stable but metastable, since a change in any part of the system will have repercussions throughout the system as a whole.

C). The third metaphor incorporates the paradox of infinite regression as articulated by Zeno of Elea: that is, the race between Achilles the Nimble-Footed and the tortoise. The tortoise is given a start corresponding to its disadvantage. The race begins and Achilles makes up the distance, but by which time the tortoise has moved a little further; again Achilles makes up that distance, but again the tortoise has moved on a fraction further; and again . . . and again . . . *regressus in infinitum*. This repeated halving of the distance between two points is what Borges elsewhere calls the "Greek labyrinth which is a single straight line."⁵ Achilles is unable to overtake the tortoise, since he is destined only to recover the distance covered by the tortoise. Achilles runs ten times faster than the tortoise, therefore the series is represented by " $10+1+1/10+1/100+1/1,000+1/10,000+. . .$ "⁶ Zeno uses this paradox to deny movement. This paradox is again taken up by Aristotle who uses it to deny the reality of Platonic Forms: Man is the phenomenal representation of a Form; but this Form must also correspond to a higher Form of which it is a representation; and this second Form in turn must correspond to a third Form . . . *ad infinitum*. St. Thomas Aquinas rediscovers the paradox and uses it to prove the existence of God: everything has a cause, every cause must have a

⁵ J. L. Borges, *Labyrinths*, p. 117.

⁶ J. L. Borges, *Other Inquisitions*, p. 110.

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previous cause, and these causes a previous cause, and these causes . . . The universe is conceived in terms of a infinite series of linear causes extending both backwards and forwards in time. But the cosmos exists as something more than a vanishing linear series: it exists as a whole. In order to make sense of this existence the conjunctive synthesis representing the non-contingent first cause is employed. Once again the paradox is rediscovered, Borges tells us:

Hermann Lotze uses the *regressus* as a way not to understand that an alteration of object *A* can produce an alteration of object *B*. He reasons that if *A* and *B* are independent, then to postulate an influence of *A* on *B* is to postulate a third element *C*, which to operate on *B* will require a fourth element *D*, which will not be able to operate without *F*. . . To elude that multiplication of chimeras, he concludes that there is one single object in the world: an infinite and absolute substance, comparable to the God of Spinoza. The transferable causes are reduced to immanent ones; events, to manifestations or forms of the cosmic substance.⁷

The essence of the world is no longer conceived in terms of a relation between subject and object, structure and function, language and bodies, separated by an abyss which only a transcendent value could come to fill, but rather in terms of a plane of immanence whose criterion comes from within. It is at this point that Deleuze picks up the baton, employing this paradox in the service of liberating desire from the repressive structures imposed upon it by transcendent values. D). The fourth metaphor concerns time. In his essay: *New Refutation of Time*, Borges takes up the idealist position in order to refute, within the limits of the idealist doctrine, the traditional conception of time. To this task he applies the writings of both Berkeley and Hume. As he tells us: "Berkeley denied that there was an object behind sense impressions. David Hume denied that there was a subject behind the perception of changes. Berkeley denied matter; Hume denied the spirit. Berkeley did not wish to add the metaphysical notion of matter to the

⁷ Ibid, p. 112.

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succession of impressions, while Hume did not wish to add the metaphysical notion of a self to the succession of mental states."⁸ The former refutes the existence of the object, and therefore absolute space, while the latter, taking the idealist argument of the former a logical step further, refutes the existence of the subject, and therefore absolute identity. However, both presuppose temporal succession. To this Borges adds the denial of a universal and absolute time wherein all phenomena would be serially connected, substituting it with an infinity of coexistent times. "For Berkeley, time is 'the succession of ideas . . . which flows uniformly and is participated by all beings' (*The Principles of Human Knowledge*, 98); for Hume it is 'composed of indivisible moments' (*A Treatise of Human Nature*, I, 2, 2). Nevertheless, having denied matter and spirit, which are continuities, and having denied space also, I do not know with what right we shall retain the continuity that is time."⁹ Borges thereby reduces time to an absolute instant that is neither a succession of presents nor a unity of past moments. Deleuze names this time - which is neither present nor past, objective nor subjective - *Aion*, and attributes it to the futural dimension of metamorphosis, since it continually forks. To Aionic time there corresponds the paradox of a pure becoming; a movement that simultaneously goes from both past to future and future to past. As Deleuze writes: "This is the simultaneity of a becoming whose characteristic is to elude the present. Insofar as it eludes the present, becoming does not tolerate the separation or the distinction of before and after, or of past and future. It pertains to the essence of becoming to move and to pull in both directions at once."¹⁰

⁸ Ibid, p. 183.

⁹ Ibid, p. 183.

¹⁰ G. Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, p. 1.

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These four themes find their analogues in the developing sciences of evolutionary biology and quantum mechanics, which affirm the primacy of *participation* over *observation*, of the *event* over the *phenomenon*, of the *anegoic* over the *egoic*. The structure of this primary domain exhibits a fractal pattern: that is, below the finite forms of phenomenology subsists infinity. The finite coastline of Britain, magnified again and again *ad infinitum*, never arrives at a straight line that would represent the boundary that defines the country, and thereby render it absolutely measurable. Rather, at every level of magnification there is irregularity, or rather a self-similar pattern as exemplified by the 'Koch Curve' - there is no such thing as a straight line, only an infinity of repeating levels that are irreducible to number. For example: the root system of a tree bears a striking resemblance to the structure of the human nervous system, which in turn exhibits a remarkable likeness to satellite photographs of river deltas. Large-scale and small-scale mirror one another to an uncanny degree, which leads some to hypothesise that the manifestation of Nature represents the iteration of a simple mathematical rule. Likewise, the structure of this present thesis takes on a certain fractal pattern, reflecting the duality between form and content on various levels of analysis. At each level - thesis, chapter, theme - the duality presented is not synthesised into a higher resolution under the authority of a transcendent value, but rather is founded and its genesis explained in terms of an immanence that leaves the duality in place, seeing in it an originary encounter between two irreducible dimensions. Philosophy therefore begins with paradox. As a whole, the thesis is preoccupied with the mind-body problem as articulated by Deleuze's middle period writings; namely *The Logic of Sense* and *Difference and Repetition*. Chapter one articulates a transcendental difference and configurational repetition beyond

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representation, thereby preparing the ground for a rereading of phenomenology in terms of *eventology* that problematises the formation of efficacious agency - on both the individual and social levels - and whose genesis must now be sought within the inhuman and strategic domain of power relations; chapter two analyses the event from the point of view of language and Husserlean phenomenology; chapter three from the point of view of the body and biology; while chapter four engages with a theory of ethics from the point of view of a material *cogito* grounded in the radical imaginary of a real desire that is productive; but a productivity that precedes the language paradigm and opens onto a polymorphous life beyond the Romantic ideal of the organic and anthropomorphic.

Chapter 1

Representation

In this chapter we will be looking at the way in which Deleuze treats both Plato and Nietzsche, locating in one that which must be overturned by what is found in the other. It could be said, in a certain limited sense, that these two figure correspond to the beginning and end of philosophy as *doxa*. Plato, who inaugurated the moral presuppositions within what was to follow as the philosophy of the Western world, and Nietzsche, the first to ruthlessly undermine those presuppositions by substituting in their place the pure becoming of the ecstatic artist as philosopher-creator. Ultimately, what is at issue within this controversy is the status of difference and the manner in which it is treated by both Plato and Nietzsche, as we find in the following quotation taken from Deleuze:

The primacy of identity, however conceived, defines the world of representation. But modern thought is born of the failure of representation, the loss of identities, and of the discovery of all the forces that act under the representation of the identical. The modern world is one of simulacra. Man did not survive God, nor did the identity of the subject survive that of substance . . . We propose to think difference in itself independently of the forms of representation which reduce it to the Same, and the relation of different to different independently of those forms which make them pass through the negative. (DR xix)

Thus, our task lies clearly before us. However, the possibility of its accomplishment depends on whether difference in itself can indeed be thought independently of representation. In the course of this thesis we will attempt to track down this philosophical superlative - or ideal - within the domain of ontology. Here it will suffice us to articulate the role that representation plays in the two figures mentioned above. The chapter will be divided into five inter-related sections: 1. Plato; 2. Schopenhauer as Nietzsche's precursor; 3. will to power as form (value) giving force; 4. eternal return and repetition; 5. carnival, art and

creativity.

1. Let us begin by means of a brief detour inquiring after the manner in which Deleuze conceives the role that representation plays and the limitations it imposes upon difference. It has four principal aspects which correspond to thought, sensibility, the Idea and being. This four-fold yoke constitutes the medium of representation as the site of transcendental illusion: that is, identity in the form of the *undetermined* concept; resemblance in the *determined* object of the concept itself; opposition in the relation between *determinations* within concepts; and analogy in the relation between *determinable* concepts. Let us examine these four aspects in closer detail.

a). The first illusion concerns the manner in which common sense postulates generalities while inaugurating an identical thinking subject who would simultaneously certify the identity of concepts in general. As Deleuze explains:

In effect, thought is covered over by an 'image' made up of postulates which distort both its operation and its genesis. These postulates culminate in the position of an identical thinking subject, which functions as a principle of the identity for concepts in general . . . The thinking subject brings to the concept its subjective concomitants: memory, recognition and self-consciousness. Nevertheless, it is the moral vision of the world which is thereby extended and represented in this subjective identity affirmed as a *common sense [Cogitatio natura universalis]*. (DR 265-6)

The postulates correspond to the primary units of knowledge (individual facts) which are imposed upon the purely nomadic functioning of thought, thereby establishing a ground from which reasoning can arise. Furthermore, all these units converge upon a juncture which constitutes the self-identity of the thinking subject. This self-identity of the *cogito* is reflected in concepts, which in turn guarantees *their* identity. Thus, like Nietzsche, Deleuze proposes we

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nurture an evil-will that would shatter the conjunctions constitutive of common sense, elude a blind subservience to the prerogatives of the moral precepts, and thus allow thought to function in its extreme singularity. In that case, thought would be freed from its allegiance to a *doxa* that would predetermine the course of its wanderings, thereby making it adequate to think difference differentially.

b). In order for representation to suppress difference in itself global similarities must be perceived in sensibility, thereby allowing the identity of the concept to be applied to the realm of diversity - this corresponds to the second site of transcendental illusion: resemblance. As Deleuze tells us:

difference necessarily tends to be cancelled in the quality which covers it, while at the same time inequality tends to be equalised within the extension in which it is distributed. The theme of quantitative equality or equalisation doubles that of qualitative resemblance and assimilation. (DR 266)

Good sense recognises these similarities, extracting from the unequal and the different that which is equal and similar. Thus, common sense and good sense form two complementary aspects - quantitative equalisation and qualitative resemblance - by which intensive difference is subordinated within perception. "Difference is intensive, indistinguishable from depth in the form of an non-extensive and non-qualified *spatium*, the matrix of the unequal and the different. Intensity is not the sensible but the being *of* the sensible, where different relates to different" (Ibid).

c). The third illusion concerns the way in which the negative suppresses difference in the form of opposition. Within the domain of representation, for a thing to be conceived as different it must in the first instance be presented negatively as that which is no longer the *Same*. From this we derive the law of contradiction, of being and non-

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being, wherein the dialectical sovereignty of the Same allows difference to exist, but only in a form that is mediated by the negative. For Deleuze, opposition is a derivative produced by understanding problems in terms of conscious questions. As he tells us:

Problems-Ideas are by nature unconscious: they are extra-propositional and sub-representative, and do not resemble the propositions which represent the affirmations to which they give rise. If we attempt to reconstitute problems in the image of or as resembling conscious propositions, then the illusion takes shape, the shadow awakens and appears to acquire a life of its own. (DR 267)

That is, the unconscious is conceived by Deleuze in terms of a domain of differentiated positivities, wherein the positivity of each and every singularity is affirmed. Thus, opposition is an epiphenomenon that is produced when we interpret problems-Ideas in terms of the theoretical antinomies of pure reason.

d). The fourth illusion concerns the subjection of difference to the categories, or rather, to analogy. Being expresses itself in a number of determinate ways (i.e., space and time), organises the distribution of things, while maintaining an undifferentiated composure. Difference is therefore suppressed at this highest level of the identical by the imposition of categories as determinable *a priori* concepts. As Deleuze writes:

the identity of the concept does not yet give us a concrete rule of determination, since it appears only as the identity of an indeterminate concept; Being . . . The ultimate concepts . . . must therefore be posited as determinable. They are recognised by the fact that each maintains an internal relation to being. In this sense, these concepts are analogues, or Being is analogous in relation to them and acquires simultaneously the identity of a distributive common sense and that of an ordinal good sense. (DR 269)

These ultimate concepts are the categories which Being distributes and orders and from which specific concepts may be derived. Thus, the task here is to think acategorically.

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However, it must be emphasised that in Plato the constraints imposed upon difference by representation are still relatively loose, in comparison to the philosophies of say Leibniz and Hegel who develop the subordination of difference in itself to the degree of infinite representation - that is, the infinitely small and the infinitely large respectively. As Deleuze writes:

Finite representation is that of a form which contains a matter, but a secondary matter in so far as it is defined by contraries. We have seen that it represented difference by mediating it, by subordinating it to identity as the genus, and by ensuring that subordination by means of analogy among the genera themselves, by means of the logical opposition of determinations and the resemblance of properly material contents. It is not the same with infinite representation, since this includes the Whole or ground as primary matter and the essence as subject, absolute form or Self. Infinite representation relates at once both the essence and the ground, and the difference between the two, to a foundation or sufficient reason. Mediation itself has become foundation. However, in the one case the ground is the infinite continuity of the properties of the universal which is itself contained in finite particular Selves considered as essences. In the other case, particulars are only properties or figures which are developed in the infinite universal ground, but refer to essences as the true determinations of a pure Self, or rather a 'Self' enveloped by this ground. In both cases, infinite representation is the object of a double discourse: that of properties and that of essences. (DR 49)

It is Deleuze's wish to articulate a transcendental empiricism that would serve as the precondition for a philosophy of representation, while subjecting the notions of the Identical and the Same to a protracted critique, and thereby performing nothing less than a philosophical inversion. From Plato to the post-Kantians, philosophy has defined the movement of thought as one which goes from the hypothetical to the apodictic. Deleuze suggests that thought's true directionality is from the problematic to the question. As Bergson in *Creative Evolution* tells us:

Plato was the first to set up the theory that to know the real consists in finding its Idea, that is to say, in forcing it into a preexisting frame already at our disposal - as if we implicitly possessed universal knowledge. But this belief is natural to the human intellect, always engaged as it is in determining under what former heading it shall

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catalogue any new object; and it may be said that, in a sense, we are all born Platonists.¹

Likewise, Deleuze believes that essentially existence is incommensurable with the Idea - that is, everything begins with paradox. In order to interrogate the basis of Deleuze's affirmation we will look at the manner in which Deleuze treats Plato on three major themes: A). Plato's method of division which is subject to the four transcendental illusions; B). The status accorded simulacra; C). The model of thought propounded by Plato.

A. The consideration of the four illusions will take the order of that articulated above. i). Platonic division, according to Deleuze, is not a method dedicated to the division of a "determinate genus into definite species" (DR 59). Rather, division or the dialectic of difference represents a method of selection wherein the true thing is not identified within a concept of representation, but rather is authenticated over and against the false pretender by means of invoking the non-representational Idea.² For this reason the dialogues can only invoke the distinction between the true and false participates of an Idea that is itself essentially ungraspable or non-representable. From this proceeds the distribution of lots between those judged true and those false. The characteristic of this method is the synthesis of difference within the cyclical movement of myth. By functioning as foundation, myth permits for a process of selection wherein the claimants may be judged as to the degree of their participation in the Idea sought. In this manner 'pure lines of descent' are established. From this we see that Platonism corresponds to a philosophy of heights and depths - that is, pure lines of descent that disseminate degrees of

¹ H. Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, Macmillan, 1911, p. 51.

² An exemplary illustration of the non-representability of the Idea constitutes the persistent theme in R. Musil's novel: *The Man Without Qualities*.

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resemblances between claimants in hierarchical order, from the pure to the impure, the authentic to the inauthentic. However, resemblance must not be understood as an extrinsic difference between two things, but rather as a difference between the manifest thing (appearance) and its intrinsic Idea. Hence, "[i]t is a question of making a difference, thus of operating in the depths of the immediate, a dialectic of the immediate" (DR 60). More importantly, this notion of 'making a difference' is a question of determining a non-conceptual difference of unilateral distinction. Let us distinguish between two levels: a dissolved indeterminate abyssal ground, and a sky populated with determinate yet distinct things. Difference is not constituted between these two levels, but rather it is *made* when a determinate thing distinguishes itself from something that does not distinguish itself from it. That is, it reveals itself in its uniqueness: this is the moment of *presence* and *precision*, or rather immediacy. When the ground rises to the surface, form becomes an abstract line traced upon the reflecting surface of a "mirror in which both the determinate and the indeterminate combine in a single determination which 'makes' the difference" (DR 28). No longer an abyssal duality between chaos and order, but an always and already interweaving of the two. Thus, by means of establishing unilateral distinction, this method of division leaps from one singularity to another in order to found a philosophy of difference and identity. But a philosophy wherein the aim is not to seek for contraries within a single genus, but rather to sift through the good and bad claimants which partake in a single Idea; always in a mixed form as an indefinite representing multiplicity. The aspiration therefore of Platonism lies in its desire to uncover the identity of the Idea which remains essentially unrepresentable in things. However, difference in Platonism is ultimately 'pacified' under the yoke of

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representation to the extent that it is subordinated under the hyperthetical identity of the Idea: the Good, the Just and the Beautiful.³ i i). The manner in which Plato establishes the method of division is by means of a recourse to the cyclical movement of 'myth' in general. But the content of myth is thought, or more correctly, it is a thought of a thought of a thought, or as in the *Timaeus*,⁴ a story of a story of a story, that supposedly emanates from the creative Word of God. Claimants are measured against the model of the Idea and their legitimacy judged according to the degree of resemblance, to the Idea, possessed by each of the claimants - this corresponds the procedure in the *Phaedrus* and *The Statesman*. However, any similarity is purely formal, in that it is based upon a perceived 'resemblance'. The circularity, or the eternal repetition as the movement of myth reveals itself as the basis of a selective test which communicates the foundation to the procedure of division. However, this recourse to myth betrays a certain impotence on the part of Platonism - that is, his inability to directly grasp the Forms as pure modalities of thought. He therefore depends upon a story (myth) in order to authenticate *his* claims as to what qualifies as the Good, the Just and the Beautiful, etc.. Therefore, myth as foundation is what supplies the method of division with the mediation it appears to lack, while simultaneously establishing the test of *participation* by relating difference (the claimant) to the One (the Idea). But myth alone is not adequate to this task of authentication, since it both lacks a philosophical rigour and can not provide an indubitable *logos*: myth is ultimately a story that

³ The notion of multiplicity in Plato is not extended to the limit, but rather, remains constrained to a dialectic between the many and the one, in which the many are organised, systematised and unified by the power of the one. For Deleuze, multiplicity should be understood in terms of the 'many as such' which has no need of systematising.

⁴ Derrida has shown us this function of story and myth in his exemplary analysis of Plato's *Timaeus*, in his essay titled *Khora*, in *On the Name*.

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lacks apodictic certainty. So in what does the purpose of myth consist? In the absence of an indubitable *logos* we can only have recourse to the sensible, that is, to the *image* as sensory world from which we deduce 'the most plausible' explanation. Myth is a plausible explanation which functions as a justification for Plato's establishment of the 'lines of descent' which flow from the archaic God down into the depths of the simulacrum. In this sense the Forms reveal themselves as attributes of God which undergo a process of degradation the further they descend into matter. As Deleuze tells us:

[D]ivision lacks probative force; it has to be relayed by a myth which provides an imaginary equivalent of mediation . . . If it is true that, within Platonism in general, myth and the dialectic are distinct forces, this distinction no longer matters once dialectic discovers its true method in division. Division overcomes this duality and integrates myth into the dialectic; it makes myth an element of the dialectic itself. The structure of this myth in Plato is clear: it is a circle, with two dynamic functions - namely, turning and returning, distributing and allocation: the allocation of lots is carried out by the turning wheel of an eternally recurring metempsychosis (DR 61).

Myth, therefore, is not a means of producing syntheses, but rather of selecting singularities; this is the whole function of the method of division which employs myth and dialectic for its purposes.

iii). What is the relation between the foundation and the ground? The function of myth is to provide a authenticating foundation for the Forms, which in turn authenticate the grounding test of participation. By means of the power of resemblance, myth founds the grounding test wherein claimants are differentiated into a hierarchy according to the degrees of their participation in the particular Idea. "The ground is the test which permits claimants to participate in greater or lesser degree in the object of the claim. In this sense the ground measures and makes the difference" (DR 62). This test itself consists in the play of 'opposition' between those claimants who truly participate and those who are the false pretenders: the simulacra. The false pretenders are

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those demonic forces who lacking all similarity ape participation by concealing their true essence behind the mask of resemblance: the trickery of appearance is achieved through simulation. Therefore, the purpose of the grounding test is primarily to facilitate the definition of the limits of a given Idea, in order to measure the degree of participation as well as to identify those claimants who fall outside the defined boundaries: limitation and contradiction. "To participate means to have a part in, to have after, to have a second place. What possesses in first place is the ground itself" (DR 62). That is, the Forms possess in first place, whereas man can only to a second degree possess the quality of the Forms: the Form is the Good, while man can merely aspire to be good. And the second degree of participation slips into a third, a fourth, etc., degrading further and further until a mere simulacrum of the Form is displayed. Thus, "[t]he function of the ground is then to allow participation, to give in second place . . . In this sense the ground measures and makes the difference" (Ibid). The ground therefore is what allows the claimants their claim.

We must . . . distinguish between Justice, which is the ground; the quality of justice, which is the object of the claim possessed by that which grounds; and the just, who are the claimants who participate unequally in the object . . . The grounding principle is imparticipable but nevertheless provides something to be participated in, which it gives to the participant, who is the possessor in second place, the claimant who has been able to pass the grounding test. (Ibid)

Obviously, those who do not pass the grounding test are excluded from participating in the elective Greek *polis*.

iv). Lastly, if the selective procedure of division is to be fulfilled, the grounding test which is itself founded on myth requires the intervention on the part of the Apollonian oracle: the oracle is addressed with a question, to which it responds with a problem. It is in the structure of this problem-question, as 'analogy of judgment', that

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the dialectic as ironic trial progresses. "Irony consists in treating things and beings as so many responses to hidden questions, so many cases for problems yet to be resolved" (DR 63). The Deleuzean interpretation of this specific aspect of Platonism could be considered controversial in its dismissal of the traditional accounts. This aspect concerns the role that both the question and problem play in the Platonic dialectic. In Hegel this role is played by the *negative*, but in Plato, Deleuze tells us, this is certainly not the case. On the one hand, in Hegel the *negative* designates a non-being in the sense of a nothingness, while Being designates a full positivity. In Plato, on the other hand, non-being designates something entirely other than the *negative*, and which, in Deleuzean philosophy, is interpreted in terms of a problematic structure, or as the differential multiplicity constitutive of the Idea itself. Deleuze extracts this conclusion from Plato's *Sophist*, however the text itself contains so many ambiguities that the controversy is far from being finalised. Nevertheless, for Deleuze:

Neither the problem nor the question is a subjective determination marking a moment of insufficiency in knowledge. Problematic structure is part of objects themselves, allowing them to be grasped as signs, just as the questioning or problematising instant is a part of knowledge allowing its positivity and its specificity to be grasped in an act of *learning*. More profoundly still, Being (what Plato calls the Idea) 'corresponds' to the essence of the problem or the question as such. It is as though there were an 'opening', a 'gap', an ontological 'fold' which relates being and the question to one another. In this relation, being is difference itself. Being is also non-being, *but non-being is not the being of the negative*; rather, it is the being of the problematic . . . in which affirmation, as multiple affirmation, finds the principle of its genesis. (DR 63-4)

Therefore, non-being in Plato is not the same as the Hegelian *negative*, but rather, the differential element which the question primarily addresses. The positivity of this structure (problem-question) is distinguished from the role that the negative plays in the dialectic -

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that is, the negative or contradiction which interprets non-being as a nothingness and being as a full positivity. In fact the negative is only "the shadow of the difference alongside the affirmation produced" (DR 64). The Idea is an irresolvable differential multiplicity; Nietzsche said much the same when he claimed that truth is a metaphor. Analogy functions in exactly the same way: identifying things with reference to similar things, thereby imposing upon univocal being a pre-given category. It is impossible to judge from the standpoint of Truth because truth is problematic, therefore one can only identify resemblances and classify it by means of analogies. Thus difference in itself remains subordinated to the presupposed Idea. Essentially, this implies that the Platonic method of division leaps from one singularity the another, even though the singularities themselves are subjugated to the law of the Same.

B. For Plato, the Idea does not correspond to the identity of the concept in general, but rather to the non-representable representative of the thing itself: essence. However, where Platonism focuses all its dialectical power for the purpose of constructing a philosophy of difference, Deleuze locates its crucial point of weakness, and ultimately the point at which the possibility of its overturning would be realised. As we have seen, the purpose of the grounding test, which proceeds by means of dialectical interrogation, is the establishment of lines of descent that authorise the differentiation between the true claimants and their false rivals. The ground is what sanctions the distinction between the true and the false by relating difference to the Same. However, Plato does not think difference in itself. Thus, "[o]verturning Platonism, then, means denying the primacy of the original over copy, of model over image; glorifying the reign of simulacra and reflections" (DR 66). In this manner a universal

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ungrounding is inaugurated. Difference in itself does not lie between the model and its copy, between chaos and form, but rather as Deleuze tells us:

Things are simulacra themselves, simulacra are the superior forms, and the difficulty facing everything is to become its own simulacrum, to attain the status of the sign in the coherence of eternal return. Plato opposed eternal return to chaos as though chaos were a contradictory state which must be subject to order or law from outside. (DR 67-8)

In order to establish the identity of the Idea as first principle, Plato needed to conceive the eternal return in terms of a mythic thought that would provide an immutable foundation, whereas what Nietzsche understood by eternal return was more akin to chaosmosis. As Deleuze warns us: "Chaos is not an inert or stationary state, nor is it a chance mixture. Chaos makes chaotic and undoes every consistency in the infinite. The problem of philosophy is to acquire a consistency without losing the infinite into which thought plunges (in this respect chaos has as much a mental as a physical existence)" (WIP 42). Thus, in Nietzsche the foundation is not identified with an eternally recurring cycle, but rather with the chaotic flux of irreducible difference, or will to power as the eternally displaced form giving force. Deleuze, like Plato, articulates difference in terms of an affirmation of singularity, but a singularity that escapes the subordination to the Idea and which *makes* a difference. The Idea itself is constituted out of intensive difference: its unity is merely an appearance. Thus the distinction between reality and appearance collapses. Difference therefore constitutes a moment of immediacy wherein the production of determination is realised. Difference is realised in those signs that are immediately affirmed, and which have not yet entered into the

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signifying process: a pure sign.⁵ These pure signs are the simulacrum. The Forms, as the elementary concepts of representation, are defined as the conditions of possible experience. By subordinating both the object and the subject to this model, the conditions of *real* experience are limited to the possibilities of representation. "The net is so loose that the largest fish pass through" (DR 68). Thus, the overturning of Platonism implies abandoning the tyranny of the non-representable Idea, decentering the great circle of the Forms, and putting in play an essential divergence amongst the vertical lines of descent. It is by means of such divergences and decenterings that everything is revealed as simulacra; as the phantasm emergent from an ungrounded chaos whose movement is that of its own repetition: the repetition of displaced difference without model or copy.

In the *Parmenides* the theory of Ideas is subjected to a series of rigorous criticisms which affirm that the arguments establishing the reality of the Forms also demonstrate that there must be Forms of man, fire, water, hair, mud, and dirt etc.. That is, there must insist a Form corresponding to every general term in language, and therefore to every class of thing. As Deleuze tells us commenting on this criticism:

In Plato, an obscure debate was raging in the depth of things, in the depth of the earth, between that which undergoes the action of the Idea and that which eludes this action (copies and simulacra) . . . however this something is never sufficiently hidden, driven back, pushed deeply into the depth of the body, or drowned in the ocean. (LS 7)

How can the notion of dirt be limited to an ideal Form? It cannot. However, the possibility of overturning Platonism does not merely depend on the double ejection of essences and appearances for its realisation. The motivation behind such a gesture would leave

⁵ However, J. Kristeva has consistently argued, in *Revolution in Poetic Language*, that the semiotic is always contaminated by the symbolic. We will return to the status of these 'pure signs' in the following chapter in relation to nonsense words.

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Platonism intact, since the notion of Truth would continue to exert its authority through a different methodology, e.g., logical positivism. Rather, we must subject Platonism to a Nietzschean genealogical analysis in order to uncover the differential elements upon which truth is constituted and which form the foundation of its unity, its prejudices and desires, its aims and morals. In short, everything which, deductively speaking, plays the role of premise and first principle. This task to overcome first principles in Platonism prompts Deleuze to ask:

Is there not a possessor of the third or fourth rank, and onto an infinity of degradation culminating in the one who possesses no more than a simulacrum, a mirage - the one who is himself a mirage and simulacrum? (LS 255)

The possessor of this degraded rank Deleuze locates in the *Sophist*, where the ironic method of Plato, more than in any other text, is taken to its limit through a persistent tracking down of the false in order to uncover the simulacrum. Ironically it is within this dialogue that Platonism accomplishes its own overcoming; or at least indicates where the fulcrum of overturning may be found.

Plato's motivation, then, is to deduce from the theory of Ideas a teleology that would order and hierarchize the disparities constitutive of social life, thereby imposing a limit on the pure becomings of the simulacrum and founding a philosophy of representation where identity would triumph over difference. As Deleuze writes:

If we really want to say that philosophy originates with the Greeks, it is because the city, unlike the empire or state, invents the agon as a rule of a society of 'friends,' of the community of free men as rivals (citizens) . . . Hence the necessity for Plato to put things in order and create authorities for judging the validity of . . . claims: the Idea as philosophical concepts. (WIP 9)

From Deleuze's reading of Plato three distinctions emerge: the angelic-Idea; the man-copy; and the demonic-simulacrum. The copy's

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resemblance to the model is defined in terms of an intrinsic relation to the Idea, whereas the simulacrum is defined by an extrinsic relation to the object, since it is constituted upon an internalised difference that evades limit and measurement. However, "[i]f the simulacrum still has a model, it is another model, a model of the Other" (LS 258). Since simulacra internalise an originary disparity they cannot be understood in terms of degraded copies. What the overturning of Platonism means is to allow the repressed power of the simulacra to rise to the surface, to tear down the edifice of hierarchy and reduce the divine law of identity to the status of the 'produced'. Identity is understood by Deleuze as mere 'simulation'; the phantasm that "establishes the world of nomadic distributions and crowned anarchies" (LS 263). Simulation designates the power of producing a mask, where behind each mask there is always another mask.

Since the model is intrinsic, the participation of the copy in the identity of the model is purely internal, whereas the simulacrum which internalises an original disparity cannot be said to partake of the model according to the rule of the Same and the form of the similar. However, resemblance is attributable to the simulacra, but in the sense of a perceived resemblance in the eye of the beholder: an extrinsic relation between things that resemble. Similarity is merely an *effect* of a subterranean chaosmos; the Idea as product of an original disparity. Through his reading, Deleuze rotates the vertical lines of descent 90 degree, flattening the hierarchies along a horizontal surface, and thereby inserting history and time into the model of the eternal Forms. Everything now occurs on the surface and at the limit of bodies; it is the time of becoming Other through a veritable liberation of the repressed power of the simulacra. By 'becoming' we understand a

pure becoming that eludes the present through a double affirmation, that is, the simultaneous affirmation of both directions - past and future within an infinitive. This essentially paradoxical construction constitutes a pure event.

C. This conclusion leads us on to Deleuze's third theme; that of appraising Plato's image of thought which has three essential characteristics: the *sentendum*, the *memorandum*, and the *cogitandum*. The first characteristic concerns 'contradictory perceptions'. In *The Republic*,⁶ Plato distinguishes between two aspects of perception: on the one hand, things which do not disturb thought and, on the other hand, those which do disturb thought and lead to *thinking*. The first class of things are objects of recognition, which fill thought only with re-presented objects that do not disturb its tranquil surface and self-identity: 'fetch me a chair!' The second class of things are objects that are not recognised: these produce disturbances and contradictions within thought itself, causing it to question its own status and thereby *think*, 'What is this? A box to sit on!' However, Socrates' interlocutor - he who puts forward the thesis of non-recognition - presupposes, according to Deleuze, a good sense or *directionality* of thought that preserves the ideal form of recognition, since its object is always the preestablished Idea: "that *philia* which predetermines at once both the image of thought and the concept of philosophy" (DR 139). All truths that are established through the directionality of a good sense are hypothetical, and belong to the mythic form of knowledge that does not think the violence of difference in itself as well as the immediacy of necessity. Therefore, the contradictory perceptions to which Plato refers are merely the coexistence of contraries (the negative) in an unlimited becoming in which recognition operates purely to limit such

⁶ Plato, *The Republic*, Book VII, 523b.

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a becoming by relating the different to the same. This formulation, for Deleuze, confuses the being of the sensible with a sensible being. Ideas, for Deleuze, essentially designate possibilities within the model of recognition; they do not define immediacies that would allow for the emergence of the *new* from a given problematic potentiality: the latter Deleuze characterises as the real conditions of experience which are perpetually destabilising the object of recognition.

Thought is primarily trespass and violence, the enemy, and nothing presupposes philosophy: everything begins with misosophy . . . The conditions of a true critique and a true creation are the same: the destruction of an image of thought which presupposes itself and the genesis of the act of thinking in thought itself. (DR 139)

The encounter in which the object is not recognised can *only* be defined in terms of sensibility. This *pure* encounter is open only to the faculty of sensibility, the *sentientum*, whereas in recognition the object encountered is referred to and guaranteed by other faculties including that of sensibility. As we have seen this consensus amongst the faculties is what Deleuze calls common sense. The pre-recognitive object of encounter is a sign which arises purely out of sensibility. "It is not a sensible being but the being *of* the sensible. It is not the given but that by which the given is given" (DR 140). At its own limit, sensibility is imperceptible from the perspective of recognition since, it can only be sensed. This pre-re-presentative and pre-re-cognitive exercise of sensibility is transcendental from the point of view of law, order and consensus, and corresponds to the immediacy of that which can only be sensed. This transcendental exercise of the faculty of sensibility defines the primary characteristic of what it is to think. The second characteristic of thought concerns a distinction between memory and the reminiscence of that which has been forgotten. Plato articulates reminiscence in terms of it being enveloped within the

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perceived object while simultaneously giving it the power of being grasped independently from the distinct perception in which it inheres. Thus, this ghost of reminiscence is never fully perceived, yet at the same time is recognised.

But this means, however, everything is betrayed: first, the nature of the encounter in so far as this does not merely propose a particularly difficult test for recognition, an envelopment that is particularly difficult to unfold, but instead opposes all possible recognition; second, the nature of the transcendental memory and of that which can only be recalled. For this second instance is only conceived in the *form of similitude in the reminiscence*, to the point where the same objection arises: reminiscence confuses the being of the past with a past being, and since it is unable to assign an empirical moment at which this past was present, it invokes an original or mythical present. (DR 142)

Empirical memory grasps those things which were originally experienced, and once forgotten are lost forever, since it cannot be grasped a second time. Transcendental memory concerns the being of the past which can *only* be recalled and which, thereby, addresses the always and already element of forgetting within memory itself.⁷

Forgetting is no longer a contingent incapacity separating us from a memory which is itself contingent: it exists within essential memory as though it were the 'nth' power of memory with regard to its own limit or to that which can only be recalled. It was the same with sensibility: the contingently imperceptible, that which is too small or too far for the empirical exercise of our senses, stands opposed to an essentially imperceptible which is indistinguishable from that which can be sensed only from the point of view of a transcendental exercise. Thus sensibility, forced by the encounter to sense the *sentendum*, forces memory in its turn to remember the *memorandum*, that which can only be recalled. (DR 140-1)

In its turn, the *memorandum* allows us to grasp that which can only be thought: the *cogitandum*. This third characteristic of Plato's model of thought is determined in terms of separate contraries which forces thought to think pure identities; the identity of each contrary. "According to Plato, therefore, the essence is defined by the *form of real identity* . . . Everything culminates in the great principle: that there

⁷ Deleuze's *Proust and Signs* is an extended meditation on the character of reminiscence as non-originary origin.

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is - before all else, and despite of everything - an affinity or a filiation . . . of thought with the true" (DR 142). However, for Deleuze this third characteristic, the *cogitandum*, must not be confused with the intelligible, but rather defined in terms of the being of the intelligible; the limit which the intelligible may reach if it breaks free from directedness of good sense and the form of common sense. Herein the *cogitandum* attains its 'nth' power within an essential discordance between all the faculties, each faculty receiving the violence that each one communicates to each other and wherein each confronts its own limit. Within this disjunctive functioning of the faculties the model as *doxa* collapses.

Therefore, in terms of the requirements of a transcendental empiricism - which advocates a dissonant, disjointed, and dissolute exercise of each faculty, reducing it into its own unique singularity, and thereby pushing that faculty to its limit - we find the Platonic determination unsatisfactory. The transcendent exercise of the faculties of sensibility, memory, imagination and thought introduces a form of time wherein the unity of the "I" is fractured. In the place of unities Deleuze substitutes 'aleatory points' or centres that envelop differentials (intensities) rather than testify to an original identity. Furthermore, these centres are always Other in essence. It is always through intensity that thought arrives. That which forces us to think (intensity) and the thought (intensity raised to the level of thought) are one. Sensibility (chaos) and the intelligible (form) are no longer conceived in terms of an essential disparity, but rather, come together in a joint functioning wherein the experimental abstract line is traced through a surface field of potentiality and where form is emergent from this tracing. Form does not orchestrate the drawing of the line, instead it is an effect of the communication between the disjointed faculties. In

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consequence, we should determine Ideas in terms of potentialities which are constituted by a field of intensities or differences in intensity, or rather as those instances which go from sensibility to thought and from thought to sensibility - like lines of communication between two different levels. Hence, the whole purpose of the transcendental exercise is to free thought from the limits of representation, and allow thought to grasp the imperceptible; that is, the *being* of the sensible, the *being* of the memory, and the *being* of thought, and not as representation would have it, the sensible being, the present memory, and the identity of thought.

One last point needs clarification. In Plato's image of thought, error is conceived in terms of misadventure or the false recognition of an object by a thinker who possesses a good will and whose thought is good natured. This dogmatic image constrains thought to retrace well worn and institutionalised paths to the 'true'. Error is thought lead astray; a wrong turn selected by thought on its retrograde movement which leads to the contemplation of the Forms. In Plato, therefore, true recognition is a positive model and error is negative model. In order to release *thinking* from the constraints of recognition, Deleuze substitutes stupidity for the Platonic model of error. The former must not be understood merely in terms of a corporeal malfunction (i.e., imbecility), but rather as the very structure of thought itself. For this reason, Deleuze tells us: "[s]tupidity . . . is not animality . . . [rather] stupidity . . . [is] a specifically human form of bestiality" (DR 150). Deleuze makes stupidity the object of a properly transcendental question in that it concerns immanent disparity, divergence and disjointedness: that is, thought traces all the dissonant pathways of an evil deformity of unrecognisable objects and thereby raises itself to the power of *thinking*. Herein, we locate a violent reconciliation

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between an aleatory individual (prior to any I or self), the ground and thought.

At this point, the intensive factors of individuation take themselves as objects in such a manner as to constitute the highest element of a transcendent sensibility, the *sentendum*; and from faculty to faculty, the ground is borne within thought - still as the unthought and unthinking, but this unthought has become the necessary empirical form in which, in the fractured I . . . thought at last thinks the *cogitandum*; in other words, the transcendent element which can only be thought. (DR152-3)

This leads us into the element of *learning* which must not be confused with knowledge. Thus, for Deleuze, the movement of thought is from stupidity to learning as a true act of thinking, rather than, as in the case of Platonism, thought goes from error to knowledge. That is, from the problematic to the question, rather than from the hypothetical to the apodictic. Learning therefore is the transcendental condition that allows time to be introduced into thought itself. However, Plato, who introduced time into thought through reminiscence, subjected it to the mythical form of a metapsychosis. But not so with Deleuze, who does not understand this time in terms of Kantian linearity, but rather, as a non-linear time of pure thought (time takes thought).

Platonic time introduces difference, apprenticeship and heterogeneity into thought only in order to subject them again to the mythical form of resemblance and identity, and therefore to the image of thought itself. As a result, the whole Platonic theory of apprenticeship functions as a repentance, crushed by the emerging dogmatic image yet bringing forth a groundlessness that it remains incapable of exploring . . . [L]earning is the true transcendental structure which unites difference to difference, dissimilarity to dissimilarity, without mediating between them; and introduces time into thought . . . in the pure form of an empty time in general. (DR 166-7)

Deleuze's efforts therefore at overturning Platonism concentrate on revealing the irrepressible functioning of the simulacrum within the heart of the Platonic text itself. The aim of Deleuzean philosophy does not aspire toward the identical and the true behind the mask of appearance, but rather reveals an irreducible disparity and becoming

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constitutive of being. By showing pure becoming to be pre-representational, the simulacrum is demonstrated to elude the action of the Idea. In Plato, thought is orientated toward ascension, toward the philosophy of heights in which the mind can ascend on wings of Reason from the cave of shadows (depths) and redeem itself within the sun of Truth. Nietzsche distrusted this orientation of thought, and affirmed the belief that philosophy could not find its accomplishment therein, but only its degeneration. Rather than ascend Nietzsche sought to remain on the surface. He thereby rejected both the Socratic heights and the pre-Socratic orientation toward the depths as autochthonous. These two extreme orientations, of height and depth, were unsatisfactory for Nietzsche who understood the importance of superficiality, of being superficial through profundity. For both Nietzsche and Deleuze the depths climb to the surface while the heights descend into the laterality of the surface Event. This lateral orientation corresponds to that of the Stoics whose cynicism toward Plato is well documented (Diogenes the Cynic).

This point would benefit from an explanation of the Deleuze's appropriation of Stoic philosophy that he receives via Diogenes Lucretius.⁸ Pure events possess a simultaneity of becoming which eludes the present through a double affirmation, that is, the affirmation of both directions at once. On the one hand we have limited things, while on the other we have unlimited becoming; a becoming which escapes the action of the Idea, contests *both* models *and* copies and is, therefore, the matter of the simulacrum. This paradox of pure becoming has the consequence of contesting personal identity. It is this lack of identity which constitutes the objective structure of the event.

⁸ D. Lucretius in his *De Rerum Natura* argues that the products of Nature are essentially diverse, and the task for philosophy, therefore, is to think the diverse as diverse. In this respect, he claims, all previous philosophies have failed.

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Pure becoming not only introduces history into the lateral interpretation of being - this was one of the major themes affirmed by the Renaissance and its overturning of theological notion of eternity - but also affirms the bi-directionality implicit in a time not constrained to the mere linear and historical perspective. Good sense affirms the directionality of thought, common sense fixes identities, thereby it is shown that the simulacrum obeys neither. As Deleuze tells us:

the proper . . . name is guaranteed by the permanence of *savoir*. The latter is embodied in general names designating pauses and rests, in substantives and adjectives, with which the proper name maintains a constant connection. Thus the personal self requires God and the world in general. (LS 3).

The Stoics distinguished between bodies and their effects. Firstly, bodies with their quantities and qualities, actions and passions, which enter into mixtures forming 'states of affairs.' But not in the sense of cause and effect, since all bodies are causes unto each other and for each other. At the limit of this ensemble all bodies are absorbed into a unity which the Stoics called Destiny. That is, a determinism that relates to the time of the present. Secondly, this mixture of bodies causes *effects* which are not themselves bodies, but rather, incorporeal entities which play on the surface or at the limit of bodies. The time of these entities-events is the unlimited Aion. As Deleuze says:

They are not physical qualities and properties, but rather, logical or dialectical attributes . . . They are not substantives or adjectives but verbs. They are neither agents nor patients, but the results of actions and passions. They are not living presents but infinitives: the unlimited Aion . . . Thus time must be grasped twice, in two complementary though mutually exclusive fashions. (LS 5)

Thus, there is the time of the present where action and passion develop, and the impassive time of the pure becoming: Aion. These are two entirely different beings, or more correctly, states of affairs can

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be said to have being but events have extra-being. From this we may surmise that the Stoics inaugurated a new dualism which constitutes a reversal of Platonism. Deleuze again:

If bodies with their states, quantities and qualities, assume all the characteristics of substance and cause, conversely, the characteristics of the Idea are regulated to the other side, that is to this impassive extra-being which is sterile . . . *the ideational or the incorporeal can no longer be anything other than an effect.* (LS 7)

The consequences of this operation raises unlimited becoming from the depths of bodies, where Plato attempted to bury them, to the surface where the effects of mixtures of bodies insinuate themselves, forming the entire Idea and robbing the latter of its "causal and spiritual efficacy." Now the Idea is grasped purely in terms of effect. Within the corporeal domain of the causal relatedness the reversal cannot be actualised (to cut-to be cut), whereas within the realm of the incorporeal effects form among themselves quasi-causes which are always reversible (the wound-the scar). All these reversals testify to a continuity which replaces depth with surface effect, and where all events take place in one and the same Event. Hence, Plato's ironic method of heights and depths, of lines of descent, of the pure and impure, are lateralised and incorporated within the bi-directionality of a pure becoming through the Stoic operation, corresponding to the art of paradox. The paradox itself cannot be grasped in terms of identity and truth, since it remains essentially irreducible, the starting point for all philosophising: misophy. Therefore, as Deleuze tells us; "the paradox is thus essentially a 'sorites,' that is a series of interrogative propositions which, following becoming, proceed through successive additions and retrenchments. Everything happens at the boundary between things and propositions" (LS 8).

Through this operation Ideas are converted into events, stripped of

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their Platonic Essence or Identity and interpreted in terms of incorporeal 'effects' emergent from corporeal mixtures. Moreover, no measure can be found in either the depths or the heights that would order or limit the mixtures between bodies; mixtures are only as good or bad as the bodies which pervade each other. Everything is permissible within the sphere of mixtures to the extent that all choices are selected locally: this defines the law of immanence. Morality, as an immutable and global decree, is therefore subverted. A whole new orientation of thought has been inaugurated; problems and solutions, questions and answers take on a whole new meaning.

2. Let us turn now to Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche and the character of the latter's thought which we will present as incorporating three essential aspects: A) The interpretation of truth in terms of value and its relation to the outside. B) By means of the ontological notions of will to power and eternal recurrence thought is characterised in terms of intensity: that is, it is shown to have its roots in sensibility. C) Philosophy as an affirmation of life is understood in terms of an *artistic* process which is not pessimistic but essentially humorous. But firstly let us situate Nietzsche in relation to his precursor, namely Schopenhauer. The latter's philosophy is divisible into four main categories that correspond to the four books of *The World as Will and Idea*: the idea subordinate to the principle of sufficient reason; the universal Will; the Idea as aesthetic object; and pessimism. We will briefly elucidate these four themes respectively. Schopenhauer's dualistic model of the world was the framework upon which Nietzsche based his philosophical reflections in *The Birth of Tragedy*. The basic idea for this model was taken from Kant, but reworked in terms of the *Will*. In Kant the opposition is presented in

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terms of a duality between the noumenal (transcendent) and the phenomenal (empirical): the former corresponds to that beyond the grasp of the individual and constitutes the foundation of being; the latter corresponds to the subjectivity of the individual, its architectonic structure and the manner in which the world appears to that individual. If we liken the phenomenal to an egg, the noumenal would correspond to the chicken that layed it. The embryo within the egg can have no knowledge of the existence of the chicken outside of the shell in which it develops. The cosmos is like an evolving embryo; it can grasp nothing about what existed before the 'big bang', or what may lie beyond the boundaries of its own time-space curve. But since we are in the habit of thinking in terms of causality, a first cause will eventually be hypothesised. Moreover, a first cause which can only be defined paradoxically: as *the* non-caused cause (God). Thus, the noumenal chicken can represent merely a speculation in the mind of a developing embryo. Schopenhauer rejects the purely speculative character of the noumenal and substitutes it with the will as immanent principle.

In Schopenhauer, Kant's duality is reworked in terms of will and idea. "The world is my idea."⁹ That is, the idea of world consists in a representation solely in the mind of the individual who perceives it. As an object of representation in the mind of the perceiver, the idea is a composite of two complementary aspects: an object that obeys the forms of space, time and causality, and a undivided subject structured in accordance with the *a priori* forms of intuition presupposed in all experience. "But as in general the object exists only for the subject, as its idea, so every special class of ideas exists only for an equally special quality in the subject, which is called the faculty of

⁹ A. Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Idea*, p. 3.

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perception."¹⁰ The ideas therefore are in a certain sense innate. Perception itself consists in both the raw data that is received through the five senses, and the ideas as products of an operation of the understanding upon this data. "What the eye, the ear, or the hand feels, is not perception; it is merely data. Only when the understanding passes from the effect to the cause does the world lie before us as perception extended in space, varying in respect to form, persistent through all time in respect of matter . . ."¹¹ Therefore, the three forms of space, time and causality constitute the principle of sufficient reason under which all empirical ideas are subordinate.

But perception can tell us nothing of the real *inner nature* of things themselves. Schopenhauer therefore affirms a universal will as immanent principle. This primary will is essentially unitary and therefore capable of bridging the duality between object and subject. For that reason, it must not be conceived in terms of intentionality, which is purely subjective, but rather, as Schopenhauer tells us:

Every true act of will is also at once and without exception a movement of the body . . . The act of will and the movement of the body are not two different things objectively known, which the bond of causality unites . . . but they are one and the same.¹²

The immediate knowledge that we have of our own body makes that knowledge an idea unlike any other, since "it appears in consciousness in quite another way *toto genera* different from idea, and this we denote by the word *will* . . ."¹³ Hence, knowledge concerning our body is given in two distinct forms: immediately as voluntary movement, and in perception as idea. The will is not subordinate to the principle of

¹⁰ Ibid, p. 8.

¹¹ Ibid, p. 9.

¹² Ibid, p. 32.

¹³ Ibid, p. 35.

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sufficient reason as ground, but rather shows itself in this respect as the groundless foundation of every objectified and differentiated thing. The unity of the will is represented in the unity of my body: the manner in which it assimilates a multiplicity of disparate elements. Moreover, in its capacity for *dominating assimilation* the will shows itself as essentially affirmative. This affirmative or *motivated* action underlies all phenomena and must not be confused with force. Will is dynamic and related to inner nature; force is kinetic and related to manifest phenomena. As Schopenhauer tells us: "If . . . we subsume the concept of *will* under that of *force*, as has till now been done, we are renouncing the only immediate knowledge of the inner nature of the world that we have, in allowing it to be engulfed in a concept which is abstracted from the phenomenon, and with which we can therefore never transcend the phenomenon."¹⁴ Force is objectified will. Hence, that which had eluded Kant, namely the noumenon, can for Schopenhauer be grasped as an object of knowledge given in the immediate experience of the body as manifestation of will. Will is not exclusively human. From the analogy of my own body it follows that all objects must be conceived in terms of manifestations of will: animals, vegetables and even matter are expressions of it. Will therefore corresponds to the universal inhuman.

Aesthetic perception, according to Schopenhauer, consists in a disinterested experience purged of all egotistic and individualistic will-ful desiring: the highest form of aesthetic perception is music. Through it the individual is transplanted into the domain of the abstract universal, where things are grasped in their perfected wholeness as eternal Ideas. Aesthetics therefore corresponds to a transcendental operation that reveals the hierarchy of Ideas through

¹⁴ Ibid, p. 44.

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which the will manifests itself in nature. "In these grades", Schopenhauer claims,

we recognised the Platonic Ideas, in so far as these grades are the same as the definite species, or the original unchanging forms and qualities of all natural bodies, both organic and inorganic, and also the universal forces which reveal themselves according to natural laws. These Ideas, then, express themselves, one and all, in the innumerable individuals and entities, and are related to these as are archetypes to their copies.¹⁵

Since the Platonic Ideas elude the action of the principle of sufficient reason, they possess neither plurality nor change - that is to say, they are eternal universals. For this reason they can become objects of knowledge only to the extent that individuality is suspended. "As individuals we have no other knowledge but that which is subject to the principle of sufficient reason, and this form excludes knowledge of the Ideas."¹⁶ As we have seen, the body is an objectification of will; our knowledge originates from the input of sense data; knowledge therefore is subordinated to the will. In order to grasp the eternal Ideas, the relation between knowledge and will must be reversed; that is to say, from the effects of knowledge we derive the causes of will. Aesthetic contemplation corresponds to the operation wherein the reversal is actualised. Philosophy and science merely employ the ideas and concepts which they derive from empirical experience that is subordinate to the principle of sufficient reason. They therefore fail where the artist succeeds - that is, in the attainment of the underlying universal graspable only in the immediacy of aesthetic contemplation. Within the rapturous contemplation of the natural object the artist, Schopenhauer tells us;

ceases to consider the where, the when, the why, and the whither of things, and looks simply and solely at the *what*. He does not allow abstract thought, the concepts of reason,

¹⁵ Ibid, p. 97.

¹⁶ Ibid, p. 100.

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to take possession of his consciousness, but, instead, gives the whole power of his mind to perception, immerses himself entirely in this, and lets his whole consciousness be filled with the quiet contemplation of the natural object actually present . . . He *loses* himself in this object . . . he forgets his very individuality, his will, and continues to exist only as the pure subject, the clear mirror of the object, so that it is as if the object alone were there without anyone to perceive it, and he can no longer separate the perceiver from the perception . . . If the object has to such an extent passed out of all relation to something outside it, and the subject out of all relation to the will, then what is known is no longer the individual thing as such, but the *Idea*, the eternal form, the immediate objectivity of the will at this grade. The person rapt in this perception is thereby no longer individual . . . but he is a pure, willess, painless, timeless *subject of knowledge*.¹⁷

Since both the object and the subject are manifestation of will, they find the point of their unity therein. Thus, the Ideas alone possess actual being, while the nature of genius consists in the contemplation of these Ideas.

But aesthetic contemplation, for Schopenhauer, is only a temporary release from man's subordination to the will. "The *affirmation of the will* is the continuous willing itself."¹⁸ That is, Schopenhauer defines will in terms of desire as lack, or rather as "the satisfaction of the needs which are inseparable from the life of the body"¹⁹ and from which we may attain only momentary satisfaction. Nothing can fully appease the will to life: perpetually consuming and destroying that which it desires, it shows itself as essentially cruel and unjust. Add to this outlook atheism and irredemption and we have what Schopenhauer understood by pessimism. Since the thing-in-itself is itself desire, suffering is an essential and irreconcilable component of existence. Influenced by Buddhist doctrine, Schopenhauer therefore asserts that the only adequate response to such all pervading suffering is to cease desiring.

¹⁷ Ibid, p. 102.

¹⁸ Ibid, p. 206.

¹⁹ Ibid, p. 206.

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Nietzsche breaks with Schopenhauer on two fundamental points. Firstly, he rejects the conception of a transcendental domain defined in terms of an abstract universal beyond the individual, and substitutes it with the notion of will to power which is neither form nor formless, but rather the pure unformed world of pre-individual and impersonal singularities constitutive of the process of individuation itself. As Deleuze tells us:

The great discovery of Nietzsche's philosophy, which marks his break with Schopenhauer and goes under the name of the will to power or the Dionysian world, is the following: no doubt the I and the Self must be replaced by an undifferentiated abyss, but this abyss is neither an impersonal nor an abstract Universal beyond individuation. On the contrary, it is the I and the self which are the abstract universals. They must be replaced, but in and by individuation, in the direction of the individuating factors which consume them and which constitute the fluid world of Dionysus. What cannot be replaced is individuation itself. Beyond the self and the I we find not the impersonal but the individual and its factors, individuation and its fields, individuality and its pre-individual singularities. For the pre-individual is still singular, just as the ante-self and the ante-I are still individual. (DR 258)

Thus absolute ground and absolute subject are erased from Nietzsche's later philosophy. Secondly, Nietzsche further rejects the interpretation of life in terms of an irredeemable suffering. *Human all too Human* marks the phase where he began to conceive tragedy not as a pessimism of 'weakness', but rather as a tonic to life - that is to say, as a tragedy of 'strength' wherein the whole of existence is affirmed, even the greatest of suffering. Both good and bad are Stoically and indifferently embraced. It is from these two points of departure that we may begin our analysis of Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche.

3. Nietzsche's distinction between the creation of new values and the recognition of established values should not be understood in an historically relative manner, as though that which is established was once new, and where the new always becomes established over a period

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of time and requires overturning. Rather, revaluation defines a perpetual process of evaluating in the light of the death of God and the dissolution of Self. It implies a difference which has the power to continually begin over again, remaining forever new in an eternal return of the unrecognisable and dissimilar. That is to say, there are no immutable values, only contextualisations and specificities out of which values are extracted. Thus, a distinction is drawn between the creation of new values and the recognition of established values, the former which inspires in thought an evil will and strips it of its innate knowledge. As Deleuze tells us:

The new, with its power of beginning and beginning again, remains forever new, just as the established was always established from the outset, even if a certain amount of empirical time was necessary for this to be recognised. What becomes established with the new is precisely not the new. For the new - in other words, difference - calls forth forces in thought which are not the forces of recognition, today or tomorrow, but the powers of a completely other model, from an unrecognised and unrecognisable *terra incognita*. (DR 136)

The object of recognition is never the *new*; the new can only be different from the form of recognition and dissimilar to the Same. The new is that which strips thought of its 'innateness' and frees it from the yoke of the principle of sufficient reason to which it was tethered. But more importantly, the new eludes the action of the Same in the recognised Idea grasped as truth. That is to say, Nietzsche aims to liberate thought from the transcendental illusion to which Schopenhauer subordinated it. On the one hand, in Schopenhauer the Idea ultimately remains an object of recognition authenticated by means of a pact between a good will and a common sense, since in its Platonic form it is conceived in terms of immutability. On the other hand, Nietzsche's notion of will to power is alleged to elude this transcendental model of thought based upon identity and recognition in

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the Idea, and thereby infuse into thought the novel: this is what Deleuze calls *thinking*. Thus, will to power inaugurates a veritable becoming evil in a fulfilment of Pascal's prophecy and challenge.²⁰ It is in this light that Nietzsche criticised truth as;

a more modest being from which no disorder and nothing extraordinary is to be feared: a self-contented and happy creature which is continually assuring all the powers that be that no one needs to be the least concerned on its account; for it is, after all, only 'pure knowledge.'²¹

The will to truth must be called into question, since it is willed not in the name of what the world is but in the name of what it is not. Truth is an ideal that corresponds to an inverted image of the world. It was Nietzsche's belief that the world is essentially false, thus he who wills truth does so in the name of a world which does not deceive. As an end in itself, the will to truth opposes knowledge to life. Knowledge expresses a type of life (reactive) which contradicts *real* life by giving the latter laws which separate it from what it can do. Knowledge is merely a symptom of life. As Deleuze tells us:

When knowledge becomes a legislator, the most important thing to be subjected is thought. Knowledge is thought itself, but thought subject to reason and to all that is expressed in reason. The instinct for knowledge is therefore thought, but thought in its relation to the reactive forces which seize and conquer it. For rational knowledge sets the same limits to life as reasonable life sets to thought. (NP 100-1)²²

Rational knowledge presupposes the four-fold yoke of representation, whereas the affirmation of life itself goes beyond the limits by which knowledge measures it (life). That is to say, to release a thought which

²⁰ This reference is to a note by Nietzsche in *The Will to Power*, Book 1, §83, where he says: "Without the Christian faith," Pascal thought, 'you, no less than nature and history, will become for yourselves *un monstre et un chaos*.' This prophecy we have fulfilled."

²¹ F. Nietzsche, *Untimely Meditations*, §137.

²² On this notion of the limit Blanchot has some extremely interesting things to say which Deleuze appears to echo: "The limit-experience is the response that man encounters when he has decided to put himself radically in question." *The Infinite Conversation*, p. 203.

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would go to the limits of life; a thought which would be active and creative; a thought that would release new possibilities for life. Nietzsche does not affirm a natural affinity between thought and truth, but rather expresses an alliance between thought and life. Therefore, not truth but value as an emergent property corresponds to the essential component in thought: its value for life. As an emergent property, value arises out of an intertwining between two irreducible forces - that is to say, an encounter between material contextualities and subjective specificities: value as event. We will have more to say on this idea in the following chapter.

In all the expressions of reactive force, activity is misrepresented or judged from the standpoint of utility. "We can guess the source of 'utility': it is the source of all passive concepts in general . . . the taste for replacing real relations between forces by an abstract relation which is supposed to express them all, as a measure" (NP 74). A veritable conceptualising and universalising of singular and particular forces. Nietzsche's method therefore involves relating a concept to will to power in order that it may be grasped as a symptom of a process to which it owes its emergence: this method characterises the genealogy. Since will only desires to affirm difference, what is affirmed in every act of willing is singularity - not unlike the singularities that the 'lines of descent' affirm in Platonism. However, in Nietzsche these singularities themselves are further liberated from the yoke of recognition and the law of the Same to which Plato held them captive.

For Nietzsche, truth can exist only in terms of value, and ultimately in terms of the value of values - that is to say, as a process of evaluation out of which value arises. "Evaluation is defined as the differential element of corresponding values, an element which is both critical and

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creative" (NP 1). It is critical²³ in that it imposes its difference, thereby undermining the establishment and its system of values (anarchistic); and creative in its capacity to produce the 'new' out of the past (artistic). In this sense evaluations are said to be styles of being (ontology), but beings which lack an immutable centre since they are constituted upon an irreducible relation between forces. Or rather, if being has essence, it has only to the extent of the irreducible difference constitutive of being itself. This difference at the heart of every origin is that which the genealogist strives to reveal. "[U]nderstood this way [as genealogy], critique is also at its most positive . . . This is why critique is never conceived by Nietzsche as a *reaction* but as an *action* . . . Critique is not a re-action of *re-sentiment* but an active expression of an active mode of existence; attack and not revenge" (NP 2-3).

By ontology we mean certain fundamental assumptions about the existence underlying our conceptual or rational schema, i.e., will to power and eternal return are said of everything that exists. In Platonism every phenomenal thing represents a copy of an eternal Idea. Ideas therefore were the ontology that inspired Plato to differentiate between the 'real' and the 'apparent' world. For Deleuze, the ontological is not transcendent, but rather transcendental; that is to say, ontological being subsists within life as a process of pure becoming whose limits are defined by the two extremes of materialism and idealism. In this sense ontology is said to constitute the surface plane of immanence upon which *thinking* takes place. On the plane of

²³ This notion of critique is subsequently dropped by Deleuze in *Difference and Repetition* and *The Logic of Sense*, presumably since it implies the requirement of recognising an object to be overcome, and this in turn implies the prerequisite of being conscious in order that recognition take place. This would place critique under the yoke of representation. Whereas the affirmative character of will to power is said to be essentially unconscious, thereby eluding the form of recognition and identity. Therefore, will to power cannot be critical except in terms of a symptom of its primary functioning.

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immanence the creation of value is a question of a throw of the dice, wherein each throw affirms the whole of chance.

The singular points are on the dice; the questions are the dice themselves; the imperative is to throw. Ideas are the problematic combinations which result from throws . . . Ideas emanate from it just as singularities emanate from that aleatory point which every time condenses the whole of chance into one time. (DR 198)

By affirming chance difference (pathos of distance) is affirmed as the very object of affirmation itself. This imperative does not refer back to a Cogito, but rather to a fractured 'I'. "Imperatives do indeed form the *cogitanda* of pure thought, the differentials of thought, at once that which cannot be thought and that which must be thought and can be thought only from the point of view of the transcendent exercise" (DR 199). Thus, the question is not a subjective determination marking a moment of insufficiency in Knowledge, but rather corresponds to the pure thought of the *cogitanda*, which designates the impossibility of thinking that *is* thought. Herein lies Nietzsche's becoming sensible of thought: thought and evaluation which derive from a domain of forces that originate outside the *cogito* - that is to say, exterior to the form of recognition and identity that subordinates difference to the model of representation.

Like Schopenhauer, Nietzsche presents inner experience in terms of a duality between conscious and unconscious forces. The latter which constitute the domain of the body - the real - remain essentially obscured from the former which correspond to the realm of language - the ideal. We can only know the effect of something that originates from the outside, impressing itself upon us through the senses in the form of raw data. The interpretation which we impose upon this effect, which is nothing other than an "excitation of nerve centres,"²⁴

²⁴ F. Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, §479.

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is determined by our inner experience, i.e., instinct, habit, memory and understanding. For this reason "we are always unconscious of the real activity of the outer world."²⁵ From the fact of inner experience, or the principle of sufficient reason, we derive the three forms of space (outer sense), time (inner sense), and causality. That is to say, from the effect we infer a cause. But the cause that we infer - the interpretation imposed upon sensation - is itself conditioned by past experience: "'to understand' means merely: to be able to express something new in the language of something old and familiar."²⁶ To suppose that there is a direct causal connection between an unconscious sensation and its conscious interpretation, between thought and its object, between thought and truth, is to allow oneself to be seduced by what Nietzsche elsewhere calls the 'chronological inversion'. That which is inferred cannot be grasped in its reality, we can only know it through its effects which are solely our affects. Therefore, Nietzsche tells us in relation to the functioning of will to power on the subjective level; "that nothing is 'given' as real other than the world of our desires and passions."²⁷

Furthermore, this distinction is compounded through its application to the material level. The scientific concept of force corresponds to the world as described by Newtonian mechanics, whereas the notion of will refers to that which is presupposed in force: the former is active-

²⁵ Ibid, §479.

²⁶ Ibid, §479.

²⁷ F. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, §36.

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reactive, the latter affirmative-negative.²⁸ Deleuze's Nietzsche defines a body as a quantity of force locked together in a struggle for domination that establishes a hierarchy between the constitutive forces. Every relationship between forces constitutes a body; the minimum being two unequal forces irreducible to one another. As Deleuze tells us:

In a body the superior or dominant forces are known as *active* and the inferior or dominated forces are known as *reactive*. Active and reactive are precisely the original qualities which express the relation of force with force. Forces which enter into relation do not have quantity without each of them having, at the same time, the quality corresponding to their difference in quantity as such. This difference between forces qualified according to their quantity as active or reactive will be called *hierarchy*. (NP 40)

A body therefore is a quantity of force constituted by an irreducible complex or multiplicity that is essentially differential. "Nietzsche's reproach to every purely quantitative determination of forces is that it annuls, equalises or compensates for differences in quantity" (NP 43). Difference in quantity is the irreducible element of quantity, and quality is merely the difference in quantity between forces which enter into a relation. When a force dominates another force, the latter force does not cease to exist, that is to say, it is not consumed by the dominating force, but merely assimilated and continues to exercise its own quality. Obeying is a reactive quality of force, whereas active force is "reaching out for power . . . To appropriate means to impose

²⁸ This distinction between active-reactive ceases to appear in Deleuze's writings after *Nietzsche and Philosophy*. It would appear to us that describing force in terms of extreme oppositional tendencies implies that it possess an original directionality and telos. If we take the body's digestive system as an example, we see that the process of breaking down a nutritional compound into its elementary components would imply a reactive process: that is, negating the compound. However, on closer examination this 'chemical' action is necessary if the consuming body is to perpetuate itself. Thus, depending on the perspective from which the process is viewed a reactive force is conceivable in terms of affirmation; likewise an active force can be negative. Active and reactive are therefore not applicable to the realm of forces. The distinction between force and will is thereafter defined by Deleuze in terms of energetics: kinetic and dynamic respectively which elude the metaphysics intrinsic to the active-reactive distinction.

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forms, to create forms by exploiting circumstances" (NP 42). The irreducible complex of forces constitutes the body as *being*, but Nietzsche also affirms an innocence of *becoming* as the inner will of force. This is deduced, Deleuze tells us;

immediately from the principles of a philosophy of force and will. Every thing is referred to a force capable of interpreting it; every force is referred to what it is able to do, from which it is inseparable. It is this way of being referred, of affirming and being affirmed, which is particularly innocent. Whatever does not let itself be interpreted by a force nor evaluated by a will calls out for *another* will capable of evaluating it, another force capable of interpreting it. (NP 22)

Moreover, the inner will is essentially unitary which presents the irreducible complex of forces as a hierarchised whole. As inner will of force, it corresponds to what a force can do, and in this capacity shows itself as either affirmative or negative. It is from this domain of competing forces that value is derived. Value, or interpretation, is properly speaking a property emergent from an encounter between quantities of force. Since the encounter itself constitutes necessity, events represent a certain 'throw of the dice', and where the result is purely contingent. But value as interpretive act is carried out by an evaluating will. As Nietzsche puts it: "The will to power *interprets* . . . it defines limits, determines degrees, variations of power. Mere variations of power could not feel themselves to be such: there must be present something that wants to grow and interprets the value of whatever else wants to grow."²⁹ Genealogy as method is a product of the will to power, since it corresponds to the genetic element in value: it is the dynamism that every kinesis presupposes. As Deleuze explains:

This is because relations of force remain indeterminate unless an element which is capable of determining them from a double point of view is added to force itself. Forces in relation reflect a simultaneous double genesis: the reciprocal genesis of their difference in quantity and the absolute genesis of their respective qualities. The will to power is

²⁹ F. Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, §643.

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thus added to force, but as the differential and genetic element, as the internal element of its production. (NP 51)

We are composed by will to power, an expression of will to power, inescapably ensnared within the cosmic flux that is will to power. Nietzsche therefore distances himself from the notion of a foundational thought, since this presupposes the ability to step outside the will to power and purely observe rather than participate, and would correspond to a philosophy that would aspire to supply history with an identity, unity and telos. In this sense, truth becomes a simulacrum: the acceptance of this fact manifests the meaning of "accomplished nihilism." The Idea is understood by Nietzsche in terms of an intensive field of competing forces hierarchically organised in terms of dominant and dominated: that is, depending on the level from which a particular force is conceived, it could appear as either dominant or dominated. The Idea is a multiplicity that contains an infinity of levels which when taken as a whole define the Idea in terms of a 'problem' to which a solution is sought. Such solutions constitute the values that are imposed upon life: solutions constitutive of the 'lies' by which man lives.

In short, the revolutionary element in Nietzsche's thought introduces an irreducible rupture into 'identity thinking' characteristic of Modernity, through a radicalisation of its own innate tendencies, rather than an attempt at a 'critical' overturning. Truth is conceived in terms of a series of metaphors imposed upon the real. That is to say, metaphors that go "from the thing to the mental image, from image to the word which expresses the individual's state of mind, from this to the word that social conventions determine to be the 'right' one, and once again from this canonical word to the thing, which we now see only in terms of the traits which may most easily be metaphorised in the vocabulary

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that we have inherited."³⁰ Thus, modernity is not overturned by substituting it with a new model of the true, but rather by means of a "chemical"³¹ analysis wherein the very notion of truth itself is dissolved. Without a comprehensive notion of truth critique is unrealisable. Thought as truth becomes *thinking* as process and wherein the simulacra is grasped as the very ground which constitutes it - nihilism - while simultaneously turning this ground into an act of affirmation - tragedy.

4. What returns in the eternal return is not the Same but the Different: being is not that which returns, but rather returning itself is what constitutes being. Returning is that which is affirmed of becoming. "That everything recurs is the closest approximation of a world of becoming to a world of being."³² Ultimately this proposition throws into question the validity of the 'second law of thermodynamics' which postulates that every system tends toward thermal death: entropy. How is this claim reconcilable with the fact that the cosmos is an ever expanding and complexifying entity? The idea of a 'big bang' has several consequences: firstly there would have to be a beginning of time of infinite density and infinite curvature. Secondly, such a point in time would constitute a singularity in which all the known laws of science collapse. That is, an absolute beginning which in turn must imply an absolute end. However, Hawkins has argued that the quantum theory does not necessarily imply a singularity point - in an absolutist sense - and that the ordinary laws of science would hold even at the beginning of time. He supports this position by offering two features which the

³⁰ G. Vattimo, *The End of Modernity*, p. 167.

³¹ F. Nietzsche, *Human all too Human*, 'Of First and Last Things' §1. Nietzsche advocates breaking things down into their constituent elements in order to reveal how our highest values derive from the basest of elements.

³² F. Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, §617.

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universe must possess if we are to unify general relativity and quantum mechanics. As he tells us:

One is that it should incorporate Feynman's proposal to formulate quantum theory in terms of a sum over histories. In this approach, a particle does not have just a single history, as it would in classical theory. Instead, it is supposed to follow every possible path in space-time, and with each of these histories there are associated a couple of numbers, one representing the size of a wave and the other representing its position in the cycle.³³

And a little further on, he argues:

A second feature that we believe must be part of any ultimate theory is Einstein's idea that the gravitational field is represented by curved space-time: particles try to follow the nearest thing to a straight path in a curved space, but because space-time is not flat their paths appear to be bent, as if by a gravitational field. When we apply Feynman's sum over histories to Einstein's view of gravity, the analogue of the history of a particle is now a complete curved space-time that represents the history of the whole universe.³⁴

In the quantum theory of gravity, space is indistinguishable from what Feynman calls imaginary time: that is to say, imaginary time is indistinguishable from directions in space; imaginary time moves both forwards *and* backwards. This allows Hawkins to propose that space-time is finite, an enclosed egg: a four-dimensional space without absolute singularities or limits like the surface of the Earth but with more dimensions - topology. On the quantum level the universe is neither created nor destroyed. Therefore, in imaginary or virtual time directionality is meaningless: there subsists only the pure becoming in which both forwards and backwards are affirmed simultaneously. However, the same does not apply to a general relativity, since in 'real' time we perceive identities and thereby distinguish between direction. Therefore, the second law of thermodynamics, or the arrow of time, is applicable only within a general theory of relativity. That is to say, as

³³ S. Hawkins, *A Brief History of Time*, p. 148-49.

³⁴ *Ibid*, p. 150.

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a derived or inverted image of the universe. The eternal return corresponds to the paradox constitutive of the two levels of relativity theory, or rather proposes itself as a solution to the problematic relation between being and becoming. The double affirmation of the eternal return corresponds to the affirmation of Dionysus as difference and Ariadne as identity. Nietzsche affirms that pure becoming could never have an absolute origin, and therefore could never have an absolute end. "This is why we can only understand the eternal return as an expression of a principle which serves as an explanation of *diversity and its reproduction*" (NP 49). This principle is will to power as differential and genetic element.

Therefore, being is life viewed from the perspective of reactivity, whereas becoming corresponds to the active point of view. The ethical imperative in Nietzsche is located in his desire to transform the triumph of reactive forces into an active force. As we have seen, the relationship between forces in each case is determined to the extent that each force is *affected* by other forces. It follows that will to power is manifested as a capacity for being affected. This affective capacity manifests itself as a sensation or feeling of power, rather than a feeling of happiness. It is in this sense that the will to power is the primitive affective form from which all other feelings derive. As Deleuze tells us: "The will to power manifests itself, in the first place, as the sensibility of forces and, in the second place, as the becoming sensible of forces: pathos is the most elementary fact from which a becoming arises" (NP 63). This constitutes thought primarily within the sphere of sensibility; it makes thought sensible and perception material. But we do not know any becoming other than becoming reactive, since consciousness is essentially a reactive phenomena derived from an unconscious domain. By pushing the reactive force to

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the limit of what it can do, the reactive force does not thereby become active. The question is: How is the transmutation of reactive force into active force possible? As the internal will of force, the will to power possesses qualities more subtle than the qualities of force: that is, affirmation and negation are the immediate qualities of becoming itself. "Affirmation is not active but the power of becoming active, *becoming active* personified. Negation is not simple reaction but a *becoming reactive*. It is as if affirmation and negation were both immanent and transcendent in relation to action and reaction" (NP 54). The transmutation of reactive force into active force requires the affirmation of the eternal return as a selective principle: "My formula for greatness in men is *amor fati*: that one should not wish things to be otherwise, not before and not after, in the whole of eternity."³⁵ Only when the will to nothingness is related to the eternal return does it break its alliance with reactive force, that is, by making negation a negation of reactive force: an active negation. This makes sense of Nietzsche's claim that only by going to the end of nihilism is it overcome: nihilism vanquished by itself wherein reaction is transmuted into action. But only to return again in the movement of the eternal return, *ad infinitum*.

In Nietzsche's work two conceptions of the affirmation-negation relation are opposed. In the first model, we are presented with the 'Yes' of the Ass, where to affirm is to bear the burden.

This Ass and the dialectical ox leave a moral aftertaste. They have a terrifying taste for responsibility, as though one could affirm only by expiating . . . It is as though Difference were evil and already negative, so that it could produce affirmation only by expiation . . . Always the same old malediction which resounds from the heights of the principle of identity. (DR 53)

³⁵ F. Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, "Why I Am So Clever", §10, p. 68.

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In this instance Difference is mediated through the negative within the dialectic circle that conserves all the moments in an infinite representation: *Aufheben*.³⁶ In the second model, difference is no longer the negative, but rather corresponds to a 'No' which results from the affirmation of difference and distance itself. This 'No' embodies the force of anarchy-creativity that undermines the conservative forms of representation by actively unbearing oneself of the Ass's load. However, this effect of affirmation, as subversion, is nonetheless a shadow of difference in itself: that is to say, it is merely "the effect of an affirmation which is too strong or too different" (DR 54). Thus, Zarathustra's 'No' is a consequence of affirmation and not a pure affirmation which 'makes' a difference: in itself it does not make a unilateral difference, but merely throws off the yoke of representation. In this sense, it is still caught within representation because by rejecting negation it remains within the domain of critique: i.e., the atheist who negates God remains within a theological framework,³⁷ while the 'atheist' who purely affirms a non-belief - agnosticism - passes beyond theistic thought. Difference in itself is a multiplicity of positive differential elements which determine the genesis of affirmation and the difference affirmed. But negation is an effect produced by the genesis of affirmation. Both these affirmations, the affirmation of the load and the affirmation of the unloading, correspond to the form of representation which always fails to grasp the world of affirmed primary difference.

For this reason, Nietzsche also described the eternal return as a selective test that eliminates the average forms and uncovers 'the

³⁶ This reference is to Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, its aim toward the end of history in the recovery of the absolute concept.

³⁷ An example of this would be the work of de Sade, whose constant and repetitive polemics against God and the moral order perpetuate that same structure, albeit from its reverse side.

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superior form of everything that is.' Eternal return creates the superior form wherein everything which can be denied is and must be denied by means of the operation of active forgetting. By positing difference at origin the only equality is that which affirms the eternal return. All things which affirm repetition are equal within univocal being because they express the same power: that is to say, the power to go beyond the limits and affirm difference in itself. Unilateral difference is *that* which is equal, while the eternal return is *that* which is said of difference in itself. In this sense the repetition is a simulacra of difference; the mask that difference wears in the eternal return of the same. As Deleuze writes:

If eternal return is a wheel, then it must be endowed with a violent centrifugal movement which expels everything which 'can' be denied, everything which cannot pass the test. Nietzsche announces only a light punishment for those who do not 'believe' in the eternal return: they will have, and be aware of, only an ephemeral life! They will be aware of themselves and know themselves for what they are: epiphenomena. This will be their absolute knowledge. In this manner, negation as a consequence, as the result of full affirmation, consumes all that is negative, and consumes itself at the mobile centre of eternal return. For if eternal return is a circle, then Difference is at the centre and the Same is only on the periphery: it is a constantly decentered, continually tortuous circle which revolves only around the unequal. (DR 55).

The difference we locate at the centre implies a plurality of centres and multiplicity of perspectives that continually undermine the model of representation: difference and identity mediated by means of the negative. The pathos of distance is the affirmation of difference: the positive difference between health and sickness is made the object of an affirmation itself. Health is an *evaluation* of sickness, just as sickness is an *evaluation* of health - the affirmation of positive difference is wholly transcendental and thereby eludes the action of hermeneutic. This affirmation of difference corresponds to Nietzsche's understanding of perspectivism and opens, Deleuze tells us:

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onto a divergence which it affirms: another town corresponds to each point of view, each point of view is another town, the towns are linked only by their distance and resonate only through the divergence of their series, their houses and their streets. There is always another town within the town. Each term becomes the means of going all the way to the end of another, by following the entire distance. Nietzsche's perspectivism - his perspectivism - is a much more profound art than Leibniz's point of view; for divergence is no longer a principle of exclusion, and disjunction no longer a means of separation. Impossibility is now a means of communication. (LS 174)

This difference is sub-representative immediacy, a multiplicity of positive singularities that refer to other differences without identifying them, but rather differentiates them. In this manner difference is shown differing. It is this world of implicated difference that the eternal return relates to a complicated world without identity: the viscous circle of a chaosmos.

With eternal return, chao-errancy is opposed to coherence, of representation; it excludes both the coherence of a subject which represents itself and that of an object represented. *Re*-petition opposes *re*-presentation: the prefix changes its meaning, since in the one case difference is said only in relation to the identical, while in the other it is the univocal which is said of the different. Repetition is the formless being of all differences, the formless power of the ground which carries every object to that extreme 'form' in which its representation comes undone. (DR 57)

Difference is the *in itself* which Nietzsche called will to power, and the eternal return, as the groundless 'law' and consequence of this difference, is the *for itself* of difference. Hence, it is not the One that returns but the many, not the similar but the dissimilar, not the same but the different. Furthermore, it is not necessity that governs over this repetition, but rather, 'Lord Chance'. Within this system the Same and the Similar are only simulated effects, retrojected onto difference in itself and interiorized within the disparate series, by the eternal return itself. In this sense it is the eternal return that returns; it is the only same of that which returns.

Nietzsche makes repetition a "power peculiar to language and thought, a superior pathos and pathology, but also the fundamental category of a

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philosophy of the future . . . [Also, there] corresponds a testament as well as a Theatre, a conception of the theatre, and a hero of repetition as a principal character in this theatre" (DR 5). A veritable philosophical theatrics wherein masks, play and laughter take on a movement that opposes repetition to generality. Repetition, then, is the power of thought or rather of *thinking* which corresponds to the ontological and intensive dimension of will to power which can be reduced to neither ideal nor material; to neither language nor body; to neither signifier nor signified. To *think* is to allow the differential and genetic element into the model of thought defined in terms of knowledge subordinate to representation.

Repetition is opposed to the laws of nature. In fact, Nietzsche "discovers repetition in the *Physis* itself, this is because he discovers in the *Physis* something superior to the reign of laws: a will willing itself through all change, a power opposed to law, an interior of the earth opposed to the law of its surface" (DR 6). Thus repetition in the eternal return is understood as Being. Repetition opposes the moral law, taking thought beyond good and evil to the point where ethics itself is suspended. This is the trial of the private thinker in opposition to the public professor. This moral test of repetition substitutes Kant's categorical imperative by challenging the thinker to will in such a manner that whatever he does so will he also wills its eternal return.

There is a 'formalism' here which overturns Kant on his own ground, a test which goes further since, instead of relating repetition to a supposed moral law, it seems to make repetition itself the only form of a law beyond morality . . . The form of repetition in the eternal return is the brutal form of the immediate, that of the universal and the singular reunited, which dethrones every general law. (DR 7)

In this manner, repetition is opposed to habit and memory in order that it become the thought of the future; and in this sense it opposes

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Platonic reminiscence. "It is in repetition and by repetition that Forgetting becomes a positive power while the unconscious becomes a positive and superior unconscious" (DR 8). That is, the immediacy and singularity of repetition is the expression of the will to power which separates a selective operation of thought: the Overman.

Therefore, the selective test "is a question of producing within the work a movement capable of affecting the mind outside of all representation; it is a question of making movement itself a work, without interposition; of substituting direct signs for mediate representations; of inventing vibrations, rotations, whirlings, gravitations, dances or leaps which directly touch the mind" (DR 8). A movement which directly affects the soul through its theatrics of plays and masks, the 'wild clangings' and 'log-rollings',³⁸ and the monstrous roar of laughter at its own expense. Herein we do not find the production of the Same but of the absolutely different, of a multiplicity of superimposed masks whose inner emptiness is filled within a theatrical space: "by inserting both the infinity of real movement and the form of the absolute difference given in the repetition of eternal return" (DR 9). Thus, real movement which theatricality extracts is not 'mediation' but repetition, not a representation of concepts but a veritable dramatisation of Ideas. As Deleuze writes:

The theatre of repetition is opposed to the theatre of representation, just as movement is opposed to the concept and to representation which refers it back to the concept. In the theatre of repetition, we experience pure forces, dynamic lines in space which act without intermediary upon the spirit, and link it directly with nature and history, with a language which speaks before words, with gestures which develop before organised bodies, with masks before faces, with spectres and phantoms before characters - the whole apparatus of repetition as a 'terrible power'" (DR 10)

³⁸ The reference here is to A. Artaud's *The Theatre and Its Double*.

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Repetition in the eternal return corresponds to a betrothal between the dead God and the dissolved self forming the true condition by default and the true metamorphosis of the agent, both of which disappear in the unconditioned character of the product. Eternal return is not a faith, but the truth of faith: it has isolated the double or the simulacrum, it has liberated the comic in order to make this an element of the superman. For Klossowski, the eternal return is not a doctrine but the simulacrum of every doctrine. We should not judge the atheist from the viewpoint of faith, but from the truth of faith, that is, of repetition as the elevation of thought to the power of the simulacrum - Antichrist. All these swirling 'breaths'³⁹ are productive of so many intensive states based on the intensity = 0: the BwO. The subject himself passes through all these intensive states, identifying with each one of them and, thereby, claiming to be all the names of history. This *transport* does not correspond to the realisation of a system, but rather the actualisation of a programmatic parodic recollection of events as intensive states. As Klossowski writes:

An intensity is at work in everyone, its flux and reflux forming the significant or insignificant fluctuations of thought. And while each appears to be in possession of this, in point of fact it belongs to no one, and has neither beginning nor end.

But, contrary to this undulating element, if each of us forms a closed and apparently limited whole, it is precisely by virtue of these traces of signifying fluctuations; i.e., by a system of signs that I will here name the everyday code of signs. So far as the beginning or end of our own fluctuations is concerned - on which basis these signs permit us to signify, to speak to ourselves as well as to others - we know nothing, except that for this code a sign always corresponds to the degree of intensity, sometimes the highest, sometimes the lowest: even if this sign be the *me*, the *I*, the *subject of all our propositions*. It is thanks to this sign, however, which is nothing but an ever variable trace of fluctuation, that we constitute ourselves as *thinking*, that a thought as such occurs to us, even though we are never quite sure that it is not others that think and continue to think in us. But what is this other who forms the *outside* in relation to the *inside* that we hold ourselves to be? Everything leads back to a single discourse, to fluctuations of intensity that correspond to the thought of everyone and no one.⁴⁰

³⁹ C.f. P. Klossowski, *The Baphomet*, in relation to these swirling breaths.

⁴⁰ P. Klossowski, *Nietzsche's Experience of the Eternal Return*, p. 112.

Thus, the highest point of intensity corresponds to the eternal return in which the incoherency between *outside* and *inside* manifests itself in thought as an affirmation of a code of signs. But the codes themselves are contingent, and I also am contingent in the instant of affirmation of will, in which each affirmation is singular and different; the for itself alone. Only after the fact of affirmation is it filtered through the apparatus of recognition and accorded a location within the signifying nexus of representation. The eternal return as principle of individuation is the object of the Dionysian faith: *amor fati*. This faith corresponds to the element in Nietzsche's understanding of the role of the artist-philosopher in the service to life, and to which we now turn as constituting the third theme of our Nietzschean characterisation.

5. In terms of an aesthetic theory Nietzsche's work is divisible into two parts. In the early essays, notably *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche describes life and cultural production in terms of an opposition between two irreducible tendencies or gods: Dionysus and Apollo. Dionysus corresponds to a purely fluid and passionate domain that is given form by the Apollonian individuating principle. Man is said to primarily entertain an irrational and poetic rapport with life; an experience that provides him with the content that will come to be cast in the form of a cultural edifice by means of the individuating principle. As Nietzsche tells us with reference to this element of life: "A becoming and a passing away, a building up and tearing down without any moral additive: the world is the play of an artist and a child, in perpetual innocence."⁴¹ For Nietzsche, the Dionysian element

⁴¹ F. Nietzsche, *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of Greece*, §7.

is the impetus and tonic content that fills Apollonian form.⁴² As a tonic, the Dionysian corresponds to a feeling of power and joy that is wholly sensible rather than rational. True art, as both a process of production and reception, enhances the feeling of power and makes one stronger. Furthermore, the Dionysian irrational domain constitutes the cause of everything that enters consciousness as effect and object of knowledge, but of the Dionysian itself we can *know* nothing. The authenticity of any moral system consists therefore in its claim to reflect the true cause and purpose of life. But as we have seen, they merely express a human production of values in accordance with the actions and passions of the individual. Such nihilism does not imply a return to a barbaric mode of existence, but rather should impel us to embrace the creative power of Dionysus in order to transform life into a veritable aesthetic event. Values are merely metaphors that come to form "an infinitely complex cathedral of concepts upon shifting foundations and flowing waters."⁴³ These metaphors form so many expressions for experiences which in themselves there are no words. Here we can grasp the meaning behind Nietzsche's persistent polemics against *the* Socrates who presented rationalism, science and logic as the definitive mode of human expression.

But if life is essentially illusion, as Nietzsche maintains, how is it possible to distinguish between a true artistic expression - Dionysian lyricism - and a purely formal one - Apollonian sculpture. It is precisely this dualistic metaphysicalism that Nietzsche begins to question in *Human, All-too-Human*, substituting it with a model wherein Dionysus is no longer conceived in terms of a transcendent being, but rather as the immanent will to power within the process of

⁴² In chapter II we will present Deleuze's critique of the form-content duality by introducing a third term: expression.

⁴³ F. Nietzsche, *Concerning Truth and Falsehood in an Extramoral Sense*, §1.

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individuation itself - that is, as the process of individuation itself. Now, the Dionysian and Apollonian components form two complementary aspects of the same whole: tragic art. Reason, science and logic are no longer conceived as degraded forms of a primary and passionate mode of existence, that the so-called artist is privy to, but rather every single manifestation of form is understood as a product of the process of self-creation out of chaos. It is not that Apollo is discarded but merely integrated into the Dionysian: the plane of immanence which is populated by preindividual and non-personal singularities is the inhuman domain that bestows form. Dionysus is not form but form-giving; not the basic material elements constitutive of the world but the relations that exist between the elements. Since form is merely a given relation between certain elements, the Dionysian corresponds to the potential for the transformation of the relations existing between elements. It is no longer the artist who is elevated as a superior type, rather the process of creative production itself, as a process of invention and transformation, becomes the value bestowing virtue and the veritable ethic and justification for life. Nietzschean aesthetics does not concern itself uniquely with the production of the Beautiful and pleasurable, but rather embraces the force of the grotesque, suffering and cruelty channelled through a process of sublimation in order to utilise it in the service for life; "to intensify it into a comprehensive symbol."⁴⁴ The Dionysian therefore implies an austere self-discipline and the ability to integrate into distinctive forms a multiplicity of disparate elements. Thereby the brute *physis* is elevated from the depths of bodies to the limit between bodies - the relations they entertain amongst themselves - and is transformed into an aesthetic event. It is exactly this that Deleuze

⁴⁴ F. Nietzsche, *Dawn*, Second Meditation §6.

means when he writes:

No wonder, then, that aesthetics should be divided into two irreducible domains: that of the theory of the sensible which captures only the real's conformity with possible experience; and that of the theory of the beautiful, which deals with the reality of the real in so far as it is thought. Everything changes once we determine the conditions of real experience, which are not larger than the conditioned and which differ in kind from the categories: the two senses of the aesthetic become one, to the point where the being of the sensible reveals itself in the work of art, while at the same time the work of art appears as experimentation. (DR 68)

Beauty would correspond to the immutability of eternal rest and peace, which as we have seen is wholly incommensurate with the fundamental notions of will to power and eternal return - both of which demand a heroic self-discipline and perpetual skepticism within the maelstrom of irredeemable repetition. Aesthetics does not preoccupy itself with truth, but with the imposition of value upon an event-horizon, which necessitates a cold and cruel sense of realism: accepting the reality of existence as suffering. Thus, aesthetics must embrace the grotesque: feasting, cruel spectacles, sexual license. We find a similar appeal in M. Bakhtin⁴⁵ where he presents carnivalesque laughter as an implicit becoming that subsists 'between' the two extremes of the ideal and the grotesque. Grotesque realism - feasting, defecation, swearing, drunkenness, sexual promiscuity - and the ideal - work, officiality, ecclesiasticity, Court pomp, bureaucracy, legislation - are related extrinsically, whereas laughter represents the univocal implicate. Since it envelops both extremes, carnivalesque laughter is paradoxical by nature. The grotesque is not definable purely in terms of the formal psychological mechanism of perception (phenomenological organicism), but must also embrace the objective content or reality of the object itself. By including both extremes a revolutionary topography expressing a plethora of potential relations subsistent within the

⁴⁵ M. Bakhtin, *Rabelais and His World*.

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products of a cultural edifice are liberated. Through the mechanisms of reversal, grotesque exaggeration, caricature, and defilement, a great wealth and fullness of meaning is revealed that was formally repressed under the yoke of conventional representation. By displacing the official form of the object we open onto a purely topographical plane wherein objects are rendered partial; the anus of defecation can be connected with the mouth of consumption: talking out of one's arse, and talking shit; to vomit and to shit. By partializing and complicating the identity of the images, and by rendering the relations that exist between them interchangeable, the power of metamorphosis is liberated. The Dionysian therefore represents the affirmation of the whole of life, even its cruelest suffering: meaning of *amor fati*. Christianity distances itself from the grotesque as such, and thereby identifies itself with the peaceful and beautiful image of a merciful *Christus*. It separates the real content of life from its ideal image by means of the denial of suffering. It is in this capacity reactive since it fails to embrace the whole of life, and thereby separates life as will to power from what it is potentially capable of doing.

This grotesque spirit of festivity shatters the respectable and ideal object of truth, while intoxicated rapture breaks through the limits imposed upon becoming by the reactive self-preservative drives constitutive of identity. "Preoccupation with itself and its 'eternal salvation' is not the expression of a rich and self-confident type; for that type does not give a damn about its salvation - it has no such interest in happiness of any kind; it is force, deed, desire - it imposes itself on things, it lays violent hands on things."⁴⁶ For this reason Nietzsche affirms a will to self-annihilation as a means to self-creation: "Life itself, its eternal fruitfulness and recurrence, creates

⁴⁶ F. Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, §781.

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torment, destruction, the will to annihilation."⁴⁷ The death drive, then, as the element of creativity presupposes the affirmation of the eternal return of the same. But the will to power is the principle of eternal recurrence, thus what returns, eternally the same, is difference in itself clothed in the form of the recognised object. In fact, Deleuze goes on to distinguish between three types of repetition: material, psychical and ontological.⁴⁸ The material corresponds to an absolute present; the psychical to an absolute past; and the ontological to the future as evolutionary and revolutionary dynamic. It is the future dimension of time that possesses the power to liberate itself from the yoke of representation. This third repetition, by distributing difference throughout the system as a whole, enacts the *ungrounding* of both physical (*physis*) and psychical (*metaphysis*) repetition - it therefore corresponds to the death drive which separates instinct from habit and ideas from memory.

Perhaps the highest object of art is to bring into play simultaneously all these repetitions, with their differences in kind and rhythm, their respective displacements and disguises, their divergences and decentrings; to embed them in one another and to envelop one or the other in illusions the 'effect' of which varies in each case. Art does not imitate, above all because it repeats; it repeats all the repetitions, by virtue of an internal power (an imitation is a copy, but art is simulation, it reverses copies into simulacra) (DR 293).

Aesthetic production therefore implies both a radical conception of time, and a new understanding of the manner in which eternal objects are constituted. The concept of eternal recurrence is Nietzsche's response to the necessity for a time that is neither the linearity of the purely historical, nor that of the eternal wherein a God would supposedly reside. The movement of the eternal return, far from being

⁴⁷ Ibid, §1052.

⁴⁸ We will analyse more fully these three repetitions in chapter three. For now it suffices to indicate how the material and psychical mark the limits of the ontological as a pure becoming and futural dimension, and wherein we locate the evolutionary dynamic and artistic creativity intrinsic to life.

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linear, presents itself in a certain sense as the return of a point on the circumference of the wheel of time. But as we saw in relation to Plato and the manner in which he employed the circularity of myth in order to found truth, the metempsychotic model is far from adequate. Nietzsche grappled with this problem from quite early on in *Of the Use and Disadvantage of History for Life*; even before he had articulated his theory of the eternal return. In this 'meditation' he distinguishes between three types of history: the unhistorical; the historical; and the supra-historical. In fact, these three types of history are the three forms of repetition which we attributed above to Deleuze: the material; the psychical; and the ontological. The unhistorical corresponds to the absolute present; the historical to memory; and the supra-historical to the 'monumental'. The value of art resides in the creation of values that surpass mere contingency; values which add something to life and make it worth living, or at least endurable. The justification for this prioritisation of the value of aesthetic production can be understood only in terms of the process of culture creating: a "conception of culture as another and improved *physis* without inside and outside . . . culture as a harmony of living, thinking, appearing, and willing."⁴⁹ Beyond material and psychical repetition we locate the ontological as evolutionary and revolutionary. As Deleuze writes:

A philosophy of repetition must pass through all these 'stages', condemned to repeat repetition itself. However, by traversing these stages it ensures its programme of making repetition the category of the future: making use of the repetition of habit and that of memory, but making use of them as stages and leaving them in its wake; struggling on the one hand against *Habitus*, on the other against *Mnemosyne*; refusing the content of repetition which is more or less able to 'draw off' difference (*Habitus*); refusing the form of a repetition which includes difference, but in order once again to subordinate it to the Same and the Similar (*Mnemosyne*); refusing the overly simple cycles, the one followed by a habitual present (customary cycle) as much as the one described by a pure past (memorial or immemorial cycle); changing the ground of memory into a simple condition by default, but also the foundation of habit into a failure

⁴⁹ F. Nietzsche, *Untimely Meditations*, II, 10.

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of 'habitus', a metamorphosis of the agent; expelling the agent and the condition in the name of the work or product; making repetition, not that from which one 'draws off' a difference, nor that which includes a difference as a variant, but making it the thought and the production of the 'absolutely different'; making it so that repetition is, for itself, difference in itself" (DR 94)

The eternal return is intrinsically related to Nietzsche's understanding of eternal objects. The eternal object is a pure event, the *Eventum Tandum*. With difference in itself as their foundation, the boundaries separating eternal objects become indistinct.⁵⁰ Nonetheless they possess a singular nature which constitutes their Wholeness. Events therefore are not eternal yet they endure: that is, they possess 'duration'. True artistic production therefore takes place only within durational time.⁵¹ Whitehead, Deleuze tells us, gives us four components which constitute an event. If we begin with chaos or multiplicity, the problem is how we make the One from the Many. For this to occur, "[a] great screen has to be placed between them" (F 76), a formless skin, prior to space and time, which envelops a multiplicity of elements, and thereby forms a whole. This whole-parts structure forms an infinite series without limit. This is the first component: extension. The second is intension, which corresponds to the value attributed to the extensive series. These values enter into a "new infinite series, now converging toward limits, with the relations among limits establishing a conjunction" (F 77), producing characteristics which fill space and time. The third component is prehension, which itself has three characteristics, namely: 'subjective form' or project; 'subjective aim' or becoming; and 'self-enjoyment' in its own becoming. The latter drives it ever forward toward making new connections: invention. The

⁵⁰ We can also compare events to the uniqueness of "situations" as characterised by the Situationist Project in the 50's and 60's.

⁵¹ We will analysis this ontological time and its relation to production more fully in chapter II in terms of nonsense words and Alonic time, and in chapter III in terms of aleatory points and duration - that is, linguistic production and biopsychical production respectively.

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fourth components are the "eternal objects or 'ingressions' . . . [which] gain permanence only in the limits of the flux that creates them" (F 79-80) - that is, the durations that compose them. Therefore, art as the highest expression of will to power is a form giving force.⁵²

By means of this four-fold relation the role of the artist as creator of values becomes apparent - let us consolidate this estimation of the Nietzschean philosopher-artist with the aid of two examples from poetry and painting respectively. A). Repetition is the power of language which always implies an excessive Idea of poetry. This Idea of poetry is laudably represented in the symbolism of the Mallarmean poetic Word.⁵³ Each line of the poem, each differentiated series, is constituted by a sequence of singularities or pattern of repeated beats (as in music) which characterise them. Moreover, all the differentiated series resonate or focus on a *aleatory point*. Blanchot names this point the *essential Word* which stands for the totality of all the levels of differentiated series, and through which all the series communicate and repeat themselves in all the other series. In essence therefore this element is simultaneously displaced and Whole. In this sense, all the series form so many 'synonyms' in relation to this element which itself plays the part of a 'homonym' for the totality of levels. Or "as in a song," Deleuze writes, where "the differentiated series are organised into couplets or verses, while the [dark] precursor is incarnated in an antiphon or chorus . . . the chorus which represents the object = x" (DR 292). This identification of the essential Word with the chorus is reminiscent of Nietzsche's fascination with the Dionysian chorus which was represented by those dark elemental powers of the fates and the

⁵² In connection to the will to power as doctrine of form shaping force, c.f., F. Nietzsche, *The Genealogy of Morals*, Essay II, 12.

⁵³ For an exemplary analysis of Mallarmé's poetry see Blanchot's *The Space of Literature*, p. 38-48.

furies. B). *Ukiyo-e* or 17th century Japanese colour print was otherwise known as the 'Pictures of the Floating World' School. As the title suggests, this form of art is concerned not so much with mere contingencies as with the eternal verities of the world. Essentially *Ukiyo-e* style is not purely a representational art-form which mimics optical appearance: it does not copy the objects from nature as ends in themselves, but rather the artist stores a great many impressions from nature in his mind for use as and when the intensity of an inspiration impels him to paint. The work therefore originates not so much within the visual field, but in the passions seated in a constitutive imagination. Thus, the Japanese genius was for the brush-stroke itself or expressive line, for pattern and for design. Balance is established between all the elements constitutive of the painting by paying each one no more attention than any other. In this manner diversity is harmonised into a whole, and wherein the works verity resides in the relational order created between the component parts. In this sense, the work's value is in its design or constructive synthesis. Moreover, it is the will of the artist seated in the constitutive imagination that produces this synthesis. As Lyotard and Thebaud tell us in relation to Kant: "The ability to judge does not hang upon the observance of criteria. The form that it will take in the last *Critique* is that of the imagination. An imagination that is constitutive. It is not only an ability to judge; it is a power to invent criteria."⁵⁴ It follows, that what Nietzsche means by the philosopher-artist is the Overman; he who creates his own criteria and invents himself through his own rules. He thereby creates a best possible world out of the fabric of the given world. It is in this sense that we must understand Nietzsche's rejection of *the* moral world. As Deleuze tells us:

⁵⁴ J-F. Lyotard and J-L. Thebaud, *Just Gaming*, p. 17.

Representation

As for the subject of this new discourse . . . it is not man or God, and even less man in the place of God. The subject is this free, anonymous, and nomadic singularity which traverses men as well as plants and animals independently of the matter of their individuation and the forms of their personality. 'Overman' means nothing other than this - the superior type of *everything that is*. This is a strange discourse, which ought to have renewed philosophy, and which finally deals with sense not as a predicate or a property but as an event. (LS 107)

Therefore, the value of the overman as creator cannot be considered as a function of the race or species to which it belongs (Darwin), but rather the high point of evolution is the individual himself: meaning of aristocracy.

For Deleuze's Nietzsche, aesthetics reveals itself as a practice which expresses the possibility of the poetic, free and wild nature within empiricism. Aesthetics cannot be defined as a science of the sensible nor theory of the Beautiful, but rather it becomes an apodictic discipline only when the being *of* the sensible - as the difference and difference in intensity behind qualitative diversity - is itself apprehended. In this manner empiricism becomes transcendental, replacing representation with repetition. By determining the conditions of real experience, the forms of experience are united within the work of art as experimentation: since the immutable centre is always lacking, one can only go on inventing by means of the potential within the constitutive imagination or the power of the subconscious.⁵⁵ This power corresponds to that which takes art from representation to abstraction. The creation of eternal objects corresponds to cultural integration; *physis* raised to the surface. Life may well begin with the raw matter of the universe, but its creative force is located at the limit of bodies, the relations between bodies, and the integrations that the relations form: greater bodies.

⁵⁵ This theory is proposed by P. Klee in, *Paul Klee On Modern Art*, Faber and Faber, mcmxlviii.

Representation

To conclude, in Platonism we locate a condemnation of art in its relation to truth. Plato conceives art purely in terms of a *mimetic* process extrinsic to the Idea; it corresponds to the production of the false and is thereby relegated to the level of the sensible. Its value is less than that of a truth conceived in terms of pure reason and beauty. Therefore, art's veneration poses a threat to the constitution of an ideal *polis* which has as its underlying principle the idea of a 'natural' organic growth. To the Idea belong the notions of permanence and self-sameness which stand in opposition to becoming and change. The artist does not produce the Idea, but merely re-produces a copy of an Idea as it manifests itself as a shadow cast through reflected light on the wall of a cave. This conception of art is purely ocular. The Idea lies behind the form (mask) by which things show themselves; it constitutes content as Being. Moreover, the essence of Being is unitary and singular. For Plato therefore there exists a discordance between Being and its manifest appearance. Hence art as the re-production of the visible stands far removed from truth.

Nietzsche rejects Plato's understanding of the relation between art and truth, restores the power of the sensible to the Idea, and thereby affirms the worth of art over truth. Nietzsche's reversal of Platonism finds its basis in the primacy of sensibility and becoming over intelligibility and being. The real is the sensuous, that from which all experience and knowledge - even of the Ideas - is derived. For Nietzsche, the Ideas are merely concepts of representation, forming a nexus of intelligible symbols which 'diagram' an otherwise enigmatic and fluid domain of pure becoming. The work of art is an enigma, having its value in the feelings and passions that are aroused in both artist and recipient alike. Thus the greater worth of a discordant and sensible intoxication over a calm and rational reflexivity. This justifies

Representation

Nietzsche's claims for the primacy of the physiological over the intellectual, and the requirement therefore to deviancy, through a process of sublimation, the senses. Out of this discordant sensibility, this multiplicity of perspectives derivative from a plethora of forces and power relations wherein everything is at war with everything else, the aim of the true philosopher-artist is the production of an eternal object. The element of the real is pure becoming graspable not in totality but through perspective; Being corresponds to the petrification of any one perspective. Thus Nietzsche makes of truth a mere semblance and seduction: truth as Woman. As Heidegger tells us: "Art as will to semblance is the supreme configuration of will to power. But the latter, as the basic character of beings, as the essence of reality, is in itself that Being which wills itself by willing to be Becoming. In that way Nietzsche in will to power attempts to think the original unity of the ancient opposition of Being and Becoming. Being, as permanence, is to let Becoming be a Becoming. The origin of the thought of 'eternal recurrence' is thereby indicated."⁵⁶ Only through artistic excess will we ever be able to create. This is the singular importance of the artist-overman in Nietzsche. We go from despair, to the limit of nihilism, from rapture to the creation of a new valuation out of sensibility. The absolutely singular encounter through sensibility with the object, as opposed to the universal character of representation. The unique, unrepeatable event, as opposed to the repetition of the Same. Thus, Nietzsche's formulation of eternal recurrence is different from that of the Ancients, since it specifies singularity rather than universality; Difference rather than Same; the unique rather than the normative.

⁵⁶ M. Heidegger, *Nietzsche* Vol 1, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981, p. 218.

Chapter II

Transcendental Linguistics¹

Having discussed the manner in which representation subjugates difference under its four-fold yoke, it is now incumbent upon us to articulate in greater detail the element of that which is subjugated from the point of view of language. However, we must not comprehend the subjugated as being in some sense a transcendent Being, or a concrete presence that would possess the power of redeeming the slippage immanent within the domain of representation while simultaneously bestowing to the life of Self a centre of absolute certainty. Since it is our wish to characterise this transcendence in terms of a 'third' ontology, it will be necessary to articulate it from two radical perspectives: the above and the below; language and empiricism; idealism and materialism. To this end, it will not be feasible to establish the conditions of possibility in terms of a set of fixed principles, but on the contrary these conditions may only be predicated upon an originary heterogeneity; not an original sense but a co-presence of sense with its own nonsense.

To a great extent postmodern thought preoccupies itself with the task of overcoming metaphysics, of dismantling the structural and binary systems of opposition, and taking to the point of absurdity methods based upon first principles. The realisation of this ambition is pursued by means of affirming a certain poetics of play. Deleuze's *The Logic of Sense* exemplifies just such a concerted effort to think a non-foundational thought that would overcome any naive philosophy of 'origins'. This objective reminds us of the phenomenological motif of a 'radical beginning', which would always-already remain irreducible to

¹ By this title we infer a mode of thought which emphasises the intuitive in language. The necessity for an intuitive approach arises from the premise that life and language are constituted upon paradox rather than certainty. A purely rationalist and empirical approach fails to grasp the transcendental conditions which constitute them - that is to say, fails to grasp the ambivalence within the heart of life.

the objective truths of fact, and thereby introduce the demands of a certain historicity grounded in contextual contingencies and specificities to whose exigency the philosopher responds. In this respect *The Logic of Sense* corresponds, perhaps in a limited sense, to a rethinking of Husserlean phenomenology in order to retain the latter's philosophical rigour while simultaneously rejecting its metaphysical presuppositions.

However, we should not over-hastily conclude from these introductory remarks that an anti-logos thinking would condemn philosophy to the aimless wanderings of a pure *derive*, since the determination of value or meaning represents a composite constituted by two irreducible components: material contextualities and subjective specificities. Furthermore, this so-called 'third' ontology does not constitute a reconciliation, or unification into a kind of monism between the two radical extremes, but rather a problematising and deepening of both that allows us to perpetually rethink the relations that have, do, will or potentially could exist between the two extremes.

For these reasons, Deleuze distances himself from the contemporary (at the time of writing *The Logic of Sense* and *Difference and Repetition* - the late 1960's) "structuralism" of Lacan, Barthes and Levi-Strauss, by claiming that meaning has less to do with binary oppositional structures and more to do with the nomadic and singular distribution of "signs" within a signifying space. As we have already remarked, this space cannot be understood in purely linguistic terms, but rather sense (*Sens*) is more like a frontier or surface between the two extremes of an idealism and an empiricism that mark the limits of a pure becoming. Thus, Deleuze's intention is to attribute both an independence to each limit in the constitution of meaning and, more importantly, an asymmetrical value to each. It is the asymmetrical

element that confirms the irreducibility between the two constitutive components. Deleuze's aim therefore is not simply to reject phenomenology by adopting some naive empiricism, but rather to pass through it in order to maintain its transcendental move.

As the "father" of phenomenology, Husserl set it up as *the* way of avoiding metaphysics. What he meant by metaphysics was a certain 'naturalistic attitude' or complacency on the part of philosophers who use concepts, words, symbols, etc., without having access to their intuitive grounding.² The purpose, then, of phenomenology, at least for Husserl, is to reclaim an originary ground in order to situate language meaning upon a stable and certain foundation. The task, is to uncover the primordial experiences which give rise to our concepts. The extent to which Husserlean phenomenology is itself metaphysical and the manner in which Deleuze addresses this problematic with the aim to its overcoming will be investigated through four central themes: the presumed distinction between two kinds of sign; the logical *a priori* motif; the transcendental ego; and lastly the collapse of the meaning-surface.

1. Husserl distinguishes between two heterogeneous signs: *expression* and *indication*.³ The former type of sign possesses meaning, whereas the latter lacks meaning but has sense. Although both types of sign have a sensory basis, it can nonetheless be said, in a certain limited way, that sense belongs to the material dimension of expression, while expression is purely ideal (logical) and *for consciousness*. As Husserl tells us: "Let us start from the familiar distinction between the

² This attitude is described by Deleuze in terms of a good sense and a common sense attributable to the domain of representation that covers over the transcendental, or the difference in itself and repetition for itself constitutive of meaning.

³ Using this distinction as a way of reading Husserl owes its originality to J. Derrida's *Speech and Phenomena*.

sensory, the so to speak bodily aspect of expression, and its non-sensory 'mental' aspect."⁴ However, Husserl is not so concerned with pursuing the sensory side of expression, which corresponds to the noematic sphere of lived experience or communicative speech, as he is in tracking down the mental or ideal side, which corresponds to the *a priori* as the element of meaning. Communicative speech articulates the pre-expressive physical sphere of sense, while charging this content with *the* form of meaning: a meaning which is purely intentional and therefore immanent to consciousness. Consciousness is always consciousness of something, speech therefore must always contain both an indicative stratum and a purely logical expression, the two being inextricably interwoven. The problem for Husserl will be to radically distinguish the one from the other. Moreover, since the same phenomena may be grasped as either expression or indication, Husserl will attempt to capture the logical purity of meaning as the possibility of *logos* itself. In fact, expression and indication are not so much beings in the substantial sense, as modes of being for being in general. So how does Husserl distinguish between expression and indication? In cautioning us against understanding expression merely as a species of the genus indication, he writes:

If, as one unwillingly does, one limits oneself to expressions employed in living discourse, the notion of an indication seems to apply more widely than that of an expression, but this does not mean that its content is the genus of which an expression is the species. To mean *is not a particular way of being a sign in the sense of indicating something*. It has a narrower application only because meaning - in communicative speech - is always bound up with such an indicative relation, and this in its turn leads to a wider concept, since meaning is also capable of occurring without such a connection.⁵

Husserl therefore affirms that there exists a certain distinction between expression and indication - even though in the instance of

⁴ E. Husserl, *Ideas*, 1, § 124, p. 346.

⁵ E. Husserl, *Logical Investigation I*, § 1, p. 269.

communicative speech expression is inextricably intertwined with indicative relations - since the application of meaning to being in general implies a certain "conceptuality" beyond the mere connectivity between discursive signs and what the signs denote.

In order to maintain the purity of expression as having meaning, it is necessary for Husserl to show that the indicative sign maintains an extrinsic relation to expression. He thus defines the connectivity characteristic of the indicative sign as a certain "motivation"⁶ which allows a 'thinking being' to make the association between a sign and what it is a sign of. As he tells us:

*the fact that certain objects or states of affairs of whose reality someone has actual knowledge indicate to him the reality of certain other objects or states of affairs, in the sense that his belief in the reality of the one is experienced (though not at all evidently) as motivating a belief or surmise in the reality of the other.*⁷

Here, Husserl infers the distinction between belief and truth. We believe in the existence of certain extrinsic relations, yet we have no real or absolute certainty that these relations are in fact the case: they are mere contingencies existing between perceptual phenomena. On the one hand, belief describes only a very general notion of motivation, on the other hand, in the case of apodictic demonstrations, the relations evidenced are necessarily persistent - that is, beyond empirical contingency. Apodictic demonstrations do not reveal indicative motivations or connections, but rather necessary relations between ideal objects. Thus, a sign can be both an expression wherein it carries an intuitive weight, and an indication wherein it refers to another sign or what it is a sign of. For Husserl, language therefore has a fundamental aspect and a secondary aspect: the expression is

⁶ This notion of motivation Deleuze articulates in *The Logic of Sense* in terms of 'manifestation'.

⁷ E. Husserl, *Logical Investigation I*, § 2, p. 270.

fundamental, the indication secondary. Even though expression is always caught up in indication, it can nonetheless be grasped in all its purity within the silence of "solitary mental life" that suspends the *outside*. This suspension does not eradicate the outside, but grasps it in its ideal objectivity within a meaning-intention gaze. Moreover, solitary mental life not only suspends the outside, but implies a suspension even of speech itself, in order to grasp the internal voice and pure intention within all speech acts. A pure intention which is present only within *The Voice of the Silence*.⁸

One of course speaks, in a certain sense, even in soliloquy, and it is certainly possible to think of oneself as speaking, and even as speaking to oneself, as, e.g., when someone says to himself: 'You have gone wrong, you can't go on like that.' But in the genuine sense of communication, there is no speech in such cases, nor does one tell oneself anything: one merely conceives of oneself as speaking and communicating. In a monologue words can perform no function of indicating the existence of mental acts, since such indication would there be quite purposeless. For the acts in question are themselves experienced by us at that very moment.⁹

As this quotation makes clear, Husserl's aim is to present the possibility of attaining the full presence of intentionality with itself, through the suspension of the sensuous world of indication, in order to uncover the full intuitive weight of a primordial experience that would serve as the foundation of meaning and truth in general. From such an experience one could *command* precepts.

However, we must not understand by the suspension of indicative speech a complete eradication of sensibility, since our imagination has

⁸ The reference is to a work by H. P. Blavatsky, the prolific writer and founder of *The Theosophical Society*; a movement which attracted vast intellectual interest at the early quarter of the Twentieth century. This tradition condemned the attachment to objects of sense and pursued a path of ethics toward self-knowledge wherein the flame of bodily desire as the embodiment of self would be extinguished and the true Self revealed. Even though Husserl bases the *Logical Investigations* on the rejection of just such a psychologism, he nonetheless affirms, in some fundamental sense, the distinction between form and content, where expression would correspond to the purely formal character of an indicative sensible content. This dualism is essentially metaphysical.

⁹ E. Husserl, *Logical Investigation I*, § 8, p. 279-80.

limits which the things themselves fix, e.g., we are unable to imagine colour independent of space. Thus, essences are constituted by that which remains identical throughout the imagining of all possibilities: the noetic core of the noemata. Essences are the pure eidetic forms, a pure formal ontology, identifiable with the *Mathesis Universalis* of both Descartes and Leibniz which takes philosophy beyond the purely empirical. In this manner, Husserl addresses the problem of what it means to know; what knowledge itself is in its meaning for the subject. He can therefore preserve the notion of truth founded on the subject of knowledge while rejecting a Kantian separation of this subject from the empirical ego, and thereby avoiding the pure psychologism of which he accused the latter.

However, is the distinction between the two kinds of sign justified in the first place? And, since the bracketing of the outside is never an eradication of the outside, but merely an extraction of an ideal objectivity or form through a meaning-intention, does this not imply an always-already contamination of expression by indication?

Deleuze rejects the distinction between the two kinds of sign; between indication and expression, and reconstructs the problematic in terms of a distinction between the three different levels which constitute an Event as such. The three levels coincide with: bodies, language and the frontier between these two extreme limits. Bodies correspond to the material dimension of the *Eventum Tandum*, whereas language corresponds to its subjective dimension. In fact, everything happens on the border between things and propositions: a border that is characterised as a virtual surface of unlimited becoming that affirms the simultaneity of past and future within the infinitive *instant*. The triple consequence of affirming the past-future infinitive is the contestation of personal identity, absolute certainty, and pure

intentionality. In short, the denouncement of the Husserlean notions of the transcendental ego, apodictic truth and idealism.

Deleuze does not idealise meaning at the expense of denigrating sense, but rather brings the two limits together in what he elsewhere calls an 'encounter' constitutive of the event as such. Although it constitutes an ideality, an event cannot be said to correspond to a pure eidetic form, but rather is both simultaneously the expression of a proposition and the attribute of a state of affairs. For Deleuze, therefore, there is always-already an intertwining of expression with indication - this necessary intertwining motivates him to speak purely in terms of sense. The *sign* of the encounter is that which is presented to the mind in the form of an ideal event, but an encounter which must not be understood as constituting a pacification or mediation between the two levels of subjectivity and materiality. The ideal event is not a pure origin, Word or Being, but rather it is what Foucault has named the "thread of discourse"¹⁰ due to its correspondence with what he has elsewhere presented under the name "the statement."¹¹ Let us examine these three dimensions in turn - states of affairs, language and the event respectively - in order to fully comprehend Deleuze's rejection of the manner in which Husserl distinguishes between expression and indication as well as the priority he accords to the former over the latter.

a). In Stoic philosophy Deleuze uncovers a fundamental distinction between two kinds of being: corporeals and incorporeals. Firstly, corporeal bodies with their quantities and qualities, actions and

¹⁰ M. Foucault, *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice*, p. 175.

¹¹ For a full explication of this notion see G. Deleuze's *Foucault*, especially pp. 1-22. Briefly, what characterises a statement is that it corresponds to a regularised transversal movement that Deleuze likens to a "statistical curve" (p. 4). Regularity allows for repetition, while the rules governing the formation of a statement's distribution does not owe its production to a transcendental subject, but on the contrary to a certain non-personal 'gathering' of particular elements.

passions, enter into mixtures forming states of affairs. Not in the manner of cause and effect, but as one massive causal entity in which all bodies are absorbed into a unity which the Stoics called 'Destiny'. A veritable corporeal determinism that coincides with the time of the chronic present: the *moment*. Secondly, this mixture of bodies produces effects which are not themselves bodies, but incorporeal entities which play at the surface and limit of bodies. These effects are likened to ephemeral attributes and correspond to *events* rather than actual beings. Events do not form amongst themselves a causality, but rather a quasi-causality of incorporeals to which there corresponds the time of the unlimited Aion: the *instant*. As Deleuze tells us:

They are not physical qualities and properties, but rather, logical or dialectical attributes . . . They are not substantives or adjectives but verbs. They are neither agents nor patients, but the results of actions and passions. They are not living presents but infinitives: the unlimited Aion . . . Thus time must be grasped twice, in two complementary though mutually exclusive fashions. (LS 5)

There corresponds to an event, therefore, both the time of the present where actions and passions develop, and the impassive, incorporeal time of a pure becoming. These are two entirely different beings, or rather, states of affairs are said to have being whereas incorporeal events have extra-being. It follows:

If bodies with their states, quantities and qualities, assume all the characteristics of substance and cause, conversely, the characteristics of the Idea are regulated to the other side, that is to this impassive extra-being which is sterile . . . *the ideational or the incorporeal can no longer be anything other than an effect.* (LS 7)

The consequence of this operation raises unlimited becoming up from the depths of bodies where Plato attempted to bury it - that is, to the surface where the effects of the mixtures of bodies insinuate themselves, forming the entire Idea, while denying it its "causal and spiritual efficacy." The Idea is now conceived purely in terms of an

effect. However, this is not the Idea in the real sense of the concept, but a sense-event which constitutes the sensibility of sense: the material dimension of the surface frontier.

b). There exists between events and language an essential relation, since it is in the nature of events to be expressed in propositions. Deleuze distinguishes between three aspects which constitute propositional logic: denotation, manifestation and signification. i) Denotation is the relation of language to an external state of affairs, where words function as empty forms for the selection of images which represent states of affairs. "The state of affairs is *individuated*; it includes particular bodies, mixtures of bodies, qualities, quantities, and relations. Denotation functions through the association of the words themselves with *particular* images which ought to 'represent' the state of affairs" (LS 12). In this capacity words function as substantives. ii) Manifestation is the relation of the proposition to the person who expresses himself: the "I" is the basic manifester" (LS 13) of the relation between word and state of affair. "Manifestation therefore is presented as a statement of desires and beliefs which correspond to the proposition" (Ibid). There is always an essential motivation at the heart of language and desire is the causal inference that makes denotation possible. iii) Signification is the relation of the word to general concepts, and the manner in which concepts connect and imply other concepts: that is, the movement of signifiers in general.

From the standpoint of signification, we always consider the elements of the proposition as 'signifying' conceptual implications capable of referring to other propositions, which serve as premises of the first. Signification is defined by this order of conceptual implication where the proposition under consideration intervenes only as an element of a 'demonstration,' in the most general sense of the word, that is, either as premise or as conclusion. (LS 14)

The logical value of the movement of signification is that of providing the conditions of truth in general. In this manner, signification establishes both the possibility of truth as well as that of error, since we are liable to make erroneous as well as correct associations within the signifying process.

In the domain of 'speech' (*parole*) manifestation enjoys a certain privilege or primacy in relation to denotation and signification, since it is the "I" of speech which begins absolutely. This primacy Kristeva has aptly named "Desire in Language."¹² Whereas, in the domain of language (*langue*) significations are primary in relation to denotation and manifestation. "In it, a proposition is able to appear only as a premise or a conclusion, signifying concepts before manifesting a subject, or even before denoting a state of affairs" (LS 15). However, the primacy of signification over denotation is unable to ground denotation, since the movement of signification is lateral, and therefore can only refer

¹² In *Desire in Language*, Kristeva appropriates the manner in which Lacan links language to the unconscious, and by so doing, shows how desire is immanent within language. In fact, language operates on two distinct levels, which allows for the possibility of undermining a purely formal linguistic sense, which in turn reveals how absurdity and paradox lie at the heart of linguistic practice. Moreover, this practice of paradoxical or nonsensical signification gives rise to the possibility of political and ethical resistance. The subject of resistance, or what Kristeva calls the "speaking subject", is divided between two levels of motivation: unconscious and conscious drives, physiological processes and social constraints. This divided subject can not, therefore, be identified with the subject of phenomenology, that is, Husserl's transcendental ego whose experiences are always correlates of consciousness. Kristeva, therefore, posits two types of signifying processes as always-already operative within any production of meaning: the semiotic and the symbolic. The semiotic corresponds to the economy of primary processes articulated by Freud's instinctual drives, and upon which social and familial structures are imprinted through the mediation of the maternal body - primary repression. The symbolic process refers to the to the domain of philology, that is, sign, syntax, grammar, law, etc., - secondary repression. The divided subject functions or resonates between these two extreme levels and manifests what Kristeva calls "poetic language," which she appropriates from the Russian post-formalists - Bakhtin *et al.* Thus, the signifying process which the divided subject employs in her poetic language consists of both a 'phenotext' (a mathematical treatise) and a 'genotext' (as exemplified by the works of Artaud). However, no one signifying process can be employed in a pure state, totally separate and uninfected by the other process.

to other concepts along a chain of possible significations in which propositions are substantiated by the next proposition in the chain of significations, and this next proposition by the proposition following it, *regressus in infinitum*. Except, that is, when *implication* "gives itself a ready-made denotation, once in the premises and again in the conclusion" (LS 16). That is, the conditions which constitute signification require that both the premises and conclusions be posited as effectively *true*. In virtue of this necessary presupposition, denotation enjoys a certain primacy over signification. This whole circle and mutual dependency between denotation, manifestation and signification constitutes the circularity of the proposition in general. However, propositional logic is ultimately impotent and therefore requires another dimension in order to adequately account for language use. Perhaps we could provisionally conclude that signification corresponds to the process of association characteristic of expression; denotation to the presupposition of truth in indication; and manifestation to the belief motivating the particular indication.

c). To this ternary logic Deleuze adds a fourth element: the verb as sense proper, which replaces the Husserlean notion of expression, in order to refute the purely apodictic character attributed to the latter by Husserl. The relations existing between the logic of the proposition, the state of affairs, and the event is elucidated by Foucault in his essay *Theatrum Philosophicum*, which concerns itself exclusively with Deleuze's *The Logic of Sense and Difference and Repetition*. As he tells us:

For a ternary logic, traditionally centred on the referent, we must substitute an interrelationship based on four terms, "Marc Anthony is dead" designates a state of things; *expresses* my opinion or belief; *signifies* an affirmation; and, in addition, has a *meaning*: "dying". An intangible meaning with one side turned toward things because "dying" is something that occurs, as an event, to Anthony, and the other toward the

proposition because "dying" is what is said about Anthony in a statement.¹³

The Event (dying) merges exclusively with neither the state of affairs nor with the proposition, but rather is the expressed of the proposition and the attribute of a state of affairs.¹⁴ The Event is the frontier between words and things and for this reason is defined as something *aliquid*, since it is a composite constituted by two unequal components. This duality between bodies and language is reflected on both sides: viewed from the side of the thing, this duality is represented as that between states of affairs and incorporeal effects; viewed from the perspective of language, it becomes a duality between substantives (or adjectives) and verbs expressive of pure becomings.

In this manner, Deleuze characterises the event as a double-sided entity which does not constitute a unity between the two extreme positions. Rather, while partaking of both in unequal proportion, it is that by which the two extremes communicate. "We will not ask therefore what is the sense of the event: the event is sense itself. The event belongs essentially to language; it has an essential relationship to language. But language is what is said of things" (LS 22).

However, it is not sufficient to formulate this duality simply in terms of bodies and language. Rather, the duality must be developed within the proposition itself in order to deepen our understanding of the two dimensions constitutive of each term within language: the denotation of things (signified) and the expression of a proposition (signifier). Sense, Deleuze tells us:

is endowed with an efficacious, impassive, and sterile splendour. This is why we said that *in fact* we can only infer it indirectly, on the basis of the circle where the ordinary dimensions of the proposition lead us. It is only by breaking open the circle, as in the

¹³ M. Foucault, *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice*, p. 173.

¹⁴ Note carefully that the Event is the expression of the proposition and attribute of a state of affairs, and not the expression of a transcendental ego that would certify an absolute truth.

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case of the Mobius strip, by unfolding and untwisting it, that the dimension of sense appears for itself, in its irreducibility, and also in its genetic power as it animates an *a priori* internal model of the proposition. (LS 20)

Sense is an ideational objective unity, without purely physical or psychological existence, as exemplified by the now famous distinction between the two noemata; "evening star" and "morning star." A purely ideational and intentional correlate of an act of perceiving. The noema is a pure event, not given in a perception, yet not existing outside the proposition that expresses it. The sense attributable to the two concepts "evening star" and "morning star" is ideal, it functions immanently within the two distinct substantive terms. Hence, we can "distinguish between green as a sensible colour or quality expressed in the substantive form, and 'to green' as a noematic colour or attribute" (LS 21). The event is both sensible and ideal - it is immanent and functions *a priori* from within the dimensions of the proposition and states of affairs. The substantive *green* is a crystallisation of the infinitive verb *to green*; a veritable abstraction from the ideal event of *greening* as expressed by its verb 'to green'. Sense does not exist outside the proposition, but is both the expressed of the proposition and the attribute of the thing; 'to green' does not have being, but extra-being; it is not a spatio-temporal realisation, but an incorporeal or pure event. For Deleuze, meaning is purely the function of signification and from which it extracts its *a priori* character, whereas sense entertains an irreducibly double relation. Unlike Husserl who is at pains to prioritise meaning over sense, what Deleuze understands by meaning is the purely formal logic of the proposition in general. The two levels of sense are accorded a certain participation in the constitution of the event: the material is no less important as the subjective. In fact, both substantives and verbs are inextricably intertwined. As Deleuze tells

us:

Sense is never only one of the two terms of the duality which contrasts things and propositions, substantives and verbs, denotations and expressions; it is also the frontier, the cutting edge, or the articulation of the difference between the two terms, since it has at its disposal an impenetrability which is its own and within which it is reflected. (LS 28).

Sense has its own internal paradoxes, of which Deleuze identifies four, namely: the paradox of regress; sterility; neutrality; and absurdity. Let us look at each of these in turn: i). Regress - the sense of that which I designate is always presupposed. However, since we can never directly state the implied sense of that which is being designated, we require another designation. And to state the sense of this second designation we would need yet another, *ad infinitum*. This constitutes the "infinite power of language to speak about words" (LS 29). ii). Sterility - in relation to bodies sense is sterile, since only bodies act and suffer. Moreover, since sense entertains a certain independence from the proposition, it suspends the latter's affirmations and negations. iii). Neutrality - it follows that "[s]ense is strictly the same for propositions which are opposed from the point of view of quality, quantity, relation, or modality" (LS 32). iv). Absurdity - contradictory objects still have a sense (i.e., square-circles) even though they are not realisable in a state of affairs: they are "pure, ideational events" (LS 35).

It is from the paradox of regress that the other paradoxes are derived. This paradox is serial by nature; i.e., a series of terms. As we have seen, each term itself is constituted upon the dualism of denotation and expression. It therefore follows that each base series of terms subsumes at least two heterogeneous series, where, the denotation functions as the *signified* and the expression corresponds to the

signifier. There is a perpetual relative displacement between signified and signifying series, not a pure chaos, but a disequilibrium which is oriented toward the signifying series by virtue of the excess which it produces over the signified series. However, the heterogeneous series do not remain completely isolated from each other, nor wholly unified (neither monism nor absolute dualism), but enter into communication via an *aleatory point* which is neither reducible to the signified nor the signifying series. Nonetheless, Deleuze tells us:

It circulates without end in both series and, for this reason, assures their communication. It is a two-sided entity, equally present in the signifying and the signified series . . . Thus, it is at once word and thing, name and object, sense and *denotatum*, expression and designation, etc. It guarantees, therefore, the convergence of the two series which it traverses, but precisely on the condition that it makes them endlessly diverge. (LS 40)

The paradoxical entity, or esoteric word, as differentiator of the heterogeneous series is itself the principle of the emission of singularities. This entity indicates displacements which are essentially indeterminate - that is, *aliquid*.

2. The second important aspect is Husserl's commitment to a logical ground - that is, Husserl maintains that language essentially has an *a priori* structure. The logical structure of language itself, the way in which it is structured gives rise to meaning. Meaning is structure, since there exists no deep enunciator in language but only the structure of language. In order to emphasise the *a priori* foundation of language, Husserl distinguishes between two kinds of meaning; that is to say, a general *a priori* and a logical *a priori* of language. The purpose behind this distinction is to authorise Husserl's prioritisation of the logical over the general; meaning over sense. As Husserl tells us:

We propose in the interests of distinctness to favour the word *Bedeutung* (meaning at the

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conceptual level) when referring to the old concept, and more particularly in the complex speech-form "logical" or "expressive" meaning. We use the word *Sinn* (Sense or Meaning *simpliciter*) in future, as before, in its more embracing breadth of application.¹⁵

This "more embracing breadth of application" refers to the manner in which a sign functions as an indicator of a state of affairs - that is, the bracketed matter, but which is not wiped off the phenomenological slate.¹⁶ The difference between sense and meaning is presented as a difference between a general structure and a logical structure of meaning as such. On the one hand, sense embraces communicative speech insofar as it (faithfully) corresponds to a thing or state of affairs. On the other hand, meaning is a purely formal structure that is identical with itself, and thereby possesses the power of being infinitely repeated independently of any state of affairs. It is, therefore, capable of presenting itself as identical to like-minded and rational persons. As Husserl goes on to tell us:

From the noetic standpoint the rubric "expressing" should indicate a special act-stratum to which all other acts must adjust themselves in their own way, and with which they must blend remarkably in such wise that every noematic act-meaning, and consequently the relation to objectivity which lies in it, stamps itself "conceptually" in the noematic phase of the expressing.¹⁷

From the point of view of the noetic, meaning possesses a wholly sterile or unproductive¹⁸ nature in relation to the neutral¹⁹ noematic sense, since it merely impresses upon the latter the form of its pure conceptuality. It is in the special act-stratum "expression" that the power of repetition resides. Therefore, there would appear to exist a

¹⁵ E. Husserl, *Ideas*, § 124, p. 346.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, §76, p. 212.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 347.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 349.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

kind of parallelism between a material or content sense-substratum and an ideal or formal meaning-superstratum.²⁰ The superstrata constitutes the ideal meaning-form that delineates a general rule of logic and under the hegemony of which the noematic sense is subjugated. Because of its neutral or passive character, the noematic content is reworked into a form which reflects the noetic logico-scientific structure. Expression, then, as an act-strata is intended in a certain 'logic' and possessing an 'intentional' character. In the words of Husserl:

A peculiar intentional instrument lies before us which essentially possesses the outstanding characteristic of reflecting back as from a mirror every other intentionality according to its form and content, of copying it whilst colouring it in its own way, and thereby of working into it its own form of "conceptuality".²¹

That is to say, expression is an intentional act that 'expresses' meaning. On the other hand, 'indication' corresponds to the material side of the 'expressed' intention, insofar that a state of affairs is denoted by a sign. Essentially, Husserl is making a distinction between form and content: the content is the sense which will be reworked by the meaning-form. Moreover, form enjoys, within the sphere of meaning, a certain prioritisation over content - a pre-eminence which affirms his desire to establish a theory of pure meaning-forms that would be wholly scientific. Husserlean phenomenology therefore reveals its orientation toward a pure formalism. This formalism is what introduces a certain telos into phenomenology in the form of the *a priori* motif. This form-content dualism is brought together in an encounter through the peculiar intentional instrument he calls

²⁰ However, as Husserl cautions us, "we should not hold too hard by the metaphor of stratification; expression is not of the nature of an overlayed varnish or covering garment; it is a mental (*geistige*) formation, which exercises new intentional influences (*Funktionen*) on the intentional substratum and experiences from the latter correlative intentional influences." (Ibid, p. 349).

²¹ Ibid, p. 347-48.

expression. But this tripartite model requires further elucidation since expression itself appears as a double-sided entity. In relation to sense it is an indicator; in relation to meaning it becomes the expression of a pure logical grammar. As Husserl tells us:

So far we have considered expressions as used in communication, which last depends essentially on the fact that they operate indicatively. But expressions also play a great part in uncommunicated, interior mental life . . . A word only ceases to be a word when our interest stops at its sensory contour, when it becomes a mere sound-pattern. But when we live in the understanding of a word, it expresses something and the same thing, whether we address it to anyone or not.

It seems clear, therefore, that an expression's meaning, and whatever else pertains to it essentially, cannot coincide with its feats of intimation.²²

It follows that the expression does not require to be signified - that is, along with Frege, Husserl affirms the possibility of meaning without a referent. The proposition '*S* is *P*' has meaning but lacks a referent: it is purely formal. We must not understand by this that it would be possible to totally separate sense from meaning - admittedly a view Husserl affirms in the *Ideas* - since, as he tells us:

If I am right, it is of basic importance for linguistic investigations that they should become clear as to the distinctions provisionally shadowed forth here. They should possess themselves of the insight that the foundations of speech are not only to be found in physiology, psychology and the history of culture, but also in the *a priori*. The latter deals with the essential meaning-forms and their *a priori* laws of compounding or modification, and no speech is conceivable that is not in part essentially determined by this *a priori*. . . . [W]ithin pure logic one must separate off what, considered in itself, forms the first, basic sphere, the pure theory of meaning-forms. Considered from the standpoint of grammar, it must lay bare an ideal framework which each actual language will fill up and clothe differently, in deference either to common human motives or to empirical motives that vary at random.²³

What exactly, then, does Husserl mean by the distinction between the general and the logical *a priori*? In the *Logical Investigations* IV, §10, Husserl describes the manner in which individual meanings are subject

²² E. Husserl, *Logical Investigations* I, § 8, pp. 278-79.

²³ Ibid, §14, pp. 525-26.

to *a priori* laws governing the combinations that they form between themselves during the process of constructing new meanings. That is, since combinations cannot be formed in a totally free and independent manner, there must exist categories which set *a priori* limits in relation to the number of possible combinatorial forms. "Wherever, therefore," Husserl tells us; "we see the impossibility of combining given meanings, this impossibility points to an unconditional general law to the effect that meanings belonging to corresponding meaning-categories, and conforming to the same pure forms, should lack a unified result."²⁴ That is to say, constituent elements belonging to incompatible categories brought into a combination by means of a purely formal logic - i.e., of the form '*S is P*' - while the grammar of the proposition holds good, its sense vanishes by virtue of the natural non-correspondence between the signs and the material objects that the signs represent. This incompatibility Husserl calls 'nonsense' in order to distinguish it, on the material side of the existential dynamic, from sense. In short, *S* and *P* cannot stand for any object; it is necessary that a natural correspondence should exist between the objects referred to in the proposition. When this general *a priori* law is violated false propositions result. Nonetheless, the abstracted logical *a priori* form '*S is P*', as a pure grammatical law holds true in every case - that is, the principles governing the combinatorial forms pertaining to the logical *a priori* enjoy a certain independence from those that rule over the general *a priori*. Therefore, Husserl tells us; "every concrete meaning represents a fitting together of materials and forms, that each such meaning falls under an ideal pattern that can be set forth in formal purity, and that to each such pattern an *a priori* law of meaning

²⁴ Ibid, §10, p. 511.

corresponds."²⁵ The distinction, then, between the general and the logical corresponds to what Husserl elsewhere calls the 'material specificity of meaning' and the 'form-theory of meaning'.

Incompatibilities, therefore, within the domain of sense, are the result of an ungrammatical combination of linguistic elements which present the proposition in the form of an un-unified or disparate meaning, e.g., 'a round or', 'a man and is' etc.. But this is not the case for what Husserl calls absurd propositions, an example of which would be 'a square circle', 'wooden iron'. In this instance the grammatical form is correct and produces a unified meaning or sense, even though no state of affairs corresponds to the proposition. Nonetheless it testifies to an ideal meaning. The difference between nonsense and absurdity, Husserl tells us, is:

In the *one* case certain partial meanings fail to assort together in a unity of meaning as far as the objectivity or truth of the total meaning is concerned . . . In the *other* case the possibility of a unitary meaning itself excludes the possible coexistence of certain partial meanings in itself . . . The judgment of incompatibility is in one case connected with ideas, in another with objects; ideas of ideas enter the former unity of judgment, whereas plain ideas enter the latter.²⁶

We must not assume that the pure logical grammar responsible for the production of meaning within absurd propositions is absolutely separable from the grammatical rules governing the sphere of communicative speech, but rather see in the pure logico-grammatology a geological, historical and cultural infection. Nonetheless, an essential difference does emerge from the distinction: the difference between independent and non-independent meanings. The task for Husserl, therefore, is to; *"fix the primitive forms of independent meanings, of complete propositions with their internal articulations,*

²⁵ Ibid, §10, p. 513.

²⁶ Ibid, §12, p. 517.

and the structures contained in such articulations."²⁷ To each of these independent meanings there corresponds a constitutive *a priori* law. Nonsense is deviant, therefore, from the pure theory of forms, whereas absurdity is not. In this sense, the pure formal logic holds itself aloof from the four types of logical proposition: connective, conjunctive, disjunctive and hypothetical. The latter Deleuze interprets in terms of the 'forced movement' or creative dynamic intrinsic to systems in general. The *a priori* therefore corresponds to nothing less than the "intrinsic essence of meanings, and is seen from this essence with apodictic evidence."²⁸ There's the rub. In relation to meaning, that which is intrinsic to a system, body or proposition is not disparate but unified and true. Therefore, in "the *a priori* which has its roots purely in the generic essence of meaning as such . . . we recognise the undoubted soundness of the idea of a *universal grammar*"²⁹ that would be wholly rational and capable of transgressing all racial, tribal and cultural boundaries. Thus, from the above analysis we will focus on two aspects of Husserl's phenomenology: the form-content dualism, and the logico-a priori motif so dear to phenomenology.

a). As we have seen, Husserl proposed a kind of parallelism between meaning and sense. Essentially, the notion of a "psychophysical parallelism" in Husserl takes a Cartesian orientation, in that pure intentionality, constituted as it is by an ideal objectivity, is not solely mental, but is nonetheless an *a priori* form graspable only within consciousness. That is, thinking and ultimately meaning are orientated toward the subjective pole of the dualism. Deleuze's understanding of parallelism differs slightly, in that the emphasis is shifted away from

²⁷ Ibid, §13, p. 519.

²⁸ Ibid, §14, p. 523.

²⁹ Ibid, p. 524.

the heights of meaning and orientated toward the surface which corresponds to sense. The psychical and the physical come together in what he calls an encounter: this encounter, or event is what constitutes sense. In this respect, Deleuze's understanding of parallelism employs the so-called 'bracketed' content, to a far greater extent, thus allowing him to intitate a material dynamic genesis that would constitute a parallel with a psychical static genesis. In actual fact, the relation between the two is always asymmetrical and unequal. The logical *a priori* of meaning-forms are discarded, or rather understood purely in terms of signification in general. The logic now becomes, as the title suggests, *The Logic of Sense*.

In Deleuze's *Foucault* we find a similar gesture being attributed to the eponym of that work, but this time articulated in terms of a parallelism between what Foucault calls non-discursive and discursive formations. In order to elaborate this distinction, let us call the non-discursive formation an *extrinsic* material substratum constituted by visibilities: that is, 'things' or states of affairs. Whereas, the discursive formation is an ideal *intrinsic* superstratum constituted by articulabilities: that is, concepts, propositions, and language in general which signify states of affairs. Extrinsicity and intrinsicity - contingent and essential - are here implied in relation to intentionality. However, there is a third component, what Foucault calls the 'statement', and what Deleuze names the Event. The statement is that which, in a certain sense, precedes both non-discursive and discursive formations, allows for a relation to arise between the two extremes, and which is defined as "a multiplicity that passes through all levels and 'cuts across a domain of structures and possible unities, and which reveals them, with concrete contents, in time and space'" (FU 14-5). Statements are transversal lines of variation productive of both

visibilities and articulabilities. In a certain sense, the statement is neither intrinsic nor extrinsic, but *outside*: an outside which is at the same time the profoundest interiority. This 'outside' is immanent in the sense that it is universally pervading - that is, it has existence beyond the limits of intentionality. Now, in order for sense to emerge there must arise an encounter between a non-discursive and a discursive formation, and the means by which both communicate their respective essences is via the statement.³⁰ But since the statement itself is defined in terms of a virtual multiplicity which is neither a visibility nor an articulability, no direct causal relation or correspondence can exist between them: both extremes remain essentially irreducible to each other.

The non-discursive formation, therefore, defines a visible *content* that corresponds to the element which Husserl indicated through the notion of a 'bracketed' material substratum of raw phenomenological perception, whereas the discursive formation corresponds to the *form* of what he has designated as the expressive superstratum which is wholly logico-mathematical. It is as though the model, through Foucault, has been stretched to embrace the material dimension given to us through sensibility - that is to say, the brackets have been removed and a certain 'continuation' between the material and the phenomenological inaugurated. A demarcation or limit inherent within phenomenological methodology has been transgressed, to the effect that the phenomenological plain is flooded with an autonomous - in relation to an 'outside' of the intentional gaze - material dynamic. Moreover, we are all part of this dynamic, constituted by it and wholly

³⁰ By this concept of 'communication' we do not merely refer to its linguistic connotations, but use it in the wider application - that is to say: to give a share of; to impart; to reveal; to bestow; as a means of passage between, etc.. In this sense, communication constitutes the 'new' community and commune - its relevance to the emerging communications environment is plain.

immersed: it is impossible to grasp it from a detached point of view. We are part of the universe as it is a part of us; we pass through it as it passes through us - within the domain of the 'outside' "I" and "it" have no points of reference, they are wholly meaningless. In this respect, a proposition can be apodictically true in relation to the logical *a priori*, since even absurd propositions are grammatically correct, but a proposition can never be determined as being necessarily true in relation to its referent. That a proposition fails to correspond to that which it is a proposition of, defines a proposition, as we have seen, as 'nonsense'. It must follow that all propositions contain an element of nonsense - that is to say, sense is always co-present with its own nonsense. In Husserlean phenomenology, therefore, truth or the meaning-forms are wholly abstract: they are what Deleuze elsewhere refers to as a transcendental illusion. The process by which visibilities and articulabilities are related through an irreducible communication is given over to the power of the "subjectification of the subject"³¹ in general: it follows from what has been said above that this power cannot be a wholly intentional or conscious process.

Therefore, what Deleuze discovers in Foucault, specifically in

³¹ In Deleuze's work *Foucault*, we find that knowledge is constituted upon an irreducible non-correspondance between the two forms of visibilities and articulabilities. These formalised strata trace lines of light and articulable curves through transcendental points, which entertain relations amongst themselves, and which relations define power. These relations of power are *outside* and irreducible to the forms of knowledge. A problem arises: it is the *impasse* in which power situates us, since if power is productive of truth, where may we locate a truth that would resist power. "This could be resolved only if the outside were caught up in a movement that would snatch it away from the void and pull it back from death" (FU 96). This condition is provided by the outside itself whose movement is one of spontaneous folding, unfolding and refolding. This movement overcomes the *impasse* by producing an *inside* which is not a subjective interiority, but rather, "the inside of the outside" (FU 97) as the process of subjectivation which is independent from the relations of power and the forms of knowledge. What is folded is not the One but the Other. "It is not a reproduction of the Same, but a repetition of the Different" (FU 98). Folding back the outside upon itself by means of a series of practical exercises, the Ancient Greeks produced a relation to oneself. that is, "a relation which force has with itself, a power to affect itself, an affect of self on self" (FU 101), that is constitutive of a space wherein subjectivity enjoys an independence from both force and form. In this sense, the struggle for subjectification reveals itself as the exigency of difference and metamorphosis.

Discipline and Punish, is a critique of the form-content opposition, and a substituting of it by the expression-content distinction. The opposition between expression and content is no longer characterised in terms of a transcendent distinction, but rather is defined in purely a formal fashion. Why formal? Because, for Deleuze, both expression and content possess form; this has the consequence of multiplying form twofold: once in the visibilities and once again in the articulabilities. Taking the penal system as an example: On the one hand, from the perspective of a visibility, Deleuze tells us that the *form of content* would be a 'prison', as an environmental formation: a 'thing', and the *content* the 'prisoner' himself. "But this thing or form does not refer back to a 'word' designating it, or a signifier for which it would be the signified. It refers to completely different words and concepts, such as 'delinquency' or 'delinquent', which express a new way of articulating infractions, sentences and their subjects" (FU 31, modified). These "different words and concepts" have more in common with verbs than with substantives, and correspond to what Deleuze calls an ideal event. On the other hand, from the perspective of articulabilities, penal law "is a system of language that classifies and translates offences and calculates sentences" (FU 32). The *form of expression* of penal law, the written codes, are capable of authentically articulating and indefinitely repeating a category of object which has been classified delinquent: this is the function of conceptuality or language in general. The *expression* itself in the instance of this articulability, would be, for example, the classification of the object "leprosy" as an historical example of delinquency. As Deleuze tells us:

Form here can have two meanings: it forms or organises matter; or it forms or finalises functions and gives them aims. Not only the prison but the hospital, the school, the barracks and the workshop are formed matter. Punishment is a formalised function, as

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is care, education, training, or enforced work. The fact is that there is a kind of correspondence between them, even though the two forms are irreducible (in fact, care was not the function of the seventeenth-century hospital and the penal law in the eighteenth-century does not refer essentially to prison). (FU 33)

What are the implications which follow on from this critique of the form-content opposition for Husserlean phenomenology? In Deleuze, both the extreme poles of content and expression have form. Form no longer functions as an ideal superstratum that impresses its originary logicity upon a material content, but is grasped purely in terms of an ideal abstraction. Between the two forms there exists a 'mutual presupposition', but no conformity. The two irreducible forms come together in an "encounter" which does not constitute an unity, in the monist sense of the word, but a virtual multiplicity of divergent forces which cannot be resolved into an identity: the statement. However, multiplicity does exhibit an unity that gives itself to us as an essence: an Event.

The first consequence, which we have already articulated above, is to shift the notion of meaning away from a conscious or ideal orientation, where Husserl had located it, to an essentially transformative domain which lies "between" the two extreme poles; where it is understood in terms of sense. In actual fact, the third domain is both immanent and transcendent to both extremes: it is transcendent with respect to knowledge, and immanent with respect to materiality. Sense, which belongs to the surface, is a Heraclitan pacifier. "What are we to call this philosophical operation, insofar as it opposes at once Platonic conversion and pre-Socratic subversion? Perhaps we can call it "perversion," which at least befits the system of provocations of this new type of philosopher - if it is true that perversion implies an

extraordinary art of surfaces" (LS 133).³²

The second consequence subverts the concept of phenomenon, perhaps even phenomenology itself, since a phenomenon can no longer be conceived in terms of an appearance, but rather, purely in terms of a *sign*. An 'appearance' is always an appearing to someone capable of recognising it: appearance presupposes both a fixed subject of interpretation and a concrete object capable of being viewed from various perspectives, but which ultimately possesses one essential form. On the one hand, for Kant a phenomenon is an object capable of being interpreted through categories, for this reason, the task set phenomenology by Husserl was an *a priori* investigation of 'conceptuality' in general and the meanings common to the thought of different minds. On the other hand, a sign is essentially *inadequate* with respect to producing a consensus of meaning between like-minded persons, as well as lacking in the possibility of a thorough interpretation by means of categories.

In order to further explicate the Deleuzean subversion of the phenomenon, let us take the example from the point of view of the production of art in general. The modern conception of the work of art characterises it as a creative and experimental process of 'producing' signs. Production of this kind does not predetermine the outcome of its experimentations with reference to preestablished truths, but rather, as in the manner of Paul Klee and John Cage, allows the subconscious forces to take possession of the productive process, as well as inviting chance factors to influence its outcome. This attitude necessarily implies a certain ecstatic death of Self. As J. London tells us:

³² What is meant here by perversion? We will illustrate this by means of an example: The kana for *Yakuza* is made up of three numbers, eight, nine and three, totalling twenty: twenty corresponds to a losing number in Japanese gambling. It is out of a perverse pride that the Japanese gangster has named himself thus. Perversion does not imply sexual deviancy, but rather, a certain humour directed toward moral uprightness.

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There is an ecstasy that marks the summit of life, and beyond which life cannot rise. And such is the paradox of living, this ecstasy comes when one is most alive, and it comes as a complete forgetfulness that one is alive. This ecstasy, this forgetfulness of living, comes to the artist, caught up and out of himself in a sheet of flame; it comes to the soldier, war-mad on a stricken field and refusing quarter.³³

The origin of the work of art can only be understood as a seeming unity constituted upon an essential and originary disparity - a heterogeneity which excludes the Self - that remains eternally incommensurable with its formal actualisation(s). This unity, which Deleuze articulates in terms of essences,³⁴ is a kind of 'superior perspective' or principle of individuation, signifying both the birth of the world as well as its original character. In terms of a specific example, Picasso's *Les Femmes d'Alger (O. J. R. M.)*, would correspond to this method of production. This painting employs both a fluid and flattened space which eliminates narrative in favour of the pure stylisation of its figures. These figures are fragmented and fuse within themselves a multiplicity of perspectives in one 'superior perspective' (the beginnings of Cubism). As a whole, *Les Femmes d'Alger* is openly heterogeneous rather than homogeneous in its being, in that it invites us to witness differences in style without resolving them, even while the composition as a whole works wonderfully, to the effect that all the figures are harmonised into a portrayal of perverted desire. This work can in no way be understood as a mirror of the world or nature, it is purely a *sign* representing one of many possible ways of representing. As Deleuze writes, not with reference to this painting:

Thus the entire problem of objectivity, like that of unity, is displaced in what we must call a 'modern' fashion, essential to modern literature. Order has collapsed, as much in

³³ J. London, *The Call of the Wild*, p. 36.

³⁴ G. Deleuze, *Proust and Signs*, especially the chapter added after the original publication, titled "Antilogos".

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the states of the world which were supposed to reproduce it as in the essences or Ideas which were supposed to inspire it. The world has become crumbs and chaos. Precisely because reminiscence proceeds from subjective associations to an originating viewpoint, objectivity can no longer exist except in the work of art: it no longer exists in significant content as states of the world, nor in ideal signification as stable essence, but solely in the signifying formal structure of the work, in its style. (PS 98-9)

"Internationalism," the aspiration of post-war Modernism which sought to bridge racial, ethnic and class barriers by means of the inauguration of a global rational matrix: i.e., *Esperanto*, ultimately falls short of its ideal. The possibility of a universal language between like minded persons is simply not realisable. If we begin from the hypothesis of difference in itself, everything is singularised, become univocal or unilateral. The rationality behind the hypothesis demands we pursue difference to its logical conclusion: no reconciliation, and no universal. History is always a process of conquest, subjugation and assimilation; today we are all too aware of this tyranny, thus our aim is to construct a social milieu constituted upon racial and cultural differences without attempting to homogenise; to accept difference and live within difference. This constitutes the exigency to which we must now respond. Language is not a purely rational matrix; desire lies at its foundations, and with desire we have instinct, and with instinct we have genetics. Individual genetic difference influencing how each of us interprets and understands the world. Likewise, as we see with *Les Demoiselles*, which is productive of an irreducible multiplicity of languages and modes of communication, such an homogenising aspiration proves futile. Physical death is perhaps the most powerful empathic emotion, but even this is too soon forgotten, while the death drive remains for us an ideal to aspire toward. Essentially, signs like life envelopes an irreconcilable disparity that requires interpretation and infinite hermenutical praxis. Thus, Deleuze tells us,

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we must be Egyptologists. For there are no mechanical laws between things, nor voluntary communications between minds. Everything is implicated, everything is complicated, everything is sign, meaning, essence. Everything exists in those obscure zones which we penetrate as into crypts, in order to decipher hieroglyphs and secret languages. The Egyptologist, in all things, is the man who undergoes an initiation - the apprentice. (PS 91)

Signs are the product of an encounter between heterogeneous elements; we arrange signs in patterns or forms which constitute a narrative; this narrative is re-channeled into the interpretation of signs that will become new signs. Everything works on the model of a feedback loop in which we 'sing' ourselves into existence. In this respect, there is no distinction - except perhaps a geopolitical one - in the manner in which the Australian Aboriginal "songlines" function in the production of cultural, social, tribal and individual identity, and the way in which the Western World produces its own identity. Essentially, mankind *dreams* itself into existence.

A fundamental distinction lies at the heart of this theory. Science - the physico-chemical explanation of the universe - prioritises intellect-form over intuitive-force, in so far that it is an intellectual discipline with the aim of apprehending explicit relations and significations. The intuitive, that is, art and literature correspond to a certain *antilogos* and intuitive praxis, nourished by the secret interpretation of the implicit meanings in signs (Implicit meaning, here, does not signify a universal form, but a particular and individual subconscious desire). Bergson's wish, in *Creative Evolution*, is that philosophy undergo a new renaissance, wherein it will begin to incorporate in equal measure both tendencies immanent to life: intellect and intuition. For Bergson, this interpenetration and communication between the intellectual and intuitive represents the next stage in the evolutionary process; a

process that consciousness will actualise beyond the evolution of cerebral matter. Man, by means of the intellect, has brought matter under his control, but this to the expense of the intuitive half, "which hangs limp and lifeless from his body like a deformed and neglected limb." The whole function of the intellect is to separate, to analysis, to make into discontinuous and disparate elements which are then categorised, classified, and systematised, giving rise, in its turn, to a concrete network of formulae as explanation and knowledge. Intuition, on the other hand, is one with the synthesis of life, a tension which binds the trillions of matter-particles in a Whole that is greater than the parts. But the Whole must incorporate time - that is to say, it is necessarily historical. The past is preserved in its entirety and co-exists with the present, both are contracted into an infinitesimal point which is projected into the future, thus constituting the non-linear time of Aion, which we do not *think* but *live*. This permanence of the past, as a whole, which grows without ceasing and is continually hanging over the present is what constitutes what Bergson calls duration. Thus, every present - since the past is continually adding new experience to itself, which it preserves, the whole of which leans upon the present, and where both past and present combined constitute the future - is an absolutely new moment, a repetition of the present as Different not Same. The whole therefore is not the principle of multiplicity but its 'effect'; only the formal structure of the work of art - its logic on the surface of sense - serves as a unity. In this capacity the topological surfaces encountered in the novels by A. Robbe-Grillet are exemplary; they are neither allegorical nor psychological but objective: the point, the line and the plane.³⁵ Perhaps the task assigned philosophy in general is to bridge the divide between

³⁵ C.f., A. Robbe-Grillet, *Jealousy*.

these two disciplines. We are certainly unable to put all our faith in language alone, since language is not merely a container of a rational matrix. There is therefore a necessity for an alliance between language and the intuition of the philosopher-artist.

The unity of the work of art is also described by Deleuze in terms of ideal events, or rather, the Event in which all event subsist. As an illustration of the wholeness of an ideal event let us contemplate death. The transversality immanent to the transcendental Event is nothing other than the 'death drive' which constitutes man's ultimate experience and from which all real futural living and questioning arises. The unity of an event can be articulated in terms of a near-death experience, in which the person in danger can sometimes recapitulate the whole of their life within an instant of time, and from which is extracted *the* meaning and essence of that single life. Since, if they are fortunate enough to survive the experience, their life generally takes on a completely new trajectory: the born-again Christian. The essence, grasped as a sign in its unitary form, both contextualises and, in a certain sense, predetermines all the particular experiences which go to make up the life as a whole. *Essence precedes the particular elements as an afterthought*. However, paradoxically, the meaning and essence of a singular life is the effect of the causal elements which constitute that life. Nevertheless, the transcendental whole is always more than its immanent constituent parts; *it is all perspectives given at once, in an instant, as epiphany*; a real event which presupposes the death of Self, World and God. But this death must not be understood in terms of a return to animality, as Bataille³⁶ would have us believe, which radically opposes the rational human to the animal - attaining the latter by transgressing the former. For Deleuze, stupidity does not

³⁶ G. Bataille, *Madame Edwarda*, pp. 135-160.

imply animality, since the death drive is neutral not polarised, erogenous not sexual. Besides the anthropomorphism and metaphysics inherent in such binary oppositions characteristic to Western thought, transgression itself as a possibility is impossible. For the simple reason, that by an act of transgressing we appropriate that which is beyond the possible, in this case impossibility. But if it is truly impossible, then the transgression of all possibility and the appropriation of the impossible must itself be impossible. Thus, transgression as experience is impossible. Perhaps there is nothing at all to transgress; everything is given, everything is present on the surface of a cosmic Mobius strip which generates an illusion of depth. The notion of a primary depth is merely the final trace of identity thinking; the secret centre which silently determines all the parts and into which the mystic desires to pass.

b). As we have seen, sense is constituted by two heterogeneous dimensions. On the one hand, grasped from the material perspective of corporeal mixtures of which it is an effect, sense is impassive in relation to the states of affairs and neutral in relation to the proposition.³⁷ On the other hand, viewed from the subjective perspective of incorporeality, sense enjoys a certain autonomy by virtue of the associations that exist between the incorporeal effects themselves. The genetic element responsible for this autonomy is the paradoxical element or aleatory point, which produces and distributes sense at the surface. This veritable production and distribution makes sense itself something productive, since the genetic element is bequeathed to both the states of affairs of which sense is an attribute and the proposition of which sense is an expression. Since sense is both

³⁷ This neutrality is exemplified by the fact that the notion of "square-circles", for example, still possess a sense even if they lack an objective correspondence.

material and subjective, it is necessarily paradoxical in essence. And if it is paradoxical, sense must, Deleuze affirms entertain a co-presence with its own nonsense. Thus, nonsense is the quasi-cause of sense that ensures the latter's autonomy. Sense is both impassive-neutral *and* productive, therefore, Deleuze asks:

How are we to reconcile the logical principle, according to which a false proposition has a sense (so that sense as a condition of truth remains indifferent to both the true and the false), and the no less certain transcendental principle according to which a proposition always has the truth, the part and kind of truth which it merits, and which belongs to it according to its sense? (LS 96)

This paradox constitutes the opposition between formal and transcendental logic, the reconciliation of which is only possible within an impersonal and pre-individual transcendental field which is wholly *unformed*. But why an unformed field?

Husserl distinguishes between sense and expression. Noematic sense is the material aspect of meaning and corresponds to that which is perceived. Noetic expression is the a priori, logico-mathematical form which "stamps" sense with its conceptuality. That is, expression corresponds to the transcendental core which constitutes the meaning intrinsic to sense. Moreover, the core of sense "is nothing other than the relation between sense itself and the object in its reality" (LS 97). This core of sense corresponds to the genetic moment which bestows upon sense its autonomy, while paradoxically establishing it as an effect of a corporeal mixture. Taking Husserl to task, Deleuze tells us: "But the Husserlean genesis seems to be a slight-of-hand. For the nucleus has indeed been determined as *attribute*; but the attribute is understood as *predicate* and not as verb, that is, as concept and not as *event*" (Ibid). The predicate possesses an identity which it owes to the domain of conscious representation, and therefore cannot be truly

transcendental. Whereas the verb is unformed and lacks individuation. Therefore, by virtue of sense's autonomy, false propositions have a sense, and by virtue of sense's correspondence with objectivity, a proposition always has the truth it merits. By understanding the core of sense in terms of predicates and concepts, Husserl was able to postulate a logical *a priori* structure of language. But by determining it as verb and event, Deleuze establishes a co-presence of sense with nonsense, collapses languages supposedly logical foundation and inaugurates the primacy of paradox and play. For this reason, Deleuze proposes a formal logic of sense. The Husserlean distinction between nonsense and absurdity, becomes one between that which obeys the logic of signification in general and that which doesn't. There is no transcendental logic; no deep structure - everything that happens occurs on the surface. In this respect, we employ the concept of 'nonsense' not in its Husserlean sense, but to affirm the purely disparate as the only depth out of which sense is produced. Sense is structured difference.

But how does the disparate transcendental field come to be structured? For there to be a structure, Deleuze tells us, there must exist at least two heterogeneous series. Moreover, each of these series, which itself is constituted by terms that differ in nature from the terms of the other series - material and subjective - emit a distribution of singular points which correspond to the values of the differential relations between the terms of each series. Hence, there are two distributions of singularities which correspond to a base series of names: the material distribution and the linguistic distribution. Moreover, each singularity extends itself out to the vicinity of another singularity, thereby forming sub-series. That is to say, the base series diverge, while the singularities which form the sub-series converge. The distribution of

the singularities which corresponds to the two heterogeneous series - signifier and signified - are distinguished only by their distribution. However, the moment that the series are traversed by the paradoxical element, they undergo a displacement which brings the two series of singular points into resonance. In this manner singularities, as events, "communicate in one and the same Event which endlessly redistributes them, while their transformations form a *history*" (LS 53). Thus, Deleuze tells us:

They have . . . an eternal truth, and their time is never the present which realises them and makes them exist. Rather, it is the unlimited Aion, the infinitive in which they subsist and insist. Events are the only idealities. To reverse Platonism is first and foremost to remove essences and to substitute events in their place as jets of singularities, (LS 53).

The mode of the event is the problematic; a problematic field which is determined by the distribution of singular points which express its conditions. The "problem" must not be confused with either a subjective category nor an imperfection in the method of knowledge, but as that which should be understood as being the "very object of the Idea" (LS 54). The Idea is no longer conceived in terms of ideal Platonic Forms, but rather events are the only idealities. The problem therefore is essentially subconscious. From the perspective of an inquisitory mind, the problem "expresses the objective equilibrium of a mind situated in front of the horizon of what happens or appears" (LS 57). The mind grasps the problematic in the form of an Idea, and the question which is addressed to this field is determined by the paradoxical element. "This paradoxical instance is the Event in which all events communicate and are distributed" (LS 56). In short, events are distributions of singularities in a problematic field which bestows a totality or whole by means of the the resonance subsisting between singularities. The

function of the paradoxical element consists in its potential of invention.

The paradoxical entity is likened by Deleuze to an ideal game which lacks preexisting categorical rules; a nonsense game in which chance is ramified to the *n*th degree. The time of nonsense is not the time of the present, but rather, it is the non-linear time of Aion in which the pure becoming of the past-future infinitive subsists, subdividing each present *ad infinitum* while stretching it out over the *straight line* of the labyrinth. It is this straight-line time that corresponds to the time of events. "Each event is the smallest time, smaller than the minimum of continuous thinkable time, because it is divided into proximate past and immanent future. But it is also the longest time, longer than the maximum of continuous thinkable time because it is endlessly subdivided by the Aion which renders it equal to its own unlimited line" (LS 63).

The paradoxical entity therefore is at once both word and thing, and possesses the power of saying its own sense. As esoteric word, nonsense enacts both a determination of signification and a denotation of sense. It is productive, and what it produces is sense itself. This production of sense is enacted by the circulation of the paradoxical entity throughout the series. This makes sense an effect of resonance, produced and distributed over the entire surface while maintaining an essential coextensiveness with its own cause. As Deleuze tells us: "Nonsense is that which has no sense, and that which, as such and as it enacts the denotation of sense, it is opposed to the absence of sense. This is what we must understand by nonsense" (LS 71).

By means of an example, Sydney Pollock's film *The Yakuza* proves itself more than adequate, specifically the manner in which a certain ideogram operates within it, mimicking traditional values of Japanese

culture. In actual fact, without this ideogram there would be no film, since all the divergent series which constitute it are brought into resonance around the ideogram, and from which the bestowal of sense is effected upon the distinct elements and scenes of the movie. The ideogram itself is called *Michi* and is interpreted as possessing various meanings such as, "a road, a path in the country, duty, obligation, and even God." The function of this ideogram is to produce an ethics wherein its crowning principle is sort through a total responsibility towards one's actions, since, as is postulated, it is only by paying one's own debts and discharging one's own obligations that one becomes and is recognised as a true (wo)man. The functioning of *Giri*,³⁸ meaning obligation, within the structure of Japanese ethics confuses the young American gangster, who consequently asks the Katana master why it is that they follow such a strict code of obedience when they neither believe in God nor in an afterlife where one's actions would be rewarded or punished according to a system of moral meritocracy. The swordsman answers paradoxically: it is *Giri* itself - that is, *Giri* is its own reason, or as Deleuze says; "it speaks its own sense". As such, it does not depend upon the propositional logic of signification, manifestation, and denotation, rather it functions immanently and requires no extra term or justifying principle. *Michi* therefore is a paradoxical element that traverses all the series producing ramifications of displacements and resonances between disjunctions. From this analysis we conclude that the structure of language is not fundamentally logically *a priori*, but rather, paradoxical and nonsensical.

³⁸ The functioning of the ideogram "Michi" and "Giri" appear interchangeable within the film. More than likely *Giri* is the concept for obligation, whereas *Michi* has a far wider extensivity, and thereby pertains properly to the paradoxical element.

3. Husserl is committed to a project whose task is to uncover the foundational apodictic truths which supposedly constitute the essence of the world. From the natural standpoint, Husserl tells us:

Evidence is, in an *extremely broad sense*, an 'experiencing' of something that is, and is thus; it is precisely a mental seeing of something itself . . . *Perfect evidence* and its correlate, *pure and genuine truth*, are given as ideas lodged in the striving for knowledge, for the fulfilment of one's meaning intention. By immersing ourselves in such a striving, we can extract those ideas from it.³⁹

This pure and genuine truth is not individual and contingent, but rather generic and necessary. For Husserl particular truths must attach themselves to a self-sufficient foundation that is purely eidetic. As we have seen, this essence or *eidos* is expressed by predicates and concepts.

An individual object is not simply and quite generally an individual, a 'this-there' something unique, but being constituted thus and thus '*in-itself*' it has *its own proper mode of being*, its own supply of *essential* predicables which must qualify it (*qua* "Being as it is in itself"), if other secondary relative determinations are to qualify it also.⁴⁰

This 'proper mode of being' - given by Husserl in the sense of a substantive: "as it is in itself" - is grasped, according to Husserl, by means of the phenomenological reduction which 'suspends' the material aspect of the phenomenological gaze, and thereby attests to the pure meaning-forms that manifest apodictic evidences. To achieve this, we must 'bracket out' or clear our phenomenological field of operation from any preconceived ideas, previously accepted standards and methods, and untested premises which would condition or prejudice our findings beforehand. For Husserl, the empirical sciences lack this phenomenological rigour and, therefore, lack apodictic certainty. The empirical sciences are founded upon historical layers of theoretical

³⁹ E. Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, § 5, p. 12.

⁴⁰ E. Husserl, *Ideas*, 1, § 2, p. 53.

sedimentation piled one on top of the other: the effect of this is a generalised obscuring of the originary character of our thematisations, of which it is the purpose of the phenomenological reduction to uncover. To this end, Husserl distinguishes between the objective and the ideal aspects of the sciences.

Pure logic aims at the ideal side of science, in respect to its form. It does not aim at the peculiar material of the various sciences or the peculiarity of their truths and forms of combination: it aims at what relates to truths and theoretical combinations of truths as such. For this reason every science must, on its objective, theoretical side, conform to the laws of logic, which are of an entirely ideal character.⁴¹

Note, that what Husserl means by objective is theory - that is to say, the materiality of the objective domain is wholly lacking: the objective remains an aspect of language. Thus, Husserl proposes to ground absolutely science as phenomenology within the purely eidetic. That is, to uncover "the historical meaning-structures given in the present, or their self-evidences, along with the documented chain of historical back-references into the hidden dimensions of the primal self-evidences which underlie them".⁴² In fact, the reduction has two moments: the bracketing of the natural world which suspends our belief in the associative relations that exists between sensible signs, and the bracketing of the developed ego of the natural standpoint, since it corresponds the apperceived world's supportive counterpart by virtue of its constitutive contiguity. With the neutralisation of the developed ego, what remains is pure intentionality, uncontaminated by both the developed self and the world. This reduction, Husserl believed, revealed the self-same origin and absolute foundation of all thought. As he tells us:

I can 'see' the 'seeing' itself in which this givenness, or this mode of being, is constituted

⁴¹ E. Husserl, *Origins of Geometry*, pp. 173-74.

⁴² E. Husserl, *Origins of Geometry*, p. 175.

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. . . I am now working on an absolute foundation: namely, this perception is, and remains as long as it lasts, something absolute, something here and now, something that in itself is what it is, something by which I can measure as by an ultimate standard what being and being given can mean and here must mean, at least, obviously, as far as the sort of being given is concerned which a 'here and now' exemplifies.⁴³

For Husserl, the Cartesian subject of 'reduction' is not abstract, but a lived reality and a self-sufficient or absolute entity with no need of anything upon which to found its being. This originary intuition acts as a standard by which we may measure what 'being' and 'being given', meaning and sense signify. By suspending the world, I do not reject it, but merely place it in parenthesis in order to go beyond its contingent characterisation, and thereby attain a more 'adequate' and 'rigorous' grasp of it. The intentionality that accompanies every perception is given as absolute: "as soon as I glance towards the flowing life and into the real present it flows through, and in so doing grasp myself as the pure subject of this life . . . I say forthwith and because I must: *I am*, this life is, I live: *cogito*."⁴⁴ Life is what it is through the *cogito*. 'I think therefore I am' is extended to 'I am therefore the world is'. The "I" is the guarantor of the World, as God is the Guarantor of the "I". The objects of the world can be doubted, whereas any experience given to the pure ego is necessary - it is evident to itself as an apodictic truth. By means of the reduction the eidetic radicality brings us to a transcendental radicality which provides us with the originary mode of presentation of an object. This mode of presentation is a pure intentionality related to its ideal object, and constituting the absolute foundation or apodictic certainty of experience in general.

From the preceding analysis it is clear that there corresponds to the reduction two fundamental aspects: the postulation of the transcendent

⁴³ E. Husserl, *Idea of Phenomenology*, p. 24.

⁴⁴ E. Husserl, *Ideas*, 1, § 46, p. 143.

as a conscious, or pure intentional milieu, and the apodictic certainty that is uncovered by the transcendental ego of the reduction. Let us examine the Deleuzean critique of both these attitudes.

a). As stated above, sense is neutral in relation to the proposition. One of the consequences of this neutrality is the undermining of the correspondence theory of truth. Husserl himself affirmed this neutrality, however;

what prevents him from conceiving sense as a full (impenetrable) neutrality is his concern with retaining in sense the rational mode of a good sense and a common sense, as he presents incorrectly the latter as a matrix or a 'non-modalized root-form' (*Urdoxa*). It is this same concern which makes him conserve the form of consciousness within the transcendental. (LS 102)

Both Husserl and Sartre maintained the idea that the transcendental constitutes a conscious field to which there corresponds, as an originary faculty, a common sense and a good sense. It is from this perspective that they were able to affirm the existence of a transcendental subject. Defining the transcendental in terms of a conscious milieu, imposes a complete disjunction within consciousness itself. In which case, consciousness is "either the root position of the real cogito under the jurisdiction of reason; or else neutralisation as . . . an 'improper cogito' . . . withdrawn from the jurisdiction of reason" (ibid). On the one hand, by defining the transcendental in terms of a conscious milieu, a reconciliation between the two extremes - bodies and language - of the disjunction becomes possible within the common medium of consciousness itself: a reconciliation that would constitute the uncovering of Being. On the other hand, if the transcendental is affirmed as an unconscious milieu that remains irreducible to consciousness, the possibility of reconciling the disjunction between the two extremes is permanently postponed. The material and ideal are

essentially irreducible to one another - they communicate via a virtual surface, but there exists no correspondence between the two. Foucault breaks with phenomenology principally on the point of intentionality. It is only by remaining on the level of language that we can affirm intentionality, likewise only by remaining on the level of the thing can we believe in a 'savage' experience. As Deleuze tells us:

But if phenomenology 'places things in parenthesis', as it claims to do, this ought to push it beyond words and phrases towards *statements*, and beyond things and states of things towards *visibilities*. But statements are not directed towards anything, since they are not related to a thing anymore than they express a subject but refer only to a language, a language-being, that gives them unique subjects and objects that satisfy particular conditions as immanent variables. And visibilities are not deployed in a savage world already opened up to a primitive (pre-predicative) consciousness, but refer only to a light, a light-being, which gives them forms, proportions and perspectives that are immanent in the proper sense - that is, free from any intentional gaze. (FU 109)

Therefore, Foucault analyses things and language within the irreducible dimension that generates them, and wherein intentionality collapses: "seeing and speaking means knowing . . . but we do not see what we speak about, nor do we speak about what we see" (Ibid). There can exist no savage experience, since everything is knowledge and knowledge is constituted by an irreducible double. In Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty the overcoming of intentionality is inclined towards Being as the fold, but only in order to found intentionality

in a new dimension: this is why the Visible or the Open does not give us something to see without also providing something to speak, since the fold will constitute the Self-seeing element of sight only if it also constitutes the Self -speaking element of language, to the point where it is the same world that speaks itself in language and sees itself in sight. (FU 111)

For Foucault, knowledge-Being is a double capture which necessarily flows from an unformed domain that is neither wholly intentional nor material. It is therefore incapable of reconciling the two distinct

forms constitutive of the encounter.

Deleuze understands the transcendental in terms of an unconscious domain, populated by impersonal and pre-individual singularities which are distributed in a problematic field: the Dionysian world of will to power wherein sense is discovered not as predicate but as verb, not as concept but as event. Only a theory of impersonal and pre-individual singular points can determine this field, as Deleuze writes:

A consciousness is nothing without a synthesis of unification, but there is no synthesis of unification of consciousness without the form of the I, or the point of view of the Self. What is neither individual nor personal are, on the contrary, emissions of singularities insofar as they occur on an unconscious surface and possess a mobile, immanent principle of auto-unification through a *nomadic distribution*, radically distinct from fixed and sedentary distributions as conditions of the synthesis of consciousness. (LS 102).

That is to say, we are unable to retain consciousness as a fundamental milieu, while at the same time we object to the form of the person and the point of view of individuation. It is the singularities themselves which preside over the genesis of individuals and persons. Furthermore, with reference to the Husserlean project in general, we are unable to make this depth speak in its purity and originality since, as Deleuze writes:

beyond the person and the individual, you *will discern* nothing . . . The new discourse is no longer that of the form, but neither is it that of the formless: it is rather that of the pure unformed . . . As for the subject of this discourse . . . [it] is this free, anonymous, and nomadic singularity. (LS 107)

Since the two extremes remain irreducible, the reduction must necessarily fail to deliver a moment of identity that would secure a conscious ego within the transcendental domain. The ego is an emergent quality from a domain populated by preindividual and non-personal singularities, much like the behaviour of ant or bee colonies whose

unity is not transcendent but immanent. This model is also applicable, on a macrocosmic level, to human societies whose mass of individuals correspond to so many singularities, the unity of which constitutes that particular society. It is not that the social form precedes the individuals, but that the individuals produce the form as effect. This idea has come to be known as the 'bottom-up' approach.

b). The second aspect concerns apodictic truth; the self-presence of truth in relation to the proposition. By defining the transcendental in terms of an unconscious milieu, all hope of uncovering absolute certainty is dissipated. Truth itself is now seen to be founded on a model of sense constituted between two irreducible causalities, each constituted by three stages within a genetic process. To the material causality there corresponds the ontological genesis, and to the ideal causality there corresponds a logical genesis. We will look at the ontological dimension first.

Firstly, individuation: an individual is always inalienable from a world. Above we characterised the transcendental as a distribution of singular points within a problematic field; what concerns us now is the process of genesis from the nomadic singular distributions to the actualisation of individuals and their conjoined worlds. As we have seen, singularities converge, and in their convergence centres are produced, or rather, circles around which a system of singular points are organised: such a singularity is an individual. Bodies are just such circles. Moreover, bodies converge with singularities exterior to their own singular points: this secondary convergence is what constitutes the world of an individual. In fact, in the World there subsists an infinity of centres; a veritable melee of singular points and centres of individuation which constitutes the World and the worldly individuals that populate it. "An individual is therefore always in a world as a

circle of convergence, and a world may be formed and thought only in the vicinity of the individuals which occupy or fill it" (LS 110). To be actualised means simply this rule of convergence, which defines the concept of *compossibility*. On the other hand, where a series of singular points diverge another world begins; this divergence is what is meant by *impossibility*. The expression of an individuated world *exists* only in individuals as a predicate, but, *subsists* as a verb in the continuum of singularities. Therefore, on one plane we have the continuum of singularities which preside over the constitution of individuals, and on the other plane we have the individuals which express the compossibilities and impossibilities of the continuum itself. Individuals are instances of analytical propositions of the order: "Fred exists". Secondly, a problem potentially possesses various instances of different solutions which correspond to it. Deleuze demonstrates this point by providing us with the celebrated Bergsonian example of the different "equation[s] of conic sections" which can be comprehended as "circle, ellipse, hyperbola, parabola, straight line" (LS 114). From this he concludes:

We must therefore understand that impossible worlds, despite their impossibility, have something in common - something objectively in common - which represents the ambiguous sign of the genetic element in relation to which several worlds appear as instances of solution for one and the same problem (every throw, the result of a single cast). (LS 114).

This commonality between impossibilities is described by synthetic predicates of persons. Persons are instances of synthetic propositions of the order: "Fred has two arms and two legs". These two elements of individuation and personalisation correspond to good sense and common sense respectively. But in view of the principle of their production within a transcendental field, both are continually endangered by the

irreducible disparity or fragility which constitutes them. The third element of the ontological genesis corresponds to the multiple classes and the various properties which depend on persons. Classes as a third type of proposition are of the order: "Fred is human".

Individuals and persons are embodied in ontological propositions: infinite analytic predicates are individuals, while finite synthetic predicates are persons. However, Deleuze tells us:

The third element of the ontological genesis . . . is not embodied in a third proposition which would again be ontological. Rather, this element sends us over to another order of the proposition, and constitutes the conditions or the form of possibility of the logical proposition in general. In relation to this condition and simultaneously with it, individuals and persons no longer play the role of ontological propositions. They act now as material instances which realise the possibility and determine within the logical proposition the relations necessary to the existence of the conditioned. (LS 118).

In the order of the logical genesis what is primary is signification or the conditions of possibility in general. But signification refers to manifestation which grounds signification in the ontological order upon the person. Manifestation, in turn, refers to denotation to the extent that the person is grounded upon the individual. And vice versa: "From denotation to manifestation, then to signification" (LS 16). Thus the circularity of the proposition emerges in its genesis. Sense, therefore, not only engenders "the logical proposition with its determinate dimensions . . . it engenders also the objective correlates of this proposition which were themselves first produced as ontological propositions" (LS 120). However, there is no strict correspondence between the dimensions of the ontological genesis and the logical genesis, between propositions in general and their objective correlates - between denotation and individuation, manifestation and persons, signification and classes and properties - but only a kind of "relay which permits every sort of shifting and jamming" (LS 119). The

movement of language is not linear but circular. The signifier does not absolutely relate to the corresponding signified on a one to one basis, but rather every sign is a signifier that refers to another signifier *ad infinitum*: the indefinite regress of signification.

The notion, therefore, of an apodictic certainty collapses in light of the essential disparity which presides over the geneses of good sense and common sense. Although we have described sense in terms of form, this is not strictly the case: form is essentially rhythm, a resonance out of which a seemingly stable pattern is abstractly extracted as a surplus value. Four essential aspects arise from what has preceded: i). the relation between desire and language places in question any claim to a purely rational or logical meaning. ii). Propositions - analytic propositions included - are always-already infected by a general grammar. iii). The possibility of a freedom from repression - the hegemony of the repressive signifier that the logical *a priori* authorises - is realised within just such a generalised grammar of the 'material' sign. iv). Essentially, the 'material' sign is not expressive but productive.

4. In *Proust and Signs*, Deleuze distinguishes between three kinds of machine: machines productive of partial objects; machines productive of resonance, and machines productive of the forced movement. The first corresponds to the raw material presented for interpretation; the second constitutes the particular style which "sets up a resonance between any two objects and from them extracts a 'precious image,' substituting for the determined conditions of an unconscious natural product the free conditions of an artistic production" (PS 137). Thirdly, the idea of death sweeps away the resonant moments inaugurating the time of the Other. We have discussed the first two in relation to

Husserl. However, Deleuze's transformation of a phenomenology into a transcendental empiricism ultimately derives its force from this last machine, and which in all probability corresponds to a transformation of the Husserlean category of 'hypothetical propositions'. The aim is to tap into the *profoudure* of nonsense and turn it into a veritable creative impetus. In relation to sense, Deleuze tells us:

the gift of sense occurs only when the conditions of signification are also being determined. The terms of the series, once provided with sense, will subsequently be submitted to these conditions, in a tertiary organisation which will relate them to the laws of possible indications and manifestations....This presentation of a total deployment at the surface is necessarily affected, at each of these points, by an extreme and persistent fragility. (LS 81).

Located upon a fragile and 'cracked' surface, sense is constantly in danger of collapsing into a terrifying *profondure*, in which the meaningful world collapses but also wherein one is absorbed into a universal depth where everything becomes physical, and where the word loses its meaning and power to express. Within this universal profundity, what remain are only bodies and their depths. There is no longer a separation between bodies and language, since words themselves have become physical: everything is mixture without sense; everything is physical. Words fragment and merge with unbearable sonorous qualities, and in so doing penetrate, lacerate, and poison our bodies. In F. Scott Fitzgerald, this poisonous power of the word is described in terms of an identification "*with the objects of my horror or compassion.*"⁴⁵ This "hell" or what Deleuze elsewhere calls after Artaud the 'theatre of cruelty,' corresponds to the 'failed' schizophrenic position which has fallen through the cracks in the surface - that is to say, it is never desirable to totally fall into such a depth, but to simply employ its potential, as the 'forced movement' of

⁴⁵ F. Scott Fitzgerald, *The Crack-Up*, p. 52.

the death drive, in the service of constructing a sense-surface. Therefore, a distinction arises between breakdown and breakthrough. The possibility of collapse into breakdown, and the subsequent loss of the power to lift oneself out of that formless depth, constitutes a real danger. In this sense, Deleuze courts a paradoxical death by advocating a certain metamorphosis, while simultaneously alerting us of the necessity for maintaining a certain "control." Many Western intellectuals quite simply 'lose-it': E. Hemingway, J. Kerouac, M. Lowry, and F. Scott Fitzgerald. Perhaps this 'likely eventuality' is an effect of finding oneself a product of "a generation grown up to find all Gods dead, all wars fought, all faiths in man shaken." Is the individual therefore capable of becoming that Nietzschean 'overman', or quite simply is it impossible to sustain an existence lacking in any unifying principle and ideal? No doubt, this exigency constitutes the most demanding task to which post-modern ethics could direct its efforts: toward a new ideal by which we could live, besides the ideal of heterogeneity. This non-idealistic ideal is, for Fitzgerald, the "hold[ing] in balance of the sense of futility of effort and the sense of the necessity to struggle . . . If I could do this through the common ills - domestic, professional and personal - then the ego would continue as an arrow shot from nothingness to nothingness with such force that only gravity would bring it to earth at last."⁴⁶ This balancing act Deleuze has elsewhere termed the "Governance of Temperance," and corresponds to an eternal game of equilibrating between the 'not enough' and the 'too much.' Can we now merely look forward to the profession of 'tight-rope' walking. Isn't that what Zarathustra began with, and then went on to search for something more! Clearly the 'forced movement' corresponds to something more; a persistent

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

falling-down of the tight-rope walker.

Essentially we construct for ourselves a World-Form by which we live and give ourselves meanings, beliefs and directions. On the one hand, breakdown is when the World-Form in toto collapses and we have nothing to replace it with: it all happened too fast and was a process over which we had no control. Breakdown is an identification with the becoming process. Thus, when collapse occurs becoming-other is not possible because only the terrifying becoming process is experienced: there is no longer a Self who becomes, only the process of becoming itself. On the other hand, breakthrough corresponds to a free flowing process of becoming Other, the Other being the necessary complement of the self - together they form a composite. Breakthrough corresponds to a transgressing a specificity within our World-Form, an overcoming of its limits and a substitution of it with a modified form. Thereby the World-Form is constantly metamorphosing throughout a life span, and bears little resemblance at death to what it was at adolescence. An eternal process of transformation. "Was not this, however, the epitome of art, the very model of the reality of artistic creation? In order for Yuichi's desire to come into reality, either his desire or his concept of what was real must perish. In this world it is believed art and reality live quietly side by side; but art must dare to break the laws of reality. Why? In order that it alone may exist."⁴⁷ The reality of the world, or rather, the manner in which we identify with a certain World-Form must be perpetually challenged by means of the impersonal and pre-individual process of desire. But this challenging must not take the form of a 'feet-first' approach, but must be employed as a gentle and gradual questioning, dismantling and rebuilding of our structural World-Form. We must not identify, nor must we move too fast. Like

⁴⁷ Y. Mishima, *Forbidden Colours*, p. 33.

artists, painstakingly chipping away at a marble block in order to realise an artistic production which is ourselves, but in actuality never realising, never completing, but continually chipping away, prudently and patiently. Therefore, Deleuze tells us, in relation to an 'effective' schizophrenia:

it is less a question of recovering meaning than of destroying the word, of conjuring up the affect, and of transforming the painful passion of the body into a triumphant action, obedience into command, always in this depth beneath the fissured surface. (LS 88).

This triumphant action involves the creation of "breath-words" and "howl-words" which are incapable of being decomposed into fragments, and whose values are purely *tonic* as opposed to written: language without articulation. Therefore, the 'effective' schizophrenic lives an action-passion ambivalence, racked as (s)he is between the inseparable extremes of pain and insufflation. Ultimately, the schizophrenic is unable to transform all corruption constituting this ambivalence into a perfect fluid mixture. Nonetheless, to the value of the howl-words there corresponds a glorious *Body without Organs* - that is, an "ocean-mass" within which these tonic values resonate without limit. These howl-words are fusions of consonants, similar to those portmanteau words used by Lewis Carroll and Antonin Artaud. As Artaud tells us:

Those howls, those rolling eyes, that unceasing abstraction, those sounds of branches, of chopping and log-rolling, all in a vast expanse of sounds flowing out from several outlets at once, all combine to give rise in our minds, to crystallise a new concept, what one might term a concrete concept of the abstract.⁴⁸

It is within this region that we catch a glimpse, or rather hear the thunderclap of Being - that is, Univocal Being. This univocity implies a polyvocality, and constitutes a violence against the logical *a priori*, and a concerted destruction of the hegemonic signifier - that is to say, a

⁴⁸ A. Artaud, *The Theatre of Cruelty*, p. 48.

nonsense erected as a forced movement or death drive, a polyvocality that undermines all relations. Moreover, nonsense produces its own sense, since the code immanent to the paradoxical element finds its own solution. But why vocal? In James Joyce we find the same assertion being made. In *Ulysses*, almost from the very start it begins with: "Ineluctable modality of the visible: at least that if no more, thought through my eyes. Signatures of all things I am here to read."⁴⁹ But then he immediately questions this modality, questions the fundamentality of line and colour; the "[l]imit of the diaphane," and shuts down his occularcentrism in order to explore his surroundings acoustically. Immediately we sense an element of schizophrenia being injected into the language, a solidifying of individual sound and a certain undecidability as regards personnel identity. In *Finnegan's Wake*, Joyce's art has become a pure symptomology where every word, every proper name is infected by equivocation and the repetition of the partial objects constitutive of language. The hero is called "Earwicker," affirming the fact that the ineluctable modality now belongs to the voice. We enter a veritable "echoland" in which we find it hard, if not futile, to locate the subject matter in the verb; a domain wherein all images have a phonetic form and only appear in the disguise of things. Therefore, to our original question; why voice, we answer; within the economy of the psyche the ear has a certain privilege in the constitution of the proper name.

Let us not conclude that redemption is to be found in the depths of bodies. What the above analysis exemplifies is the existence of an

⁴⁹ J. Joyce, *Ulysses*, p.31.

experience which is non-purposive and non-intentionalistic⁵⁰ to a degree. Perhaps the same could be said of autistics who fail to understand the pronouns "me" and "you," and who are often extremely violent and commonly artistic. They lack however social skills. The last point is of great importance. The sage, as pacifier or equilibrator between the heights - as an over-zealous disposition for rationality - and the depths - as a total collapse into the action-passion ambivalence - corresponds to an ethical operation which seeks to preserve the meaningful world while infusing it with a certain metamorphic motility.

Therefore, to the time of Aion there corresponds the "crack" which extends its straight line at the surface in the form of the past-future infinitive. This *wound*, which all of us bear, is the locus of originary genetic thought, and which it is necessary to actualise in the depth of bodies in the temporal form of chronos. Pure events are what the sage discovers at the surface.

Returned to the surface, the sage discovers objects-events, all of them communicating in the void which constitutes their substances; he discovers the Aion in which they are sketched out and developed without ever filling it up. The event is the identity of form and void. (LS 136).

The event, as identity of form and void is the site of sense co-present with its own nonsense, and is that which reveals the impossibility of both a purely idealistic language and a physical language. The sage always starts at the event, and moves in the direction of its spatio-

⁵⁰ If intentionality is always an intention for something, then a residual intentionality always remains no matter how fragmented or partial our global perceptions have been rendered. As long as we are aware of even the smallest parts, whether ocular or verbal, an intentionality necessarily accompanies that particular sensibility. There can be no crystallisation into new concepts of the understanding without intention: not an intentionality which would predetermine the ordering of fragments, nor an intentionality that would recognise objects and words prior to contextualization, but certainly an accompanying awareness. Interestingly, this notion of awareness, rather than intention, brings us closer to a Buddhist understanding, and which we will touch on shortly, since certain parallels between Zen practice and Deleuzian philosophy are replete throughout the latter's writings.

temporal actualisation - that is, "the quasi-cause does not create, it "operates," and wills only what comes to pass" (LS 147). This formulation represents the Stoic ethic wherein the non-linearity of past and future are the starting point of a movement which aims toward a pure instant. An example of such an instant would be Rostov's calvary charge through the borderland which divided life from death, and wherein he completely lost all fear and self-consciousness in the "joy of the gallop," becoming "more lively and excited every moment," as the experience of the pure event - to live-to die - becomes more and more crystalline, as the delirium carried him "forward with supernatural swiftness"⁵¹ towards the pure instant wherein chronic time ceases. This ethical procedure must be conceived in terms of mimeticism.

The actor thus actualises the event, but in a way which is entirely different from the actualisation of the event in the depth of things. Or rather, the actor redoubles this cosmic, or physical actualisation, in his own way, which is singularly superficial - but because of it more distinct, trenchant and pure. Thus, the actor delimits the original, disengages from it in an abstract line, and keeps from the event only its contour and its splendour, becoming thereby the actor of one's own events - a *counter-actualization*. (LS 150).

Therefore, counter-actualization does not imply an inner subject which expresses itself in its purity, rather it is a material process actualised through a pure event. This ethical procedure necessarily entails an overcoming of *ressentiment* and *bad conscience*; by making ourselves worthy of whatever happens to us, we apportion no blame and pass no judgments, neither do we see ourselves as being irredeemably guilty within divine plot. Rather, we become children of circumstance, mere actors upon a stage whose role asks of us nothing less than the expression of pure *cruelty*.

⁵¹ L. Tolstoy, *War and Peace*, p. 199.

Such non-purposive behaviour is exemplified by Prince Andrew's military action at Austerwitz: the Prince does not engage in a discriminative act between fighting and fleeing, but rather, allows the quasi-cause to operate through him. Since, he had no time to utter words and, therefore, no time to think, before he "was jumping off his horse and running to the flag."⁵² An important question arises: what is it that determines whether Prince Andrew will fight or flee? Or rather, how does the quasi-cause operate, or through what does it operate? The quasi-cause operates through sensibility, or the passionate body which is given to us by chance as our "lot": hence, the ethical principle of making ourselves worthy of what ever happens to us. That is, "if you don't *feel* it, then you won't do it." This analysis of ethics topples the hegemony of reason by prioritising the role played by sensibility in relation to action.

Counter-actualisation therefore represents a transcendence of the form of individuation; a transcendence which is possible since all events communicate in one and the same Event, by means of the quasi-causality which expresses their noncausal correspondences. If individuals are to transcend their form, they must be able to make the disjunctions between individuals communicate. For this reason Deleuze, unlike Leibniz, does not make a negative use of the rule of impossibility, but rather, he makes of it an affirmation. Things are affirmed by virtue of their difference, not their identity: Nietzsche's 'pathos of distance.' Thus, each of the terms of a duality are an evaluation of the other term; health is evaluated in terms of sickness and vice versa. It is through the affirmation of difference, as difference in itself, that disjunction becomes a veritable synthesis. Thereby: "The communication of events replaces the exclusion of

⁵² L. Tolstoy, *War and Peace*, P. 298.

predicates" (LS 174). This disjunctive synthesis affirms the communication between individuals within Univocal Being.

As the individual affirms the distance, she follows and joins it, passing through all the other individuals implied by the other events, and extracts from it a unique Event which is once again herself, or rather the universal freedom. (LS 178).

In summery: On the one hand, Husserl makes a fundamental distinction between two kinds of sign: between expression and indication; meaning and sense. Husserl locates meaning in the pure dimension of expression, while sense is relegated to the material sign of indication. Meaning is reduced to a purely logical process of signification in general and wholly for consciousness: an eternal object and ideal objectivity divorced from the world of contingency and materiality. On the other hand, Deleuze does not make sense exclusively a correlate of consciousness, but rather makes it *both* an expression *and* a denotation; both conscious and unconscious. Sense is the expressed of a proposition presented in the form of the noematic verb, *and* an attribute of a state of affairs presented in the form of a substantive. Sense therefore in Deleuze's understanding of the term is a double sided entity which does not merge with the proposition any more than with a state of affairs, it is something indeterminate between both the proposition and the thing. By means of the critique of the form-content dualism and a situating of sense upon a surface 'between' the two extremes, Deleuze is able to avoid the metaphysical gesture characteristic of phenomenology: that of prioritising the *a priori* side of consciousness over the materiality of its signs. The phenomenon is distributed across both extremes in the form of the infinitive verb which corresponds to a pure becoming. Through this process, the phenomenon loses its ideality and is metamorphosed into a *phantasm*. In this manner, Deleuze locates the

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ontological within a signifying space participated by both ideality and physicality, without identifying it with either, nor making of this duality a unifying monism. By defining the transcendental in terms of preindividual and non-personal singularities the transcendental ego and logical *a priori* structure of language lose their privilege. Now, nonsense constitutes the foundation of sense, its genetic force. Essentially, then, Deleuze's theory articulates a model of an 'always questionable' communication between disparate elements to which we respond intuitively, rather than the revealing of a wholly rational instant of apodicticality.

Chapter III

Transcendental Empiricism¹

Having analysed the virtual event from the subjective point of view, we will now deal with it from the perspective of materialism or empiricism. Together both perspectives will allow us to grasp the essence of the plane of immanence more comprehensively and thereby avoid any prioritisation of either. For these reasons evolutionary biology must now compose the essential component of this chapter, showing how the production of the organism - and therefore subjectivity - ultimately depends on biophysical and biopsychical processes emergent from a domain of internal differentiation. To this end we will focus on four themes: 1. Deleuze's appropriation of Bergson; 2. The idea of a biopsychism in Freud; 3. The contributions to this field of genetics, specifically in relation to J. Monod and J. Piaget. 4. As a critique of the purely genetic model, we will unfold process philosophy in terms of embryology as a developmental process of differentiation and individuation within an implicate order.

1. In Deleuze's *Bergsonism*, composites are divided into two halves or tendencies: spatial and durational. The former is quantitative (difference in degree), and the latter is qualitative (difference in kind). Spatial configuration is always homogeneous, whereas duration

¹ By this title we wish to emphasise the supersensible, or non-linguistic animal communication and perception, in experience in general. "The eagle, which swoops on its prey from a great height, sees a magnified image at the centre of its field of vision, while some snakes have sophisticated infrared detectors and can effectively 'see' their prey in total darkness. Pigeons learn to associate particular smells with their home area and rely on this to find their way, while monarch butterflies use the Earth's magnetic field to find their way in their annual 4000-kilometre migration. Bats dart around at high speed, guided by a system of echo location as complex as that of any radar; the kangaroo rat has a sense of hearing so acute that it can hear the rattle of an approaching snake's scales and leap to safety. Plants are able to detect changing daylength and open their flowers to coincide with the activity of pollinating insects: they are so accurate that they can be arranged into a 'floral clock'" (John Downer, *Supersense*). We are yet to discover what the human body is capable of, what hidden faculties it possesses.

possesses rhythms that differ in ways of being in time. Composites represent the facts of experience, while tendencies exist only in principle. In this manner "[w]e go beyond experience, toward the conditions of experience" (B 23). The composite is experience itself; it is by tracing the lines of divergence that we are guided toward the conditions of real experience (percepts²) wherein that which differs in kind is experienced. Real experience is both spatial and durational. Both aspects combine: space corresponds to the form of extrinsic distinctions - homogeneous and discontinuous cut ups; and duration corresponds to a purely internal succession of immediate data - heterogeneous and continuous. "[T]he subjective, or duration, is the *virtual*. To be more precise, it is the virtual insofar as it is actualised, in the course of being actualised, it is inseparable from the movement of its actualisation" (B 42-3). Space is objective quantitative differentiation in degree; duration is subjective qualitative discrimination in kind (difference in kind thus corresponds to Plato's 'lines of descent'). In this manner, Bergson redefines the concept of movement in terms of a duration, or a becoming that endures. But this does not imply a purely psychological experience:

It is only to the extent that movement is grasped as belonging to things as much as to consciousness that it ceases to be confused with psychological duration, whose point of application it will displace, thereby necessitating that things participate directly in duration itself. If qualities exist in things no less than they do in consciousness, if there is a movement of qualities outside myself, things must, of necessity, endure in their own way. (B 48)

This naturally opens onto an ontological duration. "What Bergson calls 'pure recollection' has no psychological existence. This is why it is called *virtual*, inactive, and unconscious . . . Only the present is

² Percepts are not concepts which condition experience, but rather the very conditions of real experience itself. The appeal is to a theory of sensible faculties, rather than a psychologism of the understanding.

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'psychological'; but the past is pure ontology" (B 55-6). Hence, the pure past - the quantum theory in terms of a sum over histories - is not an endurance graspable through subjective intuition, it is a material or cosmic memory accessible through 'reminiscence'. That is, recollection is preserved in the historical and evolutionary process of the universe in the form of a massive Memory: an inhuman memory or Mnemosyne. For this reason we must place ourselves in the past by means of a '*leap into ontology*.' "The past and the present do not denote two successive moments, but two elements which coexist: One is the present, which does not cease to pass, and the other is the past, which does not cease to be but through which all presents pass. It is in this sense that there is a pure past" (B 59). The pure past affirms an ontological Memory which serves as the foundation of the unfolding of time. Thus, *all* our past coexists with each present.

While the past coexists with its own present, and while it coexists with itself on various levels of contraction, we must recognise that the present itself is only the most contracted level of the past. This Time it is pure present and pure past, pure perception and pure recollection as such, pure matter and pure memory that now have only differences of expansion . . . and contraction and thus rediscover an ontological unity. (B 74)

Furthermore, this introduces repetition into duration, since the whole of the past is *repeated* in each present, slightly transformed in accordance with the specificities and circumstances of the present excitation.

"We said of life that, from its origin, it is the continuation of one and the same impetus, divided into divergent lines of evolution."³ Life is essentially the perpetuation of a primordial drive, which becomes differentiated during the process of evolution. This impetus corresponds to the vitalism immanent within all biological life-forms

³ H. Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, p. 56.

and is corroborated by the fact that evolution has repeatedly come up with the same solutions to certain problems; i.e., the independent evolution of the eye has occurred at least forty times during the history of this planet. Hence, Bergson infers that there must be a teleological element involved, which rules out the possibility of life evolving purely by the accumulation of chance mutations. Bergson conceives this telos as belonging to a whole which becomes divided while maintaining an essential programme that allows evolution to come up with the same inventions repeatedly. Hence, Bergson is anti-Darwinian, not accepting that exogenous factors *alone* constitute the diversity and increasing complexification of life. Nonetheless, they do play a significant part.

Now, we see that identical structures have been formed on independent lines of evolution by a gradual accumulation of effects. How can accidental causes, occurring in an accidental order, be supposed to have repeatedly come to the same result, the causes being infinitely numerous and the effect infinitely complicated?⁴

Neither is he neo-Lamarckian: one who upholds the notion of an inner directing principle, while placing too much emphasis on conscious behaviour or psychologism.

Certain neo-Lamarckians do indeed resort to a cause of a psychological nature. There, to our thinking, is one of the most solid positions of neo-Lamarckism. But if this cause is nothing but the conscious effort of the individual, it cannot operate in more than a restricted number of cases - at most in the animal world, and not at all in the vegetable kingdom.⁵

Rather, Bergson holds that the vitalism immanent to life must be an unconscious impetus that gets divided along the divergent lines of evolution. This division constitutes the fundamental cause of variation; thus life proceeds not by association and addition, but by

⁴ Ibid, p. 80.

⁵ Ibid, p. 91-2.

differentiation and bifurcation. The process of differentiation is simultaneously integrated in a unity or whole: organs although constituted by an extreme complexity of individual parts and processes, nonetheless constitute a functional whole. "This contrast between the complexity of the organ and the unity of the function is what gives us pause."⁶ The operation of assembling and organising all the parts into a functional whole suggests a process of invention crafted by an *intelligent* impetus, rather than the handiwork of a 'blind watchmaker'. Thus Bergson contrasts a process of manufacture which works from the periphery to the centre, from an artistic tendency toward organising which works from the centre to periphery - that is, from essence to actuality.

If now we are asked why and how it is implied therein, we reply that life is, more than anything else, a tendency to act on inert matter. The direction of this action is not predetermined; hence the unforeseeable variety of forms of life, in evolving, sows along its path. But this action always presents, to some extent, the character of contingency; it implies at least a rudiment of choice. Now a choice involves the anticipatory idea of several possible actions. Possibilities of action must therefore be marked out for the living being before the action itself.⁷

These possibilities are inscribed within the impetus in the form of potential tendencies immanent within life itself.

For Bergson, the movement of evolution is determined by a virtual potential which is 'beyond' the physico-chemical properties of matter, and which he identifies with the subjective or conscious processes. That is, although he grasps the dynamics of the virtual in terms of a process which operates unconsciously and inhumanly at all levels of existence, from the material to the psychic, he gives it the property of a vital force. There is implied in Bergson's *Creative Evolution* a

⁶ Ibid, p. 93.

⁷ Ibid, p. 102.

veritable Theosophical tradition in the manner it perceives the cosmos as a creation by a 'superconsciousness' that is beyond the comprehension of human intelligence. This divine consciousness is ours, we are part of it, each individual in his limited capacity. It is through this essential belonging that Bergson believes that we may remerge with the vital impetus. The leap into ontology is possible only through 'intuition'. Bergsonian intuition is a deductive method in search of the absolute, grounding its truth claims on the basis of a romantic idealisation of the irrational and a direct experience of the whole. As he tells us: "the interdependence of consciousness and brain is limited . . . the destiny of consciousness is not bound up on that account with the destiny of cerebral matter."⁸

However, the vitalist tradition remains pertinent in that it articulates evolution in terms of an intelligent behavioural *modus operandi* that is not wholly conscious, as in Lamarckism, but rather unconscious and virtual. As F. Jacob tells us in relation to the overcoming of mechanism and finalism:

With the application to heredity of the concept of programme, certain biological contradictions formerly summed up in a series of antitheses at last disappear: finality and mechanism, necessity and contingency, stability and variation. The concept of programme blends two notions which had always been intuitively associated with living beings: memory and design. By 'memory' is implied the traits of the parents, which heredity brings out in the child. By 'design' is implied the plan which controls the formation of an organism down to the last detail.⁹

The two most eminent events to have occurred on Earth are the emergence of life and the emergence of thought: heredity and mind. The former tends toward reductionism, the latter toward finalism. The goal of any contemporary theory on evolution must be to provide an account

⁸ Ibid, p. 285.

⁹ F. Jacob, *The Logic of Life*, p. 2.

for the emergence of these two extreme positions without falling into the idealism of prioritising any one over the other. Only through ontology can both extremes be transcended, and the powers constituting those extremes adequately postulated. It follows from the fact of transcendence that these powers must be essentially fluid, combining to form open systems that are both metastable and forward looking.

It is the subjective prioritising that we locate in Bergson that Deleuze wishes to redress. To this end, he affirms three distinct syntheses of time, to which there corresponds three different forms of repetition. We will now analyse each of these in turn.

A). The first synthesis of time corresponds to what Deleuze, appropriating from Hume and Bergson, calls habit. This originary synthesis functions by means of the repetition of discontinuous instants. On the one hand, a succession of instants, such as the strikes on a gong or the 'tick-tocks' of a clock, constitute a "discontinuity and instantaneity in repetition", wherein the presentation of one element does not arrive without the prior departure of the previous presentation. The repeated 'tick-tocks' remain identical in-themselves and present a series of elementary excitations that are essentially unthinkable. On the other hand, from the point of view of the mind which contemplates this series of disparate elements, something new is extracted which produces a change *in* the mind. That which is extracted is 'expectation'; e.g., the waiting in anticipation for the arrival of the next 'tick-tock'. In this manner habits are formed out of a repetition of disparate elements. However, "[a] succession of instants does not constitute time any more than it causes it to disappear; it indicates only its constantly aborted moment of birth. Time is constituted only in the originary synthesis which operates on the

repetition of instants" (DR 70). Within this dimension of time, the past is constituted by a retention of contracted instants, and the future is constituted within the 'expected' arrival of the next repetition in relation to the contraction. Past, present and future are not distinct elements within this dimension of time, but rather the dimensions of a single contracted instant. "In any case, this synthesis must be given a name: passive synthesis. Although it is constitutive it is not, for all that, active. It is not carried out by the mind, but occurs *in* the mind which contemplates, prior to all memory and all reflection. Time is subjective, but in relation to the subjectivity of a passive subject" (DR 71).

Therefore, from the perspective of the passive synthesis we may speak of the physiology of affect, which corresponds to a contraction of elementary excitations. All organisms are constituted by this process of contraction: contraction thus constitutes the organism's primary sensibility and passive synthesis. As Deleuze tells us:

Every organism, in its receptive and perceptual elements, but also in its viscera, is the sum of contractions, of retentions and expectations. At the level of this primary vital sensibility, the lived present constitutes a past and a future in time. Need is the manner in which this future appears, as the organic form of expectation. The retained past appears in the form of cellular heredity . . . Each contraction, each passive synthesis, constitutes a sign which is interpreted or deployed in active synthesis. (DR 73)

In short, the originary synthesis of time is constituted upon both a passive synthesis or contraction of a quantity of elementary excitations, and an active synthesis which manifests a qualitative interpretation of the contraction. This contraction is the product of a 'contemplative' soul, that is, a soul which fuses together the repetitions of similar instances into a certain compound. Everything is primarily constituted by a multitude of passive syntheses; an assemblage of minute habits which compose us organically. "We do not

contemplate ourselves, but we exist only in contemplating - that is to say, in contracting that from which we come" (DR 74). The originary synthesis constitutes time as a living present, wherein the past and future are not understood as distinct elements from this present, but rather as dimensions of it. The present passes in time since it is constituted upon the contraction of a number of instances of which the past is the sum of retentions, and the future the full 'weight' of this retention projected in the form of expectation. This living present varies depending on the particular organism; depending, that is, on the rhythms¹⁰ by which the organism innately contemplates.

These thousands of habits of which we are composed...thus form the basic domain of passive syntheses. The passive self is not defined simply by receptivity . . . but by virtue of the contractile contemplation which constitutes the organism itself before it constitutes the sensations. This self, therefore, is by no means simple: it is not enough to relativise or pluralise the self, all the while retaining for it a simple attenuated form. Selves are larval subjects . . . There is a self everywhere a furtive contemplation has been established . . . The self does not undergo modifications, it is itself a modification - this term designating precisely the difference drawn. Finally, one is only what one *has*: here, being is formed or the passive self *is*, by having. (DR 78-9)

This multitude of habits constitutes what will determine the desire-structure of an organism, not in terms of lack, but rather as a positive drive toward a need - that is, a need that constitutes its very being. In this sense we can say that repetition is inscribed in need, since it corresponds to the compulsion to repeat an organically formed habit.

B). The passive synthesis of habit - *Habitus* - constitutes the foundation of time as the living present, but a present which passes. Our question is now; what causes the present to pass? For the present

¹⁰ It is David Epstein's contention, in *Shaping Time*, that human beings are constituted upon and driven by a whole mass of interrelated biological clocks, the rhythms of which structure our experience, and not only physically, but emotionally and intellectually too. These rhythms capture the fundamental manner in which we process time, and explain the preferences that we entertain in musical appreciation, since our preferred music is intrinsically compatible with our own neuro-biological make-up.

to be present it must not pass but be present. However, for the original synthesis to be a real synthesis of time, it must constitute this present as a passing present. This paradox leads us to conclude that there exists another time in which the time of the present in general may come to pass. That is, even though habit functions as the foundation of time, it itself must be grounded in something more profound if the present which habit constitutes is to pass. "The claim of the present is precisely that it passes. However, it is what causes the present to pass, that to which the present and habit belong, which must be considered the ground of time. It is memory that grounds time" (DR 79). Memory, or the second synthesis of time, must not be confused with the active synthesis which is built upon the passive synthesis of habit, but rather, must itself be conceived in terms of a passive synthesis. Mnemosyne: the being of the past in general. The active synthesis of memory, which is the principle of representation, has two aspects: it is capable of both reflecting on the present present, and reproducing the former present. However, this principle of representation requires an additional element.

It is with respect to the pure element of the past, understood as the past in general, as an *a priori* past, that a given former present is reproducible and the present present is able to reflect itself. Far from being derived from the present or from representation, the past is presupposed by every representation. In this sense, the active synthesis of memory may well be founded upon the (empirical) passive synthesis of habit, but on the other hand it can be grounded only by another (transcendental) passive synthesis which is peculiar to memory itself. (DR 81)

It follows that what Deleuze means by 'transcendental empiricism', is that our primary form of affectivity, or the passive synthesis of habit, constitutes the foundation of our sensibility, and this sensibility takes place within the transcendental dimension of a pure past which always eludes the present. After the manner of Bergson, Deleuze articulates

four paradoxes which necessarily follow from this position: the contemporaneity of the past with the present; the coexistence of *all* the past with the present; the preexistence of the past in general; and the coexistence of the past with itself in an infinity of degrees of relaxation and contraction at an infinity of levels: the pure past as a virtual dimension. Therefore:

Between the two repetitions, the material and the spiritual, there is a vast difference . . . As a result, the two repetitions stand in very different relations to 'difference' itself. Difference is drawn from one in so far as the elements or instants are contracted within a living present. It is included in the other in so far as the Whole includes the difference between its levels . . . In consequence the difference between presents themselves is that between the two repetitions: that of the elementary instants from which difference is subtracted, and that of the levels of the whole in which difference is included" (DR 84).

Both the passive syntheses are sub-representative, but once they come under the action of the active synthesis they are subordinated to the form of representation. The question is; is it possible to grasp the entire past without reducing it to the former present or to the present present? Reminiscence, Deleuze tells us, is the manner in which we may grasp this pure past for ourselves.

C). The third synthesis of time corresponds to the future. One example that Deleuze uses to illustrate this synthesis is Kant's critique of the Cartesian formulae: 'I think therefore I am'. The 'I am', or being, corresponds to the undetermined realm of the first synthesis of time; habit. The 'I think' corresponds to the determination of the undetermined; memory which draws from habit both reproduction and recognition. However, Descartes' formulae explains nothing about the manner in which the determination of the undeterminable is produced. Kant's answer, Deleuze tells us, is to add a third value, a value which would mediate the two extreme forms of habit and memory: that is, the determinable. "This third value suffices to make logic a transcendental

instance. It amounts to the discovery of Difference - no longer in the form of an empirical difference between two determinations, but in the form of a transcendental Difference between the Determination as such and what it determines; no longer in the form of an external difference which separates, but in the form of an internal difference which establishes an *a priori* relation between thought and being" (DR 86). In Deleuze's reading of Kant, the latter is said to insert time between the two extreme forms of habit and memory, thereby making the 'I think' an affectation of the passive self whose existence is essentially temporal. Determination is possible only on the grounds of a self, which is in constant flux, and which lives the two passive syntheses' of Habitus and Mnemoysne. "It is as though the *I* were fractured from one end to the other: fractured by the pure and empty form of time. In this form it is the correlate of the passive self which appears in time. Time signifies a fault or fracture in the *I* and a passivity in the self, and the correlation between the passive self and the fractured *I* constitutes the discovery of the transcendental" (Ibid). This fractured or pure and empty form of time must be a more profound time than that which is constituted by a succession of instants, or a remembered past in comparison to a present. This form of time is not constituted by a movement of things, but rather this time is time itself, by itself and as itself. This "synthesis is necessarily static, since time is no longer subordinated to movement; time is the most radical form of change, but the form of change does not change" (DR 89). This third synthesis in which the future appears corresponds to an unequal distribution in a massive rupture between the before and the after, it profoundly distributes difference between the two extreme forms making possible a temporal series, while simultaneously drawing both the extremes together. In drawing the two extremes together the self becomes equal

to the unequal and produces a future as something wholly new. However, "it causes neither the *condition* nor the *agent* to return: on the contrary, it repudiates these and expels them with all its centrifugal force. It constitutes the autonomy of the product, the independence of the work. It is repetition by excess which leaves intact nothing of the default or the becoming-equal. It is itself the new, complete novelty. It is by itself the third time in the series, the future as such" (DR 90).

What conclusions may we draw from this tripartite theory of repetition? In the first place, bare or material repetition corresponds to repetition *in-itself*; psychic or clothed repetition corresponds to repetition *for-us*; and ontological repetition corresponds to repetition *for-itself*. Secondly, it seems to us that the three syntheses' of time articulated by Deleuze correspond to Kant's formulation, in his First Critique under the section *Transcendental Deduction*, of the three syntheses' constitutive of the conditions of possibility for experience in general. The syntheses' are: apprehension in intuition; reproduction in imagination; and recognition in a concept. The first corresponds to habit, the third to memory, and the second to metamorphosis. It is the second that will become the subject of Kant's Third Critique, where the imagination is shown to be the ground of both intuition and the understanding. Thirdly, it would seem possible to derive from this articulation of repetition the Heideggarian notion of the ontico-ontological distinction. However, this articulation is not exactly the same as it is in Heidegger, wherein the human Dasein corresponds to the only existent capable of revealing Being. Heidegger gives us five uses of transcendence:¹¹ the towards the world; the immediate relation with other existents; the towards the future; the towards Being; and the out of Nothingness. In Deleuze, the three passive

¹¹ J. Wahl, *A Short History of Existentialism*, pp. 15-7.

syntheses or repetitions - *Habitus*, *Mnemoysne* and *Metamorphosis* - which are also three forms of transcendence, correspond loosely to Heidegger's first three uses of transcendence: repetition in-itself is the toward the world; repetition for-us is the relation with other existents; and the repetition for-itself is the toward the future. What is ejected by Deleuze is Being and Nothingness, or rather a being (*Dasein*) which is toward Being and Nothingness. Therefore, ontological repetition, that is, the future, freedom and metamorphosis, loses its connection to a fundamental human being in order to become the for-itself, which undermines both condition and agent. Repetition for-itself is a movement alien to human being, it consumes human being in the furnace of the absolutely new. Ontological repetition constitutes the pure and empty form of time, an absolute formless form. This trace of Formalism which Deleuze also articulates in terms of depth, or an originary *profondure*, is withdrawn from the work subsequent to *Difference and Repetition* and *The Logic of Sense*.

There exists a fundamental disparity at the heart of empiricism, between the hidden powers of nature and the principles of human nature.¹² Ontological repetition is presumed to answer this problem, by hypothesising an irreducibly *unequal* merger across the abyss which separates the subject from the object, the material from the psychic, the real from the ideal. The passage between the two extremes is secured by the fact that both the material and the psychical repetitions find a common ground within ontological repetition - that is, ontological repetition is shown to be constituted by an irreducible duplicity or double bind. The two faces of an Event; the below and the above. Thought is shown to be material, and matter is shown to be

¹² On the nature of this split see Deleuze's work on Hume in *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, wherein the constitutive imagination plays a fundamental role in mitigating the duality between the delirium of primary sensibility and the understanding.

psychical. Quite simply, this is achieved through the reduction of the cosmos and all experience to a system of quantum mechanics: thought and matter are essentially energy. We find the same drama played-out in modern science, that is, the incommensurability between a general theory of relativity concerned with large-scale structure, and quantum mechanics concerned with micro-scale structure. What Deleuze wishes to derive from this is an originary mode of being beyond dialectics, a true transcendence wherein alienation is overcome. Ultimately, this will necessitate a unifying theory. However, let's be certain that the mere hypothesising of a theory of energetics in no way demonstrates with all certainty the possibility of extracting a pure difference in itself for thought. At this stage, it simply represents a hypothetical solution to the problem of traversing the abyss - that is, the problem of the overman.¹³

Before illustrating, by way of example, a model which Deleuze believes illustrates this double bind, let us look at the consequences for an understanding of difference which we derive from our tripartite repetition. To the three forms of repetition there corresponds three forms of difference; let us look at each of these in turn, in relation to the form of representation which the active syntheses extract.

a). The first form of difference is 'drawn off' from the passive synthesis of habitus, and concerns two determinations: genera and

¹³ Stephen Hawking, in *A Brief History of Time*, takes the "view that a theory is just a model of the universe, or a restricted part of it, and a set of rules that relate quantities in the model to observations that we make. It exists only in our minds and does not have any other reality" (p. 10-1). Therefore, all theories are hypothetical models which can not be absolutely proved. It is of interest to note that Deleuze names observations 'qualities' to exemplify their subjective character. Hence, the importance given the distinction between the quantitative and the qualitative.

species.¹⁴ Both determinations derive from the material perceptual field. On the one hand, in relation to species specific difference is determined between the species of a single genus. Oak, ash and beech are species of the genus tree: the genus tree is an emergent generalisation and out of which species are produced. In this manner, generalisation takes on an autonomy that subjugates the particularity of species. Thus, contrariety *within* the genus becomes specific difference. "It seems indeed . . . that specific difference meets all the requirements of a harmonious concept and an organic representation . . . It is thus in the nature of genera to remain the same in themselves while becoming other in the differences which divide them . . . In this manner, therefore, the determination of species ensures coherence and continuity in the comprehension of the concept" (DR 31). This kind of difference is no more than the inscription of difference within the identity of an undetermined concept (genus): a predicate of a concept; "This is an oak tree!" On the other hand, and in relation to genus, difference is assigned to a comparison between genera as categories. The comparison itself takes place within the identical concept of Being; that is, genera are attributes of a fundamental and all embracing Being which "is not collective, like genus in relation to its species, but only distributive and hierarchical: it has no content in itself, only a content in proportion to the formally different terms of which it is predicated" (DR 33). Spinozism. Moreover, that which carries out the comparison is judgment by means of analogy. "In this sense, the univocity of species in a common genus refers back to the equivocity of

¹⁴ In Hegel, singular individuality corresponds to the middle term of a duality between universal genus and universal individuality. Moreover, the middle term is reflected on both sides of the duality: once as species from the point of view of genus; and again as singular individuality (consciousness) from the perspective of the universal individuality. The process of a self-developing individual is intrinsic to the genus, therefore, "actuality starts from the genus" *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §292. Deleuze reverses the priority: actuality starts from the singular.

being in the various genera" (DR 34). Difference, therefore, is subjugated under the form of finite organic representation, since it concerns *natural* signs which always contain a matter. Organic, natural, perceptual, and finite, all imply a certain empirical consciousness. A connective synthesis which draws off difference from a series natural signs.

b). The second form of difference relates to the overcoming of organic representation by orgiastic representation. Orgiastic representation is constituted by two determinations: the infinitely small and the infinitely large. The active synthesis, which comes to fill the pure past constituted by the passive synthesis of Mnemosyne, is the form of representation which discovers the infinite within itself. The *concept* is now understood to include within itself all the particular elements which constitute organic representation, transforming it (concept) into a single and unique Whole which envelops all the finite parts. Leibnizianism and Hegelianism. "The signification of the very notion of limit changes completely: it no longer refers to the limits of finite representation, but on the contrary to the womb in which finite determination never ceases to be born and to disappear, to be enveloped and deployed within orgiastic representation. It no longer refers to the limitation of a form, but to the *convergence* towards a ground; no longer to the distinction of forms but to the correlation of the grounded and the ground; no longer to the arrestation of power but to the element in which power is effectuated, on which it is grounded" (DR 42-3). Infinite representation thus includes the Whole which functions as ground which includes difference within itself and whose essence is the Self as the introspective self-consciousness. The Whole as an active memory whose restlessness moves toward the recognition of itself as an infinity of parts which constitute a totality.

Infinite representation relates at once both the essence and the ground, and the difference between the two, to a foundation or sufficient reason. Mediation itself has become foundation. However, in the one case the ground is the infinite continuity of the properties of the universal which is itself contained in finite particular Selves considered as essences. In the other case, particulars are only properties or figures which are developed in the infinite universal ground, but refer to essences as the true determinations of a pure Self, or rather a 'Self' enveloped by this ground. (DR 49)

In this manner, orgiastic representation subjugates difference under the principle of identity, that is, under the identity of World and Self. The conjunctive synthesis which internalises difference within the presupposed identity of the whole and the part.

c). The third kind of difference is difference in itself. Difference in itself is a multiplicity of positive differential elements; an ontological difference which ontological repetition *makes*. Difference in itself is primary to repetition for itself: difference in itself is pure becoming, repetition for itself is the being of this becoming. Subsisting between the two extreme forms, it does not equalise the difference between the extremes, but rather distributes difference amongst and within them. This difference implies a multiplicity of perspectives, which continually undermine the presupposed identity within finite and infinite representation. The pathos of distance is the affirmation of difference, wherein the irreducible difference(s) between two terms becomes the object of an affirmation. Disjunction and divergence are that which affirm and wherein the form of representation collapses within a sub-representative immediacy: a veritable multiplicity of positive singularities which do not identify the differences to which they refer, but perpetually displace difference itself. In this manner difference is shown differing - this is what Deleuze means by 'unilateral difference. This world of implicated difference corresponds to a complicated world without identity: the viscous circle of a

chaosmos.

With eternal return, chao-errancy is opposed to coherence, of representation; it excludes both the coherence of a subject which represents itself and that of an object represented. *Re*-petition opposes *re*-presentation: the prefix changes its meaning, since in the one case difference is said only in relation to the identical, while in the other it is the univocal which is said of the different. Repetition is the formless being of all differences, the formless power of the ground which carries every object to that extreme 'form' in which its representation comes undone. (DR 57)

In relation to the formless ground, the Same and the Similar are only simulated effects, retrojected onto difference in itself and interiorised within the disparate series by repetition for itself. In this sense, it is the eternal return that returns; returning is the only same of that which returns. Herein, univocal Being constitutes an openness onto which thought may freely flow, not constrained as it was to equivocal Being in the synthesis of *Habitus*, nor to univocal Being of a contentless identity in the synthesis of *Mnemoysne*. In the synthesis of the pure empty form of time, Being constitutes the outside from which thought *arrives*, and within which thought is immanent: an outside which paradoxically is the most distant and imminent. A synthesis of inclusive disjunction in which divergence is affirmed in all its disparateness - an originary Otherness which constitutes a double crime against the Human: suicide *and* altricide. However, suicide - and therefore altricide - must be understood in terms of an act of empathy toward the infinite; wherein the surrender is not a result of a sense of futility, but rather constitutes a moment of productivity. This act is constantly jeopardised by the possibility of collapsing into the abyss of nihilistic despair. Paradoxically therefore a dynamic *tension* between self and transcendence must be maintained. This *tension*, as we will now explore, corresponds to a certain coincidence or coupling between two kinds of death. "In fact," Deleuze writes, "an entire

difference of nature subsists between what is joined together or what is narrowly extended" (LS 156).

2. The goal of biopsychism is to articulate the differential structures that exist between the two extremities, thereby overcoming the fundamental antinomies postulated by philosophy, as well as providing a basis upon which to found a unified model of knowledge that would be grounded in action rather than intuition or reductionism. Freud makes the distinction between two kinds of instinct: life and death. Deleuze complicates this simple binarism by additionally distinguishing between two kinds of death.¹⁵

a). Personal death refers to the death of the ego; the death which is encountered as absolute limit. This kind of death corresponds to the relation between the self-identity of the ego and a radical alterity. We can only conceive personal death by means of an inverted image generated by the ego - that is, an image of absolute negation that remains wholly unconscious. For this reason Freud described it as speculative.

b). Impersonal death, refers to the Death instinct proper and defines a state of free differences, no longer subject to the form of identity which the ego imprints on transcendence. This kind of death is not speculative but experiential and immediate, owing to the manner that it is presented within psychic life. As Blanchot tells us: "Thus night, which is Igitur's intimacy, the pulsating death which is the heart of

¹⁵ The distinction between the two kinds of death bears a striking resemblance to Blanchot's own articulation, and almost certainly owes its origination, in Deleuze, to the manner in which it is presented in *The Space of Literature* (pp. 85-159). However, in Blanchot the impersonal death is presented in the third person individual and plural, whereas in Deleuze it is taken beyond this model into the fourth person impersonal and preindividual. As he writes: "The splendour of the 'they' is the splendour of the event itself or the fourth person. This is why there are no private or collective events, no more than there are individuals and universals, particularities and generalities. Everything is singular" (LS 152).

each of us, must become life itself, the sure heart of life, so that death may ensue, so that death may for an instant let itself be grasped, identified - in order that death might become the death of an identity which has decided it and willed it."¹⁶

Freud modelled his notion of death on personal death, thereby reducing it to a biological and mechanistic entity. He claims we can speak of death only in speculative terms because it essentially exists as an absolute alterity ungraspable by the ego. Deleuze challenges this reduction of the Death instinct to a biological model¹⁷ by means of Lacan's interpretation, which articulates it in terms of a rebellion by the unconscious instincts and drives on the imaginary unity of the ego. Through Lacan's reading, the Death instinct finds a higher function as a psychological phenomenon.

For Deleuze, there can never be a moment in which death could be absolute or identical with itself. Absolute death is merely an effect generated by the transcendental illusion. Deleuze accordingly articulates death in terms of a positive model that does not affirm annihilation, but transformation and change. Furthermore, he wishes to think the time of the death drive, and insists that death is never what

¹⁶ Ibid, p. 115.

¹⁷ In connection with his belief in the conservative nature of the ego-instincts, Freud tells us: "Those instincts are therefore bound to give a deceptive appearance of being forces tending toward change and progress, whilst in fact they are merely seeking to reach an ancient goal by paths alike old and new. Moreover it is possible to specify this final goal in all organic striving. It would be in contradiction to the conservative nature of the instincts if the goal of life were a state of things which had never yet been attained. On the contrary, it must be an *old* state of things, an initial state from which the living entity has at one time or other been departed and to which it is striving to return by the circuitous paths along which its development leads. If we are to take it as a truth that knows no exception that everything living dies for *internal* reasons - becomes inorganic once again - then we shall be compelled to say that '*the aim of all life is death*' and, looking backwards, that '*inanimate things existed before living ones*.'" (*Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, p. 310-11). Freud's argument is blatantly entropic, it is unable therefore to explain either the increasing complexification of life or the fact that death is a relatively recent invention. That is, bacteria as a life form constitutes the far greater history of the evolution of life on Earth. Moreover, because of its mode of reproduction, by means of androgynous *replication*, it cannot be said die. Potentially, germ-cells are immortal. We will discuss these points in greater detail shortly.

it appears to be, but always involves a play of masks and disguises, of difference and repetition, of simulation and simulacra. In short, for Deleuze the Death instinct corresponds to a more primordial, pre-organic and pre-egoic state which the Situationists sloganised as: *The nostalgia of mud*. By taking death beyond the image generated of it by the transcendental illusion, Deleuze avoids the presupposition of the normative subject that we find in Freud. Within the pre-organic there is no difference between life and death: Thanatos is indistinguishable from the desexualization of Eros. In this manner, Deleuze is able to interpret the Freudian unconscious drives in terms of pure energy; energy that desires metamorphosis over stasis and destruction.

Let us take a closer look at his analysis of Freud, particularly in relation to repetition, in order to uncover the manner in which Deleuze complicates repetition through its extension onto the virtual dimension.

The three figures of repetition which Deleuze articulates concerns an analysis of Freud's essay *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*. The first passive synthesis, which corresponds to the formation of habit, is constituted by a contraction of elementary excitations. "A totality of this kind - a mobile distribution of differences and local resolutions within an intensive field - corresponds to what Freud called the Id" (DR 96). This binding of difference is what organises biopsychical life, and is produced, not by means of pleasure, but by the value extracted from pleasure as a *principle*. These bound excitations constitute the drives, each drive forming a larval ego within the Id itself. "The Id is populated by local egos which constitute the time peculiar to the Id, the time of the living present there where the binding integrations are carried out" (DR 97). Habit, therefore, is not subordinated to pleasure, but rather, precedes it and renders it possible: we should not confuse the activity

of reproducing an excitation because it is pleasurable, with the passion for repetition which precedes it. The distinction is between active and passive syntheses and corresponds to the subjective-objective dualism: the reproduction of pleasure is a function of the subjective principle, actualised by means of extracting a surplus value from the more primary objective repetitions which constitute pleasure's 'beyond'. "The repetition of an excitation has as its true object the elevation of the passive synthesis to a power which implies the pleasure principle along with its future and its past applications. Repetition in habit or the passive synthesis of binding is thus 'beyond' the principle" (DR 98). This binding constitutes what Deleuze calls the 'transcendental aesthetic',¹⁸ as the real conditions of sensibility which the passive self constitutes through its power of synthesis.

Upon the passive synthesis a double evolution is built: an active synthesis which relates the excitation to a real object, which activates the Ego by unifying the passive egos; and the construction of a *virtual* object which "governs and compensates for the progresses and failures of its real activity" (DR 99). The Ego itself sits at the intersection between the real and the virtual. These virtual objects, or idealities, are the ends toward which activity is directed. However, they are essentially paradoxical entities, under the power of a pure becoming which lacks an absolute identity, i.e., the serious and the playful father. But the virtual object is incorporated in the real object; "it remains planted or stuck there, and does not find in the real object the half which completes it, but rather testifies to the other virtual half which the real continues to lack" (DR 101). That is, the virtual object is ambivalent and belongs essentially to the past. "Although it is

¹⁸ In Kant's articulation of the 'Transcendental Aesthetic', in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, the binding principle is already subordinated to the forms of space and time, whereas for Deleuze, repetition itself constitutes both space and time within the simultaneous instant of binding.

deduced from the present real object, the virtual object differs from it in kind: not only does it lack something in relation to the real object from which it is subtracted, it lacks something in itself, since it is always half of itself, the other half being different as well as absent. This absence . . . is the opposite of a negative. Eternal half of itself, it is where it is only on condition that it is not where it should be" (DR 102). Therefore, virtual objects exist as displaced fragments, and are discovered only as lost, belonging to a pure past which was never present: the object = x. This virtuality constitutes the second passive synthesis of Mnemosyne.

Deleuze criticises Freud for reducing these processes to the material or bare repetition. Within the bare repetitions constitutive of the Id he locates, or rather presupposes, the identity of the former present and the identity of the present present of a representing subject: past and present moments. This understanding of temporality opens up a space between the two discontinuous and instantaneous presents, which it is the aim of repetition to fill. Or rather, the aim of bare repetition to bridge. In this sense, Freud constituted time as a connective synthesis and linear temporalisation. Deleuze's question is; how is it possible for something to be acted upon from a *distance*? That is, how is it possible for the events experienced during infancy to perpetuate an effect which persists in adult life? The answer Deleuze offers is to constitute the past and present not in terms of a single linear serialisation, but rather, to view both past and present as forming their own series within a 'parallel' structure between and through which the virtual object traverses, circulates, and is displaced. "Repetition is constituted only with and through the *disguises* which affect the terms and relations of the real series, but it is so because it depends upon the virtual object as an immanent instance which operates above all by

displacement" (DR 105). The genius of parallelism is that it undermines the notions of originality and derivation. The two presents "put a variety of terms and subjects into play in a complex intersubjectivity in which each element owes its role and function in the series to the timeless position that it occupies in relation to the virtual object. As for this object itself, it can no longer be treated as an ultimate or original term: this would be to assign it a fixed place and an identity repugnant to its whole nature" (Ibid). Therefore, communication between the series takes place by means of a disguise proper to the displacement of the virtual object itself: a veritable play of masks behind which lie only more masks, *ad infinitum*. Therefore, Deleuze claims: "Repetition is thus in essence symbolic, spiritual, and intersubjective" (DR 106). In fact, the virtual symbolic object constitutes a problematic field of differential elements, which we know by the name of the 'unconscious'. In this sense, the questioning directed toward differential structures correspond to the potential displacements which the virtual object could possibly actualise in answers. "Questions and problems are not speculative acts, and as such completely provisional and indicative of the momentary ignorance of an empirical subject. On the contrary, they are the living acts of the unconscious, investing special objectivities and destined to survive in the provisional and partial state characteristic of answers and solutions" (Ibid). Again we detect Deleuze making the distinction between the two extremes: objective and subjective. On the one hand, problems and solutions belong to the material stratum, i.e., chloroform as a solution to the problem of sunlight. On the other hand, questions and answers correspond to a subjective mind confronted by a problematic horizon. Furthermore, we should not understand the two extremes as being absolute, but rather, grasp the space between them

as an infinity of fractal levels and evolutionary stratum. It is Deleuze's contention that Freud, although recognising the unconscious as a differential structure populated by larval egos, nonetheless reduced these constitutive elements to phenomena like the representations found in consciousness: that is, to simple identities which subjugate difference in itself.

It follows that the virtual object is essentially displaced, while the real object is essentially disguised. By interiorising the difference between the two series of real and virtual, by experiencing itself as displaced and disguised,

the libido returns or flows back into the ego and the passive ego becomes entirely narcissistic. The narcissistic ego is inseparable not only from a constitutive wound but from the disguises and displacements which are woven from one side to the other, and constitute its modification.... For while the passive ego becomes narcissistic, the activity must be *thought*. This can occur only in the form of an affection, in the form of the very modification that the narcissistic ego passively *experiences* on its own account. Thereafter, the narcissistic ego is related to the form of an I which operates upon it in the form of an 'Other'. This active but fractured I is not only the basis of the superego but the correlate of the passive and wounded narcissistic ego. (DR 110).

Furthermore, the narcissistic ego corresponds to the pure and empty form of time, not as that which fills this time, but rather as *the spatial phenomenon of the form in general*. Herein, we enter into the third synthesis of time, which has abandoned all possible content as well as the real and virtual circles of a present and past, of connection and conjunction. This empty form of time is the death instinct, the desexualised and displaced energy constitutive of Thanatos. This death "refers to the state of free differences when they are no longer subject to the form imposed upon them by an I or an ego, when they assume a shape which excludes *my own coherence* no less than that of any identity whatsoever" (DR 113). Within the third synthesis, thought becomes the pure straight form of a desexualised energy which opens

us onto empty time: a 'genital' or unconscious thought which knows nothing of representation.

For a system of free differences to exist prior to representation, it must be capable of relating the different to the different within an immediate dimension of differentiation. As we have seen, for Deleuze there are three conditions which must be met in order for difference in itself to be conceivable: i). a serial organisation of different elements; ii). at least two such series in communication; iii). and a forced movement derived from the communication between series. "If we suppose that the series *communicate under the impulse of a force* of some kind, then it is apparent that this communication relates differences to other differences, constituting differences between differences within the system. These second-degree differences play the role of the 'differentiator' - in other words, they relate the first-degree differences to one another" (DR 117, emphasis added). Thus, the differences between serial elements are related to each other through a differentiator: Such a system of differences related by a differentiator is characterised as 'intensive'. In relation to the example of biopsychical life: habit is the serial organisation of different elements; memory is the totality of series within the system of communication; and the death instinct is the forced movement derived from the communication. Within such a system:

Spatio-temporal dynamisms fill the system, expressing simultaneously the resonance of the coupled series and the amplitude of the forced movement which exceeds them. The system is populated by subjects, both larval subjects and passive selves: passive selves because they are indistinguishable from the contemplation of couplings and resonances; larval subjects because they are the supports or the patients of the dynamisms. In effect, a pure spatio-temporal dynamism, with its necessary participation in the forced movement, can be experienced only at the borders of the livable, under conditions beyond which it would entail the death of any well-constituted subject endowed with independence and activity. (DR 118)

Therefore, can difference in itself be experienced only under biological, chemical, or wholly unconscious conditions which necessarily preclude a well-constituted subject? It would appear that it is only under the conditions of a larval or partial subject that these dynamisms are experiential. This first difficulty raises doubts as to the possibility, or even validity, of proving this theory, given that we are unable to experience it by means of our critical analytic faculties. That is, ultimately, does this theory merely constitute an hypothesis about the world through the use of metaphors such as resonance, forced movement, seriality, communication, etc.? The difficulty Deleuze faces is that of showing the virtual to be more than merely hypothetical or metaphorical, that is, to show the virtual as real: yet a reality without substantiality, or actuality (Proust).

A second difficulty arises from this first: if, as is claimed, difference in itself is the prior condition to all systematisation; is systematisation as such possible without presupposing the identity (even the most minimal) of that which induces the forced movement? Is Deleuze merely pushing back the problem of essence and identity one stage further, while the problem itself remains unresolved? In fact, this is exactly what Deleuze himself tells us, but he stresses that this seeming identity is only an effect of the functioning of this communicator, or what he otherwise terms a 'dark precursor'.¹⁹ Later in this chapter we will further clarify this position through the idea of 'quanta'. This precursor is essentially imperceptible, it covers over its own functioning as well as the in itself of difference. The identity and

¹⁹ The concept appears to be taken from R. Ruyer. Since Ruyer claims the idea of a subconscious to be illusory, he is forced to distinguish between two kinds of consciousness: the *dark* and the *light*. Light consciousness, for obvious reasons, is associated with sight and self-consciousness, whereas dark consciousness is more like an implicate order and condition for any consciousness. As he tells us: "An embryonic area, not yet induced to differentiate itself according to its competence, is a dark consciousness" (*There is no Subconscious*, p. 27).

resemblance attributed to it are merely the habit of thinking difference from the position of representation. As he tells us: "the logical identity abstractly imputed to it by reflection, along with the physical resemblance which reflection imputes to the series which it relates, express only the statistical effect of its functioning upon the system as a whole. In other words, these express only the manner in which it conceals itself under its own effects, because of the way it perpetually *displaces* itself within itself and perpetually *disguises* itself in the series" (DR 120). Thus, what the dark precursor names is disparateness itself, or rather the forced movement within the *disparate*.

A further difficulty arises: one which affirms that difference in itself exists prior to serialisation and resonance and, therefore, can exist *by* itself. In fact, all three conditions coexist and presuppose each other. The priority given difference in itself is that it produces movement, and in movement there is life, life at all levels of existence: physical, vegetative, organic and psychical. The only difference between these ontogenetic and phylogenetic strata are the frequency of the rhythms by which they resonate and the movements derived from the resonances. It is the connections, resonances and movements which constitute their particular quality through their specific *speeds*.

In short, the force under which series communicate in general is termed a dark precursor, which conceals itself, displaces itself, disguises itself, and is the disparate as such. Linguistically speaking, all these terms (conceal, dark, displace, disguise, and disparate, as well as mask, secret, obscure) have the same meaning, that is, to "conceal". Hence, the category of 'concealment' can only refer to the speculative or hypothetical nature imputed to the conditions of possibility pertaining to being and to the thought of difference in itself. Since this dark precursor always remains hidden, or covered

over by its effects, under what possible conditions could a well-constituted subject grasp it; how could consciousness be adequate to perceiving it? The answer must necessarily, and by definition, be given in terms of 'negativity'. The question as to whether we can experience difference differentially has not yet been answered satisfactorily. However, the dark precursor itself does not operate by means of a lack or poverty, but rather by an excess. It is because it is essentially excessive that it lacks identity, an excess, moreover, which induces identity and resemblance into the system as a whole. It follows from this analysis that we remain within a dialectic constituted by an excess-stasis dualism, or what Deleuze elsewhere calls the problem-solution dialectic.

What function could transcendence hold from the point of view of politics? The answer can only concern the status of law and anarchy. A principle is an empirical law that governs a particular field; it follows that the pleasure principle governs, without exception, the field of life in general. Whereas the compulsion to repeat unpleasurable experiences owes its force to pre-egoic or rather repressed libido-energy. It is the purpose of psychoanalysis to bring to consciousness such compulsive behaviour.²⁰ However, for life to comply to the law of pleasure, a transcendental principle is necessary: this second-order principle is repetition. Therefore, every empirical law require a transcendental

²⁰ Eros is the binding force constitutive of life, since life implies structure. As Freud Tells us in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*: "We have decided to relate pleasure and unpleasure to the quantity of excitation that is present in the mind but is not in any way 'bound'; and to relate them in such a manner that unpleasure corresponds to an *increase* in the quantity of excitation and pleasure to a *diminution*" [p. 276]. Therefore, the Death Instinct corresponds to an increase in the quantity of unbound excitation, or what Deleuze calls repetition run wild. Pain is the process by which the constituted Subject is undermined by flooding the mental apparatus and thereby disturbing the functioning of the pleasure principle, pleasure as the principle or tendency toward constancy, with a massive input of unformed excitation that spells destruction. Freud's theory operates through the duality of constancy and dissolution; the argument is entropic and presupposes a normative Subject. For Deleuze pain destabilises recognition, resists representation and is ultimately in the service of transformation rather than destruction. The Subject cracks open, normativity collapses and the anarchic is realised.

principle,²¹ since their truth lies in the 'beyond' of empiricism. Consequently, Deleuze is interested with transcendence in general in order to grasp the essence of freedom beyond the repressive structures which laws impose upon humanity. For Deleuze, subversion takes place through two processes: irony and humour.

In ancient Greece, the law represented the Good, in the same manner that the attributes represented particular aspects of God in Spinoza. Virtuousness consisted in complying to the laws of the land, by means of which the individual would partake in the Good on a secondary level. The Good functioned both as the authorising principle of the law, and as the foundation upon which civil society rested, and from which the citizen sought guidance through an ethical code of conduct. The irony is that the laws are not the Good itself, while the humour lies in the fact that the ethical life is achieved only through complying to the laws.

Kant, by means of the Copernican revolution, reverses the relation between the good and the law. The law is now absolute, it finds in itself its own founding principle and upon which the good is now made to depend. The object of the law is indeterminate while its form is absolute. All stand guilty before the law. And since the law has no determinate object, its essence haunts the psyche, behaving in the manner of the 'thought police' and turning the conscience of the individual against himself. Paradoxically, the more virtuous the

²¹ The reason why Deleuze calls the transcendental a second-order principle complies with the way in which science separates the problem of a unifying theory into two parts. As S. Hawkins tells us in *A Brief History of Time*. "First, there are the laws that tell us how the universe changes with time.... Second, there is the question of the initial state of the universe. Some people feel that science should be concerned with only the first part; they regard the question of the initial situation as a matter for metaphysics or religion . . . Yet it appears that he [God] chose to make it [the universe] evolve in a very regular way according to certain laws. It therefore seems equally reasonable to suppose that there are also laws governing the initial state" [p. 12]. It should not be understood that Hawkins is saying that the initial state was or is stable, but rather, that evolution follows a certain regular pattern of behaviour to which we can ascribe laws and make hypotheses' about. The first are empirical principles, and the second transcendental principles.

individual the greater the force of conscience introjected, and the more guilty he stands before the law. The irony now is that the law has no foundation, while the humour resides in the fact that the more we comply the guiltier we are. Freud resolved this paradox by showing that conscience is an effect of the renunciation of instinctual desires. Therefore, the law *is* repressed desire.

In order to dismantle the structures of repression the law must be subverted.²² Since the law in its modern form has no determinate object, its subversion leads us into a transcendental domain of indeterminacy, that is, *anarchy*. Two extreme models of anarchic practice that Deleuze articulates are sadism and masochism. "These two transcendent functions essentially characterise the two perversions, they are twin ways in which the monstrous exhibits itself in reflection."²³ On the one hand, sadism subverts the law by means of an ironic practice, taking the principles of the law - the *good* laws themselves - to the point of absurdity and thereby found a new transcendental principle. However, this method fails as do all methods which seek to locate first principles within a transcendent domain,

²² The whole intellectual thrust behind Deleuze's *Masochism* can be defined as a desire to articulate two forms of subversion which correspond to his understanding of the Death instinct. These two forms, sadism and masochism, he names perverse in order to distinguish them from the formations of the narcissistic ego and the superego. The latter are constituted upon conjunctions between Eros and Thanatos, and the former upon disjunctions between the two instincts. It is by means of this disjunction or crack in the structure of the constituted Subject that transcendence is possible. The crack testifies to the fact that the Subject is immersed within a continual process of simultaneously being bound and unbound; both life and death instincts in combination. The pleasure principle still retains its autonomy within this third formation, even though it take for itself *pain* as that form of pleasure. Pain, as the force of destruction and fragmentation, rests upon the transcendental principle of repetition. However, this form of repetition cannot be subordinated to a pleasure principle constituted as the anticipation of pleasure. "[P]ain in this case has no sexual significance at all; on the contrary it represents a desexualization which makes repetition autonomous and gives it instantaneous sway over the pleasures of resexualization. Eros is desexualised and humiliated for the sake of a resexualised Thanatos" (M 120). Thus it is erotic without being sexual. Repetition run wild means taking the compulsion to repeat and multiplying it to the *n*th degree in order to extract a new value from an old habit. Metamorphosis necessitates the hyperbolization of our compulsive repetitions, so as to extract a surplus value.

²³ Ibid, p. 23.

since it is left with no option but to present its principle as speculative. On the other hand, masochism subverts the law by means of a humorous practice which, before any act or breach of the law is committed, takes willingly upon itself the punishment that the law commands, only after the punitive dispensation does the masochist *demand* the pleasure that the law forbids. As Deleuze tells us: "From the idea that the law should not be based on the principle of the Good but on its form alone, the sadist fashions a new method of ascending from the law to a superior principle; this principle, however, is the informal element of a primary nature which aims at the subversion of all laws. In the other modern discovery that the law increases the guilt of the person who submits to it, the masochist in his turn finds a new way of descending from the law to its consequences: he stands guilt on its head by making punishment into a condition that makes possible the forbidden pleasure."²⁴ Ultimately, for the masochist, the torturer represents the cruel mother with whom he will commit incest: by taking upon himself the punishment he atones for his guilt and makes possible the pleasure that was denied him.

3. Monod dismisses the common sensical belief that there exists a fundamental distinction between two types of object: the natural and the artificial. Firstly, from the perspective of form and structure, both kinds of objects display regularity and repetition, since they represent homologous structures with exact symmetries; as in the case of crystals and pyramids. Secondly, from the perspective of function, the natural and the artificial equally materialise 'purposiveness'; as exemplified in the function of the eye and the camera. Thirdly, from the perspective of origins, what or who created the each object? Is the

²⁴ Ibid, p. 89.

creative process the same for both objects, or can we argue that the artifact results from purely exogenous forces, whereas the natural living being is the result of purely endogenous forces, "Implying a virtually total 'freedom' with respect to external agents or conditions."²⁵ There are two main theories which assert that the evolutionary process is a result of purely endogenous forces: on the one hand, 'vitalism', which as we saw with respect to Bergson, is an open-ended creative tendency that operates only throughout the biosphere, but presupposes an irreducible distinction between the inanimate and the living. Secondly, 'animism' affirms a universal design principle operative throughout the whole of the cosmos, including the biosphere, guided by a divine awareness that permeates every kind of object from the inanimate to the human. "A universal theory", Monod writes, "would obviously have to extend to include relativity, the theory of quanta, and the theory of elementary particles. Provided certain initial conditions could be formulated, it would also contain a cosmology which would forecast the *general* evolution of the evolution. We know however . . . that these predictions could be no more than statistical."²⁶ Therefore, dismissing both the distinction between the inanimate and the living and a naive psychologism, Monod claims that the origins of both types of object are the same; they are macroscopic actualisations of microscopic processes. He names this mechanism 'morphogenesis'. The structural stability of a living organism is maintained by the information constitutive of that organism. This information is written in the language of a genetic code and has two essential properties: the ability to replicate and express itself. All teleonomic behaviour characteristic of a living organism is attributable to the highly

²⁵ J. Monod, *Chance and Necessity*, p. 21.

²⁶ *Ibid*, p. 48-9. Emphasis added.

efficient and cybernetic manner in which it maintains its stability and reproduces itself. In short, the strict fidelity by which the morphogenetic mechanism functions generates the transcendental illusions of vitalism and animism. For Monod, "the Darwinian idea that the initial appearance, evolution, and continuous refining of ever more intensely teleonomic structures are due to disturbances occurring in a structure *which already possesses the property of invariance* - and hence is capable of preserving the effects of change and thereby submitting them to the play of natural selection."²⁷

Proteins are the essential molecular agents of teleonomic performance in living beings. Living beings can be considered as chemical machines of precise adjustment maintained by enzymes playing the role of specific catalysts. Every organism constitutes an integrated functional machine and self-constructing cybernetic system that regulates the organism by means of certain proteins that recognise specific chemical signals. "All these teleonomic performances rest, in the final analysis, upon the proteins' so-called 'stereospecific' properties, that is to say upon their ability to 'recognise' other molecules . . . by their *shape*, this shape being determined by their molecular structure. There is here, quite literally, a microscopic discriminative (if not 'cognitive') faculty."²⁸ This ability that the regulatory proteins possess in teleonomically identifying the shape of other molecules defines, perhaps, the two most basic concepts in evolutionary theory: structure and function. Moreover, the chemical reactions constitutive of an organism's development and performance are catalysed by enzymic proteins that are stereospecific to both one kind of compound (structure) and one reaction (function). "[E]nzymes, at the microscopic

²⁷ Ibid, p. 32.

²⁸ Ibid, p. 52.

level, exercise an order-creating function. But this creation of order . . . is not gratuitous; it comes about at the expense of . . . draining chemical potential into the processes chosen by the programme of which they are the executors."²⁹ In this way, Monod reconciles the seeming paradox of the ubiquitous law of entropy and the increasing complexity of biochemical evolution.

The regulatory proteins, whose activity is both inter- and intracellular, are controlled by several chemical potentials, allowing the system to react nonlinearly to variations in potential while simultaneously constituting thresholds for fine tuning. Regulation itself is executed by a number of mechanisms: feedback loops, metabolite activation, substrate, and in some cases remote precursors (dark precursors). These proteins, or allosteric enzymes, are each capable of recognising at least two different chemical states. This ability to discriminate between chemical signals and to select one of a number of possible states, proceeds exclusively from the protein itself; that is, the decisions are all made locally, producing something out of nothing, since there is no direct genetic plan or blueprint for what will emerge. Therefore, there exists an essential independence between the chemical signals and the discriminatory functions of the protein. This point is of most importance, since it illustrates the irreducible relation between structure and function on this very primary level. As Monod tells us:

The way in which allosteric interactions work hence permits a complete freedom in the 'choice' of controls. And the controls, subject to no chemical requirements, will be the more responsive to physiological requirements, by virtue of which they will be selected according to the increased coherence and the affinity they confer on the cell or organism. In short, the very *gratuitousness* of these systems, giving molecular evolution a practically limitless field for exploration and experiment, enabled it to elaborate a huge network of cybernetic interconnections which makes each organism an autonomous

²⁹ Ibid, p. 64.

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functional unit, whose performances appear to transcend, if not to escape, the laws of chemistry.³⁰

As we have seen, the three dimensional structure of a globular protein is determined by two types of chemical bond: the linear sequences of amino acids which are exclusively specified by the genetic code, and the 'spontaneous' and 'autonomous' folding of these linear sequences in to very complex pseudo-globular structures. Out of all the foldings potentially available to the linear sequences of amino acids, only one is selected. Moreover, the protein's functional activity is a consequence of its folded structure. This chemical origami defines the epigenetic process at a most fundamental level. Furthermore, the information contained in the environment plays an essential role in determining which of the many potential structures is actually expressed. These "[i]nitial conditions", Monod claims: "consequently contribute to the items of information finally closed in the globular structure. Without specifying it, they contribute to the realisation of a unique shape by eliminating all alternative structures, in this way proposing - or rather, imposing - an unequivocal interpretation of a potentially equivocal message."³¹

All structure in the biosphere is written in the form of self-replicating DNA, that is translated into linear sequences of amino acids and expressed in the foldings of these linear sequences into globular proteins.³² Moreover, the translation mechanism is strictly irreversible: that is, transformation at the level of protein structure, due to environmental constraints, are not transmitted to the DNA. By this model, information is unidirectional. Consequently the system is

³⁰ Ibid, p. 79.

³¹ Ibid, p. 93.

³² In S. Kauffman, order - structure and function - is described in terms of a spontaneously emergent property, and is therefore not written in the form of DNA. On this we will have more to say shortly.

completely endogenous and impervious to any changes that might occur in the environment. Therefore, mutations which are constantly occurring at the level of the genetic information code have two principal causes: the recombinations of genes through the activity of sex; and the effects of microscopic events, governed by the principle of uncertainty, during the process of replication. Both these causes involve radical contingency: the first in the form of a chance encounter between two organisms; the second as the unpredictable outcome of a quantum event.

Once a mutation is inscribed within the structure of DNA, it is replicated, translated and expressed with great fidelity; chance mutations thereby come under the law of necessity, that is, the initial conditions into which a chance event will enter and become subject to. As Monod tells us:

It is the teleonomic apparatus, as it functions when a mutation first expresses itself, that lays down the essential *initial conditions* for the admission, temporary or permanent, or rejection of the chance-bred innovative attempt. It is teleonomic performance, the aggregate expression of the properties of the network of constructive and regulatory interactions, that is judged by selection; and that is why evolution itself seems to be fulfilling a design, seems to be carrying out a 'project', that of perpetuating and amplifying some ancestral 'dream.'³³

Therefore, as an irreversible process, evolution defines a direction in time identical to the direction defined by entropy.

However, increasing complexity has a corresponding increase in autonomy with respect to environment. One of the cognitive functions in man is to analyse sensory inputs in order to obtain representations of the outside world geared to man's specific performances. "[A]nalysis by the central nervous system of sense impressions furnishes a meagre and slanted image of the external world; a kind of resume where the

³³ J. Monod, *Chance and Necessity*, p. 115.

emphasis and focus are exclusively upon what is of special interest to the animal, in view of its specific behaviour."³⁴ Monod goes on to call these predispositions innate frames of cognitive reference that are synonymous with Cartesian innate ideas. In this sense, the world as we perceive it is a simulated image of our hereditarily biological predispositions which have been passed on to us from our ancestors through natural selection. Simulation can even be likened to a creative process, since it does not adhere strictly to empirical principles, that is, to a strict objectivity. Simulation is not primarily verbal but imaginative, or rather image based, and thought itself is grounded in this process of simulation. These predispositions we may, after Kant, call faculties without having to restrict their functioning solely to the mental apparatus. Innate behaviour is genetically determined and, therefore, subject to the process of evolution as natural selection through adaptation. In effect, the faculties are like filters tuned to a certain prearranged frequency, a specific sonic bandwidth which they draw off from the white noise of their environment. Ideas are therefore not external but internal subjective phenomena. The outside world is a problematic field toward which minds and bodies, tuned to their own genetic, adaptive and historical characteristic, are directed: "what we see is what we are." Once man evolved the faculty of simulation, he left the purely physical path of development and entered into a dual evolution: physical and ideational. In fact, the more developed the faculty of simulation grew, the greater the autonomy it exerted over man's destiny and conditions of selection. Since it is behaviour which orients selective pressure, this development presumable influenced the genetic evolution of the innate categories of the human brain.

Essentially two problems arise out of Monod's theory of evolution. The

³⁴ *Ibid*, p. 141.

first which has been adequately noted by M. Eigen's:

We should really be asking the questions: How did the programme that the enzymes execute come into being? How did enzymes become adapted to their teleonomic function? It is true that Monod regarded optimisation as caused by evolution, which is connected to time's arrow and cannot run backwards (and thus takes place far from chemical equilibrium); and he saw that evolution, with the help of selection, 'draws from a well of inexhaustible chance'. But Monod went too far in believing that only chance can be a source of creation, while necessity, physical law, must be content with the minor role of a blind selection sieve.³⁵

Monod presents evolution as an unintelligent process generated by random mutation and constrained by physical law. This constitutes yet another version of reductionism to material causes. The second problem relates to the claim that Monod makes about evolution being a purely endogenous process, that is, that change occurs only in one direction: from the genetic to the biological. However, as S. Kauffman tells us in relation to the emerging sciences: "Organisms are not merely tinkered-together contraptions, bricolage, in Jacob's phrase. Evolution is not merely 'chance caught on the wing,' in Monod's evocative image."³⁶ In order to pursue this hypothesis we will draw on the work of J. Piaget, from the perspective of both biogeneticism and psychogeneticism respectively.

The genius of Lamarck undoubtedly lies in his recognition of behaviour's importance in the determination of an organ's structure. However, he went too far in proposing a purely exogenous origin of behaviour, and thereby overlooking the fact that all behaviour also implies the intervention of endogenous factors. Thus, Lamarck failed to distinguish between habits and instincts. Piaget defines habits and instincts in terms of exogenous phenotypical behaviour and endogenous genotypical organisation respectively. Lamarck's mistake was to believe that the

³⁵ M. Eigen, *Steps Towards Life*, p. 123.

³⁶ S. Kauffman, *At Home in the Universe*, p. 25.

habits are exclusively determined by the environment. It is quite true that environmental pressures give rise to transformations in behaviour, but these transformations must be understood in terms of an extension of "a process of global organisation that constitutes the internal motor of evolution and is the outcome of neither behaviour nor the environment."³⁷ Habits are not established solely by changes in the environment, to which the organism passively responds, but rather, imply an accommodation by the organism's prior teleonomic behaviour to an environmental change. It is Piaget's contention that these phenological behavioural adaptations can sometimes become so ingrained that a corresponding change is induced into the genotype, or organism's instinctual structure. Organisms actively accommodate themselves to external circumstances; an accommodation which is always based on earlier behavioural patterns. Thus, assimilation depends equally upon endogenous factors, since every system of action (and knowledge) presupposes an internal organisation of acquired characteristics - characteristics which are not stable, but rather metastable; dynamic internal processes endowed with a plasticity that provides the organism with the freedom that corresponds to the autonomy it enjoys over the environment. Phenological plasticity therefore allows the organism, as an open system, a spectrum of possible 'choices' to which behaviour is a response in the form of an adaptational trait that mediates between genotype and environment.

Although this approach implies a new emphasis on the effects - or at any rate the indirect effects - of the environment, it is very important to note . . . that it is the consideration of the internal environment and of changes which may occur therein under the influence of new phenotypes which makes it possible for us to envisage a simultaneous transcendence of Lamarchianism and neo-Darwinism. For the internal environment clearly also plays a part in selection: changes in it are on this reading at once more or less direct effects of the external world, brought about through the

³⁷ J. Piaget, *Behaviour and Evolution*, p. 1.

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mediation of the phenotype (the Lamarckian factor), and *causes* of the selection of mutations occurring at the same time more or less randomly (the Darwinian factor).³⁸

The Darwinian factor applies only to selective survival and reproduction on a quantitative genetic level, whereas the Lamarckian factor governs selective adequation on a qualitative teleological level. Under the influence of the phenotype, the organism is able to extend its control over and independence from its external surroundings, by means of the transformations engendered within an ever more optimal epigenetic milieu. The internal milieu, therefore, is the agent through which the evolutionary process operates, acting as mediator between genotype and phenotype. It should be noted that epigenetic transformations can occur during both embryological and post-natal development.

Piaget claims that most changes in the genotype are the result of the genes becoming sensitised to a disequilibrium in the epigenetic milieu, itself the effect of changes in the phenotype as a result of adaptations to the external environment and natural selection. As stated above, the changes in the epigenesis must become well established before they are translated into the genetic code. This length of time is not exactly known, but it probably involves the persistence of epigenetic accommodations over a period of at least three generations. As he tells us: "the new genotype arising from an internal disequilibrium takes on the same form as the initial phenotype, for a convergence comes about between the adjustments which have accommodated this phenotype to the external environment and those which adapt genic variations to the epigenetic environment."³⁹ On the one hand, organisms exploit and modify their environment, while the environment places conditions

³⁸ Ibid, p. 36-7.

³⁹ Ibid, p. 53.

upon the organism: both coexist in a symbiotic relation, wherein the whole process is one of gradual mutual adjustment. This symbiosis defines the relationship between phenotype and natural selection. On the other hand, selection does not apply to the genes directly. The formation of new genotypes is a direct result of both chance genetic mutations and sexual recombinations, as well as the adjustments which incorporate the changes in the epigenetic landscape as a result of changes in the phenotype's accommodation to the external environment.

In Weiss's⁴⁰ view, all behaviour is subordinated to the structure of Systems, dynamic unitary totalities, hierarchically stratified and capable of responding to exogenous change. A system of this nature is what characterises the organism. The same can be said of psychical systems or brain cognition; a product not of static conservations but of dynamic reconstructions capable of integration and orientation. The belief that behaviour is determined wholly by the genotype is a

logical error . . . as though the gene were able to introduce organisation into the 'orderless processes in its unorganised milieu, so as to mould the latter into the coordinated teamwork that is to culminate in an accomplished organism', as though the 'information' or 'control' emanating from the genome were unidirectional. This amounts to an *a priori* ascription of organisational capacities to the genome. But the existence of such capacities cannot be taken for granted, and to extrapolate in the way from their presence in the higher systems which, in this view, the genome is supposed to generate on its own is a completely circular argument.⁴¹

The genes themselves are part of an organised system of dynamic topologies passed down from generation to generation. Such a position argues for the existence of a epigenetic structure, capable of being transmitted through heredity and constitutive of the organic matrixes in which the genome is housed. A virtual world of will to power in

⁴⁰ A. Weiss, *Living System*, in *Within the Gates of Science and Beyond*.

⁴¹ J. Piaget, *Behaviour and Evolution*, p. 63.

which relation, interaction and coordination primarily determines the action of the genes and the morphological manifestations resultant from those actions.

The genesis of a trait is not simply embodied in particular genes; it consists in a process which, though it begins with these genes, also encompasses a determinate sector of the epigenesis with which the genes interact. Its trajectory thus displays a certain unity which distinguishes it from others, with which furthermore it may combine. At once genic and epigenic in character, a new variation may therefore enshrine aspects which are not pre-formed in the genes but which are produced by the dynamics of the genes' interactions with epigenesis. As for the innateness of specific 'behaviour', which necessarily consists in movements rather than morphological characteristics and differences between such characteristics, there is an even higher probability here that hereditary forms are the result of a fusion of this kind between genic action and the beginnings of epigenesis.⁴²

It follows from the above quotation that, at least for Piaget, the process of evolution begins with the genes; gene structure enjoys a certain primacy over epigenesis. The latter is merely a mediating and regulatory mechanism which owes its existence to the tensions that subsist between genotype and environment.

In relation to a psychogenesis, let us distinguish between two levels which are generally conflated: instinct and intelligence. Intelligence belongs to the psychic dimension constituted by a set of coordinating mechanisms which allows the individual subject the freedom to choose new problems, organising patterns of sequential operations which are constantly open to revision in function, in order to invent new solutions. Furthermore, since the method of logic is an axiomatic one, genetic epistemology cannot begin from the level of the observable or the normative in relation to natural thought, as phenomenology would have us do, but rather, must be characterised by the procedures of formalisation. Such formalisations *construct* structures, not from the point of view of the conscious subject, but from the actions the

⁴² Ibid, p. 65.

organism employs when solving new problems. This formulation is sufficient to make logic a transcendental instance.

Psychogenetic analysis contradicts the assumption that knowledge has its source in external objects which instruct the subject. As Piaget tells us:

On the one hand, knowledge arises neither from a self-conscious subject, nor from objects already constituted (from the point of view of the subject) which would impress themselves on him; it arises from interactions that take place mid-way between the two and thus involve both at the same time, but by reason of their complete undifferentiation rather than of an interplay between different kinds of things. On the other hand, if there exists at the start neither a subject in the epistemological sense of the word, nor objects conceived as such, nor invariant intermediaries, the initial problem of knowledge will therefore be the construction of such intermediaries: starting from the point of contact between the body itself and external things, they will develop in two complementary directions given by the external and the internal, and it is on this twofold progressive construction that any sound elaboration of subject and objects depend.

It is not perception which initially plays the mediating role, as the rationalists have too readily conceded to empiricism, but action itself with its much greater plasticity. Perceptions do play an essential role, but they partly depend on the whole action, and certain perceptual mechanisms which one would have believed to be innate or very primitive . . . are only formed at a certain level of the construction of objects. In a general fashion every perception gives to the perceived elements meanings which are relative to action . . . and it is therefore from action that we need to start.⁴³

In primitive action there is a complete non-differentiation between the subjective and the objective, since there is no fixed boundary between the internal and external.⁴⁴ Also there corresponds a fundamental centring on the body of the infant: individual actions are not coordinated into a unitary-whole structure, but rather form isolated zones that relate directly to the body; sucking, shiting, vomiting, etc.. Thus, the body at this primitive stage forms a topological surface of intensive zones. Differentiations between the subject and object arise from the emergent co-ordination of the subject's actions with an

⁴³ J. Piaget, *Principles of Genetic Epistemology*, p. 19-20.

⁴⁴ Deleuze's treatment of this can be found in his reading of M. Klein, in *The Logic of Sense*, pp. 186-95. I will not deal with it more fully here, since it is too complex and lengthy for our present requirements.

external milieu. The subject begins to form a network of spatio-temporal and causal coordinations, which paint a picture of the world and the subject's place within that world as one object among others. This subject's awareness of this growing process allows him to gradually decentre all focus away from the body to a world of spatio-temporal and causal coordinates. This process, when combined with the capacity to manipulate semiotic symbols, makes possible the representation of a world in thought.

The central concept of an empiricist psychology is that of association which, first developed by Hume, is still strongly held by behaviourists and reflexologists. But this concept of association only refers to an external bond between the associated elements, whereas the idea of assimilation . . . implies that of the integration of the given within a prior structure or even the formation of a new structure under the elementary form of a scheme . . . [F]or example, the young infant tries to grasp a suspended object unsuccessfully but manages to touch it, and the subsequent rocking movement, an experience not previously encountered, has the interest of novelty for him. He will then try to reproduce this occurrence, and at this point we may begin to talk of reproductive assimilation (reproduction of the same movement) and of the formation of the beginning of a scheme. When he encounters another suspended object, he will assimilate it to the same scheme, so that there is recognitive assimilation; and when he repeats the action in this new situation, the assimilation is a generalising one.⁴⁵

Three fundamental aspects emerge from this formulation: repetition, recognition and generalisation. On this primitive level, the scheme can not yet be called a concept, since it lacks semiotic content and corresponds only to the internal structure of actions - what Piaget calls pre-concepts. These pre-concepts are situated mid-way between the scheme of action and the concept. The reason for the existence of the in-between stage is that the process of interiorisation, which will eventually lead to language formation, can not be simply conceived as a retracing of actions by means of symbols. Rather, the transformation of schemes into concepts takes place through a process whereby the internal schemes are reconstructed and elaborated by means of a set of

⁴⁵ J. Piaget, *Principles of Genetic Epistemology*, p. 22-3.

pre-conceptual intermediaries. These rudimentary proto-concepts are then reworked and further elaborated into a conceptual system. Deleuze will come to call these pre-concepts 'percepts', in order to emphasise their materiality and thereby distinguish them from the notion of 'precepts'. On this level we locate the material source of perception and thought.

The biogenetic and psychogenetic levels correspond to the passive and active synthesis respectively. And as we saw with the analysis of Bergson, there correspond to the former three fundamental aspects: succession, anticipation and generalisation. Similarly, there correspond three equally fundamental aspects to the latter: repetition, recognition and generalisation. By generalisation we mean the power capable of bringing various processes under the function of a single organ or faculty, that is, on the level of biogenesis, the forming of composites capable of unifying disparate molecular units under a single function, and on the level of psychogenesis, the grounding of concepts upon a transcendental memory, or transcendental object = x .⁴⁶ In both cases, what generalises is the epigenetic structure, since it is what mediates between the two extremes.

With this understanding of epigenesis it is now possible to give an interpretation of what Deleuze means by 'problems'. Appropriating from Kant, Deleuze defines Ideas in terms of problematic structures which have an objective value. Furthermore, "a problem has three aspects: its difference in kind from solutions; its transcendence in relation to solutions that it engenders on the basis of its own determinant conditions; and its immanence in the solutions which cover it, the

⁴⁶ This theory combines both matter and memory, without radically distinguishing between the two, thereby locating them within a single process which rises hierarchically on the ladder of complexity. This corresponds to Bergson's notion of a cosmic memory, which has recently been taken up by the neurologist S. Rose, and given a contemporary articulation in his work *The Making of Memory*, Bantam Press, 1992.

problem *being* the better resolved the more *it is* determined" (DR 178-9). These two levels or kinds constitute the true dialectic: that is, the dialectic not between oppositional concepts, but rather, between problems and their solutions.

In this sense, differential calculus is a mathematical expression of problems in general. Which is not to say that mathematics itself is problematic, since it appears only within the realm of solutions.⁴⁷ The problem-Idea constitutes a transcendence of identity, opposition, resemblance and analogy: it is an *unrecognised non-knowledge* which must not be understood in terms of negativity and error, but rather, as stupidity and something to be learnt. Modern mathematics surpasses differential calculus, based as it is upon population theory which articulates a 'progressive discernibility' that is capable of incorporating a ideal continuity within the three levels of the calculus. In essence, everything is a multiplicity in so far as it actualises an Idea. Moreover, Ideas by this definition imply a structure of multiple, non-localisable connections between differential elements. Multiplicities are virtualities which are actualised in Ideas. Hence, the process of genesis, Deleuze tells us:

goes from the structure to its incarnation, from the conditions of the problem to the cases of solution, from the differential elements and their ideal connections to actual terms and diverse real relations which constitute at each moment the actuality of time. This is a genesis without dynamism, evolving necessarily in the element of a supra-historicity, a *static genesis* which may be understood as the correlate of the notion of *passive synthesis*. (DR 183)

The true opposition lies between the ideal event and representation; between learning and knowledge; between novelty and recognition; between the immemorial and memory; and between the virtual and the

⁴⁷ For a full understanding of the manner in which Deleuze articulates problematic structures and their corresponding solutions in terms of differential calculus, c.f. *Difference and Repetition* pp. 170-82.

actual. There is an essential difference in kind between these two absolute limits or thresholds which can not be synthesised within a 'higher' resolution. Knowledge designates cases of solution which presuppose conscious representation in language, whereas the ideal event expresses the sub-representative presentation of the unconscious problem-instant. This unconscious nature of Ideas, or the unthought in thought itself, must be conceived in terms of the ideal of knowledge. Thus, the problem presents itself as the ontological horizon of the question wherein true art and philosophical thought find their full force and genesis. Problems or Ideas are virtualities which, Deleuze informs us:

contain all the varieties of differential relations and all the distributions of singular points coexisting in diverse orders 'perplicated' in one another. When the virtual content of an Idea is actualised, the varieties of relation are incarnated in distinct species while the singular points which correspond to the values of one variety are incarnated in the distinct parts characteristic of this or that species. (DR 206)

This virtual region must not be understood as the negative or nothingness, but rather as the non-being or (?) -being dimension of being in general. "We call", Deleuze continues:

the determination of the virtual content of an Idea differentiation; we call the actualisation of that virtuality into species and distinguished parts differentiation. It is always in relation to a differentiated problem or to the differentiated conditions of a problem that a differentiation of species and parts is carried out, as though it corresponded to the cases of solution of the problem. (DR 207)

The virtual is real without being actual; its reality consists in its completely determined structure which doubles the object without its two halves resembling one another. E.g., the virtual structure of an organism corresponds to the set and arrangement of its chromosomes, while its actualisation into existence proper corresponds to the manifestation-determination of that species and its qualities. Between

these two halves there is a reciprocity of determination *which moves in both directions*.

Beneath the actualisation of qualities and extensities peculiar to a species we find the spatio-temporal dynamisms responsible for the actualisation itself: a spatio-temporal dynamism or *dramatism* of the Idea. These dynamisms, which are no less temporal than spatial, are defined by populations of local and singular *rhythms*, constituting both the time and the space of actualisation, and thereby determining, in their totality, the internal milieu of any particular species. As Deleuze explains:

More precisely, the species gathers the time of the dynamism into a quality (lion-ness, frog-ness) while the parts outline its space. A quality always flashes within a space and endures the whole time of that space. In short, dramatisation is the differentiation of differentiation, at once both qualitative and quantitative. (DR 217)

Moreover, Deleuze continues, there is another series to actualisation; this is consciousness, since:

[e]very spatio-temporal dynamism is occupied by the emergence of an elementary consciousness which itself traces directions, doubles movements or migrations, and is born on the threshold of the condensed singularities of the body or object whose consciousness it is. It is not enough to say that consciousness is consciousness of something: it is the double of this something, and everything is consciousness because it possesses a double, even if it is far off and very foreign. (DR 220)

In this manner, Deleuze renders thought and perception material rather than purely spiritual, since Ideas are always embroiled in the mathematico-biological system of different/ciation.

From this analysis of Piaget's theory on epigenesis, we must conclude that there arise two specific problems. Firstly, Piaget was right in exposing the reductionism implicit in certain genetic theories, but wrong, in our view, to put forward the idea of an epigenetic structure that equilibrates the disparity between the extremes of genotype and

phenotype/environment by means of the gradual accrual of mutations along which evolution progresses. We saw this same tendency to reconcile the extremes of structure and function, body and mind, in relation to Heidegger's notion of Being. Secondly, since the epigenetic milieu is put forward as a mediating structure, what comes first must be the genes, which express both organism and environment and between which the epigenesis comes to arbitrate. On the other hand, it is our contention that the epigenetic structure does not mediate, but permits the possibility of a communication between the two extremes which are themselves essentially irreducible. Furthermore, the epigenetic milieu is what is primary and therefore productive of both extremes. We will now pursue these points in greater detail.

4. Essentially, what's at stake in the emerging sciences of chaos and complexity theory, is the idea of an irreconcilability between 'teleology' and the 'spontaneous emergence' of orders out of chaos. However, we should be cautious and avoid confusing the idea of spontaneity with another, namely 'radical contingency'. The former necessitates the presence of certain conditions in order to actualise its potentials. The latter can only exist at the very beginning of the universe, and perhaps not even then. The idea of spontaneity may have removed the hand of God from evolutionary processes and refuted the notion of an absolute telos, nonetheless the channelling of evolution remains a result of initial, and subsequently derived, conditions that steer life. Self-organisation itself possesses principles which it is the aim of the emerging sciences to uncover. To Monod's chance and necessity, S. Kauffman adds spontaneity. Therefore, Kauffman separates spontaneity and selectivity; the latter being, for the last century at least, mistakenly believed to be the sole cause of evolution

in the universe. As Kauffman tells us: "if the forms selection chooses among were generated by laws of complexity, then selection has always had a handmaiden."⁴⁸ Selection, then, chooses among the potential forms that subsist within a given system, moreover, it is purely "caused by internal processes, endogenous and natural."⁴⁹ That is to say, spontaneous generation of order can best be defined in terms of aleatory points: a system that simultaneously tests or passes through all its implicit potential possibilities and actualising only one by means of the pressures exerted upon it by selection. Potentially speaking, form is infinite and spontaneously generated, but in actuality it is selected by the contextual specificities within which the system finds itself. Form does not exist but subsists; it precedes actuality only potentially. We must also be cautious and avoid understanding that emergence 'happens' and is only subsequently subjected to selective pressure. This thinking is too linear and betrays the parallelism propounded by this theory. Rather, both emergence and selection are co-present, separable only in abstract thought. Moreover, these potential forms are dependent upon the level of the system's complexity; the quanta or differences in potential that compose it. We must at all costs avoid falling back into Platonism. Nonetheless, the so-called persistent or robust forms are what Whitehead called eternal objects, but objects that do not pre-substist the systems by which they are actualised. For Kauffman, therefore, evolution proceeds not gradualistically, but by means of leaps and ruptures; or what is more accurately termed 'punctuated equilibrium'.

As we have seen, genetics regards the organism from two quite distinct perspectives. On the one hand, it conceives the organism in

⁴⁸ S. Kauffman, *At Home in the Universe*, p. 8.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

terms of visible characteristics, morphology, functions and behaviour - the *phenotype*. On the other hand, it deals with the hidden structures of the organism, the state of the genes - the *genotype*. These are two quite distinct levels. The former is concerned with the observed behavioural patterns of actual organisms, the latter providing the sufficient reason for the former in terms of preformed structures. The internal logic of an organism, therefore, is defined by the relations existing between the genetic structure and the organism's behavioural orientation. Together, both the levels constitute the organism as a whole; they are dissociable only in abstract thought. However, the link between these two levels has been made precise only for very simple traits. It is the inability on the part of the genetic theory to explain the link between the two levels, purely in terms of expression of a genetic structure, that leads us to hypothesise that the real cause is to be found in a transcendental epigenetic process.

Reproduction represents both the beginning and the end, the cause and the aim. With the application to heredity of the concept of programme, certain biological contradictions formerly summed up in a series of antitheses at last disappear: finality and mechanism, necessity and contingency, stability and variation. The concept of programme blends two notions which had always been intuitively associated with living beings: memory and design. By 'memory' is implied the traits of the parents, which heredity brings out in the child. By 'design' is implied the plan which *controls* the formation of an organism down to the last detail.⁵⁰

Biology claims that all organisms inherit their genes from ancestors who were capable of surviving adverse conditions long enough to reproduce. For this reason their descendents are equally 'fit' in terms of survival and reproduction. Man, therefore, shares a common ancestor characterised as "the information that, in all living beings, is organised according to the same principle."⁵¹ This hypothesis is confirmed

⁵⁰ F. Jacob, *The Logic of Life and The Possible and the Actual*, p. 2. Emphasis added.

⁵¹ M. Eigen, *Steps Towards Life*, p. 18.

through comparative analyses of nucleic acid sequences found in the various independent branches of the evolutionary chain. By means of this historical analysis "sequences of 'proto-genes' - the very earliest genes - can to some extent be reconstructed. They show patterns indicative of a simple, primeval code."⁵² DNA is a highly accurate digital replicating machine, only by means of random mutations (errors in copying, radio-activity and viruses) and recombinations is variation introduced into the ancestral strand. The maternal and paternal sets of genes do not blend to form another *new* gene, but only combine to form a unique set. These sets of genes determine the characteristic features of future species.

Life, as a system of replication with variation, is purely a problem solving process emergent from the fundamental laws of physics. Since DNA exhibits such a high degree of design work, it is extremely unlikely that its four constitutive letters could have synthesised themselves by a series of coincidences to form a self-replicator. This discrepancy has lead geneticists to conclude that "there must exist a process of optimisation that works towards functional efficiency."⁵³ Optimality is secured by means of feedback loops; once they are in place an exponential race toward ever greater sophistication and complexity ensues. This directedness attributed to evolution, by means of feedback loops, represents the chief difference between Darwinism and this present theory. Furthermore, this "guidance is provided by selection, which follows the value topography and thus reduces substantially the freedom of movement,"⁵⁴ giving the appearance of teleology in Nature. Optimality, therefore, is a 'forced move' that governs the process of

⁵² Ibid, p. 7.

⁵³ Ibid, p. 11.

⁵⁴ Ibid, p. 26.

evolution throughout Nature. The constraints of environmental conditions aid the evolving entity by setting it limits or parameters with which it works in the problem solving exercise. Constrained by its inherent genetic information and the environmental information, both of which exerts a pressure on the entity, the organism is forced to adapt along a diagonal trajectory between the two necessities.

Therefore, evolution is a process of the gradual accrual of chance mutations, functionally adapted to a particular environmental niche; both mutated genome and environment become the necessary constraints for the next phase of evolutionary development. As Jacob explains: "The conclusions reached by genetics required the presence in the chromosomes of a substance capable of very unusual actions: on the one hand, it had to determine the structures and functions of living organisms; on the other, to produce exact copies of itself, without excluding the possibility of rare variations."⁵⁵ This 'functionalistic' and 'gradualistic' model of evolutionary development *based solely on genetic mutation*, as proposed by F. Jacob (and J. Monod), presupposes that all the information necessary to construct the form and functions of an organism is contained in its DNA.

In fact, the genetic theory represents a variation upon the theme of 'preformation'; not the naive kind that speculated an a temporal and perfectly formed miniature adult within the germ cell, but rather, in terms of an historical structure containing all the information within its programme necessary for the expression of the fully developed organism. Furthermore, the introduction of temporality into genetics does not imply the idea of 'recapitulation', wherein the formative forces propel the developing embryo to repeat earlier stages of the evolutionary chain, exactly as they occurred in phyletic evolution, until

⁵⁵ F. Jacob, *The Logic of Life and The Possible and the Actual*, p. 244.

such time as the forces themselves are arrested - that is, the greater the vital force, the more the embryo will recapitulate and the higher will be the type of species expressed. However, recapitulation does in fact take place, not in the manner just described. Rather, embryological development passes through a series of stages that bear a striking resemblance to earlier adult species due to the common ancestry of the particular phyla.

It was von Baer who brought it to our attention that the sequence of transformations that many developing embryos undergo do not follow a structural order that would mirror the increasing complexity and organisation of species found in the natural world. Some parts of higher organisms which should develop at a late stage appear very early on. Thus, for von Baer, development is not defined as recapitulation but as individualisation; a process which develops from the general to the individual. Already in the young embryo the individual is implicit; embryology serves to explicate and enhance the implicit form through a process of increasing differentiations and complexifications. "The type of each animal seems to fix itself in the embryo right at the beginning and then to govern all of development."⁵⁶ But these beginnings are extremely general. for example, in the early stages of embryonic development the limb buds of various species resemble each other: bird's wings, horse's hooves, human hands.

The grade of development of an animal body consists of the greater or lesser extent of heterogeneity in the parts that compose it . . . The more homogeneous the entire mass of the body, the lower the stage of development. We have reached a higher stage of nerve and muscle, blood, and cell-material are sharply differentiated. The more different they are, the more developed the animal.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ K.E. von Baer, *Entwicklungsgeschichte der Thiere: Beobachtung und Reflexion*, Borntrager, Königsberg, 1828, p. 220

⁵⁷ *Ibid*, p. 207.

Therefore, the criterion of embryology is increasing differentiation in structure and organisation. The animal kingdom must not be understood as a hierarchical order of ascending forms built on a single theme, but as a collection of individual groups that evolve and differentiate along different phyletic lines of descent. We must distinguish type of organisation from degree of differentiation within each type. More importantly, there can be no transformation between types, since each type constitutes an independent lineage. "Type is to be understood through its mode of development . . . Different conditions or building forces must work upon the germ [which is originally similar in all animals] in order to create this diversity."⁵⁸ This development or process of differentiation is not motivated in a mechanical fashion, since young embryos are more variable than older embryos: if each step controlled the next (mechanism) variability would increase with age. We cannot agree with von Baer's claim that all germ cells are originally alike, but we do affirm a universal tendency of evolutionary development, which takes place during the embryonic phase (and as we shall see the post-natal phase) from the homogeneous, general and potential to the heterogeneous, specific and actual.

This brings us to Deleuze's position which articulates the embryological in terms of an implicate order of enveloped depth. What is enveloped, or folded, is the whole of the past, heredity and memory which, as we saw in relation with the second synthesis of time, enjoys in its totality a contemporaneity and coexistence with the present. This original depth is space as a whole, but space as an intensive quantity. Sensation or perception, Deleuze tells us,

has an ontological aspect: precisely in the syntheses which are peculiar to it, confronted by that which can only be sensed or . . . perceived. Now, it appears that depth is essentially

⁵⁸ Ibid, p. 258.

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implicated in the perception of extensity . . . It also appears that depth and distances, in this state of implication, are fundamentally linked to the intensity of the sensation . . . Intensity is simultaneously the imperceptible and that which can only be sensed. How could it be sense for itself, independently of the qualities which cover it and the extensity in which it is distributed? (DR 230)

Intensive quantity, as a transcendental principle, has three essential characteristics: 1. It represents difference in quantity, that which cannot be cancelled in difference in quantity or that which is unequalisable in quantity itself: it is therefore the quality which belongs to quantity. 2. Intensity *affirms* difference. It makes difference an object of affirmation. And negation - which appears with extensity and quality - is only an inverted image of difference. This inversion takes place first by the requirements of representation which subordinate it to identity, then by the shadow of problems which give rise to the illusion of the negative, and finally, by the extensity and quality which cover or explicate intensity. Thus the being of the sensible is intensity or difference in intensity which constitutes the peculiar limit of the sensible. It has a paradoxical character: it is imperceptible, and that which can only be sensed - transcendental exercise of sensibility - because it gives to be sensed, thereby awakening memory and forcing thought. 3. Intensity is an implicated, enveloped or 'embryonized' quantity. Intensity is primarily implicated in itself: implicating and implicated. We must conceive of implication as a perfectly determined form of being. Within intensity, we call that which is implicating and enveloping *difference*; and that which is implicated or enveloped *distance*. For this reason, intensity is neither divisible, like extensive quantity, nor indivisible, like quality. The philosophy of difference confirms the double genesis of quality and extensity. That is to say, intensity is essentially temporal. Time is not an absolute form, but merely an abstraction from movement

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and becoming, and becoming is an irreversible process measured in terms of increasing entropy. Three elements are required for a concept of time: i) Repetition which establishes the measure of time. ii) An irreversible process. iii) And a memory. As D. Bohm tells us:

The conscious content of the moment is therefore that which is past and gone. The future is not yet. The present *is*, but it cannot be specified in words or in thoughts, without its slipping into the past. When a future moment comes, a similar situation will prevail. Therefore, from the past of the present we may be able to predict, at most, the past of the future. The actual immediate present is always the unknown.⁵⁹

Therefore, the extension or duration of each moment is in general determined in the broader context in which they find themselves embedded. This embeddedness constitutes an implicate order of time. Furthermore, it is by means of these extended moments that a whole past may be enfolded in a single moment. This is the meaning of 'horizontal implicate order', since it corresponds to one single level. Each moment is not extrinsic to all the other moments, but rather, is intrinsically related through extended structures and processes.

It follows from the above that becoming is not merely a relationship of the present to the past that is gone. Rather, it is a relationship of enfoldments that actually *are* in the present moment. Becoming is an *actuality*. We may enunciate this as a principle, the *being of becoming*. Becoming is being first because in any given moment it is grounded on what is at that moment. Second, it is 'being' because the same general structure *continues* in all succeeding moments.⁶⁰

This model is further complicated when the whole of reality is taken into account, since the totality is determined by a 'vertical implicate order'. That is, there corresponds to the whole of reality an hierarchy of levels more or less comprehensive and fundamental. We must not infer from this the existence of an altogether fundamental level that

⁵⁹ D. Bohm, *Time, the Implicate Order, and Pre-Space*, p. 182.

⁶⁰ *Ibid*, p. 185.

would define reality in absolute terms, but only an infinity of levels that defies comprehension. For this reason the 'descriptive' method is employed, since it eliminates that element of finality and origins.

Systems, whether organic or inorganic, Jacob writes, "are arranged according to a hierarchy of discontinuous units. At each level, units of relatively well defined size and almost identical structure associate to form a unit of the level above. Each of these units formed by the integration of sub-units may be given the general name 'integron'. An integron is formed by assembling integrons of the level below it; it takes part in the construction of the integron of the level above."⁶¹ These integrons are values of implication and centres of envelopment which function in a number of ways:

1. the individuating factors form a kind of noumenon of the phenomenon. 2. to the extent that sense is tied to the Ideas which are incarnated and to the individuations which determine that incarnation, the centres are expressive, that is, they reveal sense. 3. to the extent that every phenomenon finds its reason in a difference of intensity which frames it, as though this constituted the boundaries between which it flashes, we claim that complex systems increasingly tend to interiorize their constitutive differences: the centres of envelopment carry out this interiorisation of the individuating factors. (DR 256)

In short, these centres are noumenal, expressive and interiorising - they are also the 'dark precursors' of the eternal return; the non-sense constitutive of sense.⁶² Therefore, every physical and biological object is constituted by a system of systems; determining an integration of lower level systems, as well as being a part of a higher level system. Each system, therefore, must be considered with reference to its

⁶¹ F. Jacob, *The Logic of Life and The Possible and the Actual*, p. 302.

⁶² Perhaps it is reasonable to interpret the notion of 'dark precursor' in terms of 'dark matter'. The bright or baryonic matter - protons, neutrons and electrons - detectable in the universe is not sufficient to account for all the gravitational influence observed: some estimates venture that only 10% of the mass of the universe is in the form of baryons. Thus, dark matter, or WIMP's - Weakly Interacting Massive Particles - could provide both the key to the Unifying Theory, and the manner in which galaxies and stars were formed from the collapsing clouds of gas released by the Big Bang.

adjacent levels. Through the principle of implicated enfoldment, distinct and distant moments are brought under a single resonance. Vast stretches of time are condensed into a single moment, that bursts with creative potential in an act of becoming. This timeless *unground* is the basis of the creative act, the principle of the *differend* and the third synthesis of time.

The essentially disparate nature of the transcendental field implies that the constituted individual cannot be a given, but rather requires an ontogenic principle capable of demonstrating the manner in which it is constituted. The process of individuation is itself *the* principle of individuation. During this process other things, besides the individual, are produced. In fact, far from being the *end* toward which the process aims, the individual is merely a partial and relative resolution of a process possessed of a multitude of potentials, dynamisms and dimensions, not all of which are actualised or compatible with one another. As Simondon tells us: "we would try to grasp the entire unfolding of ontogenesis in all its variety, and *to understand the individual from the perspective of the process of individuation rather than the process of individuation by means of the individual.*"⁶³ The process, therefore, as a whole is primordial in relation to the individual, within which the individual occupies only a relative reality. This process must therefore be understood as being a *pre-individual* implicate order out of which the individual is explicated by means of a series of developmental steps.

For Simondon, the organism is not conceived in terms of an explicated functional entity that is the result of a purely genetic manufacturing process, but rather, is the consequence of an implicate resonant epigenetic structure capable of processing information from both

⁶³ G. Simondon, *The Genesis of the Individual*, p. 300.

genome and environment. Only through this dynamic structure is it possible for the organism to creatively resolve its problematic. "*The living individual is a system of individuation, an individuating system and also a system that individuates itself.* The internal resonance and the translation of its relation to itself into information are all contained in the living being's system."⁶⁴ The psyche therefore represents a genuine interiority whose function it is to solve its own problematic: the solution will always be the result of a communication between individual and environment. Knowledge therefore is not an abstraction from sensation, but the organism's biological orientation toward its milieu; an orientation constituted by innate structure or a *priori* forms that predispose it toward representing the world in a specific manner and grounded in action. The implication here is an holistic one. In order for the individual to solve the problems that confront it, it must take itself as a Whole entity that is both co-present and contemporary with all its past; since the latter constitutes the very structures of its behavioural orientation. "The same method outlined above can be used to explore the affectivity and the emotivity that constitute the resonance of the being in relation to itself, and that connect the individuated being to the preindividual reality associated with it in the same way that the tropistic unity and perception put it in relation with its milieu."⁶⁵

Simondon's conception of information must not be understood as a set of definite instructions, as the geneticists would have us believe, but rather, as we saw in the previous chapter in relation the language, sense is a presupposition that entertains a co-presence with nonsense. Language is primarily a nonsensical structure out of which sense-

⁶⁴ Ibid, p. 305.

⁶⁵ Ibid, p. 310.

meaning is an emergent property effectuated by means of a subjective process. The same holds for information on a material basis: structurally it is dispersed throughout the entire system, becoming individuated into a definite form only through a biochemical process. It is the process itself that determines the indeterminate. "If this is the case," Simondon writes,

then the piece of information acts in fact as an instigation to information, *a necessity to individuate*; it is never something that is just given. Unity and identity are not inherent in the information because the information is itself not a term. For there to be information presupposes that there is a tension in the system of the being: the information must be inherent in the problematic, since it represents *that by which the incompatibility within the unresolved system becomes an organising dimension in its resolution*.⁶⁶

Thus, the nonsense or informational structure is a relational being and not something that exists between two substantial terms whose purpose it is to pacify, but rather, a preexisting relational being capable of generating the two substantial terms: a primordial being whose *being* is essentially relational and in which the substantial is grounded. Understanding being in terms of a pure relationism allows for a conception of being that does not succumb to identity thinking. Every relational quanta is thereby given a positive value within a disparate system, the resolution of which is sought within the structure of tensions themselves through the invention of new objects and concepts. This relational being from which informational units are abstracted echoes M. McLuhan's famous slogan: 'The Medium *is* the Message'. As he tells us: "It is only too typical that the 'content' of any medium blinds us to the character of the medium."⁶⁷ That is, the content represents an abstracted unit from an essentially dispersed and nonsensical field of

⁶⁶ Ibid, p. 311.

⁶⁷ M. McLuhan, *Understanding Media*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968, p. 9.

differential relations: the message is the explication of the medium, but by which the medium or difference in itself is cancelled. Cubism attempted to overcome this process of cancellation by eliminating perspective and striving for an awareness of the whole. The effects of the medium do not occur at the level of ideas and beliefs, but transform our imperceptibly sensible relations.

Therefore, the implicate order is essentially the potential memory of the individual, that becomes explicated during the embryogenetic process. This 'mnemic theme'⁶⁸ is not primarily a property of bodies, but rather, bodies themselves are the property of memory. Quite clearly we are not referring to the empirical memory of a constituted subject, but to a cosmic memory in the Bergsonian sense. In its totality this cosmic memory constitutes the massive epigenetic structure within which every individual's epigenetic structure is a part. Moreover, this structure must be understood as occupying a *pre*-space, that is neither composed of matter nor extended: it is the implicate order that space-time will come to limit. Since this order is a mnemic potential, it must be temporally determined; not empirically in terms of the linear first synthesis of time, but in the manner of the second synthesis in which the whole of time past, being the present, is folded, co-present and contemporary with itself: not Chronic time but Aionic time. Thus the reduction of structure and function to a genetic code is not only materialistic and reductionist, but it is essentially erroneous: a product of the transcendental illusion. Hence, the Bergsonian concept of 'duration' finds its basis in epigenesis.

Speeds in temporal regularity are responsible for embryological recapitulations and metamorphosis. The accelerations or retardations -

⁶⁸ This notion is taken from R. Ruyer's, *There is no Subconscious: Embryogenesis and Memory*.

heterochrony⁶⁹ - of developmental stages is the main cause of morphological and functional transformations in the adult species. Group theory has revealed the importance of population size, timing of sexual maturation and reproduction, longevity and turnover rates for the life histories and strategies of individuals. Moreover, environmental change influences these strategies.⁷⁰ L.C. Cole defines these variables in terms of r and k selection parameters, where r represents the natural rate of reproduction for a species, and k corresponds to the population capacity of the environment. As environmental conditions are constantly changing, the heterochronic structure of the organism must be able to respond rapidly if it is to survive. Endocrine balance and hormonal control are the causes of metamorphosis in ontogeny. The hormonal levels themselves are controlled by certain sets of genes during various stages of development. It is claimed⁷¹ that normal development is controlled by gradually decreasing concentrations of a hormone level at specific times and places within the regulatory system. Acceleration occurs by reducing hormone level, and retardation by the continuation of their high levels - that is, the genes control the endocrine balance, which in turn are regulated by the epigenetic structure switching the relevant sets "on" and "off" at the correct time and in a specific zone of the developing embryo. In short, progenesis is defined as paedomorphosis due to precocious sexual maturation. Neoteny is defined as paedomorphosis due to retardation of somatic development. The former corresponds to r selection parameters, the latter to k selection

⁶⁹ I owe this theory of heterochrony to S.J. Gould's, *Ontogeny and Phylogeny*, Harvard University Press, 1977, in which he presents an exceptional historical synthesis of the many ideas concerning biological evolution and embryogenesis.

⁷⁰ Cf. L.C. Cole, The population consequences of life history phenomena, pp. 103-137.

⁷¹ Cf. C.M. Williams and F.C. Kafatos, Theoretical Aspects of the Action of Juvenile Hormone, pp. 29-41.

parameters. Both, however, are dependent on environmental constraints, as exemplified by the neotenic metamorphosis of sedentary solitary grasshoppers into nomadic swarming locusts, triggered by the saturation of environmental resources; and progenetic precocious sexual maturation and reproduction in insect colonies, productive of population explosions, in environments with superabundant resources. Experimentally, heterochrony and metamorphosis in ontogeny can be induced by altering the endocrine mechanism in organisms, proving that paedomorphosis is not necessarily genetically fixed. In the words of L. Bolk: "What is essential in man as an organism? The obvious answer is: the slow progress of his life's course."⁷²

Therefore, the motor of evolution is located within a 'sumaterial' epigenetic process. This transcendental process is the sufficient reason for the diversity we observe in the natural world: from homogeneity to heterogeneity; from simplicity to complexity; from matter to reflection. However, this process is not a simple linear development, since it is constituted by two irreducibly distinct aspects: structure and function; evolution and behaviour; body and language. This pre-individual being is subject to the wave/particle duality and is, therefore, capable of being manifested in both forms. However:

Neither *mechanism* nor *energetism*, both theories of identity, can account for this reality in a comprehensive manner. Field theory, when combined with the theory of corpuscles, and even the theory of the interaction between fields and corpuscles, is still partially dualist, but is well on the way to formulating a theory of the preindividual. By another route, the theory of quanta has perceived the existence of this preindividual *regime*, which goes beyond unity: an exchange of energy is brought about in elementary quantities, as if there had been an individuation of energy in the relation between the

⁷² L. Bolk, *On the Problem of Anthropogenesis*, p. 470.

particles, which one can consider to be physical individuals in a sense.⁷³

Energy and matter, structure and function are simultaneously actualised through an epigenetic process that develops by means of successive amplifications and projections. Nonetheless, there is a qualitative distinction between the two: what is said of things are not the things themselves. We must not understand by this that the transcendental comes to mediate and reconcile this qualitative distinction: this was Heidegger's and Merleau Ponty's error. Rather, the only mediation that exists between the two domains is the "event", and this must be appreciated from its two constitutive faces. The event is essentially indeterminable with respect to words and objects which are determinable. As I. Prigogine tells us:

The law-event duality is at the heart of the conflicts which run through the history of ideas in the Western world, starting with the pre-Socratic speculations and continuing right up to our own time through quantum mechanics and relativity. Laws are associated to a continuous unfolding, to intelligibility, to deterministic predictions and ultimately to the very negation of time. Events imply an element of arbitrariness as they involve discontinuities, probabilities and evolution. We have to face the fact that we live in a dual universe, whose descriptions involves both laws and events, certitudes and probabilities. Obviously the most decisive events we know are related to the birth of our universe and to the emergence of life.⁷⁴

To these two decisive events we should add a third: the emergence of reflexive thought. Simply because by means of this property the evolutionary process has been inverted; man is no longer subject to evolution but determines it; he is capable of freeing himself from his material ground; from the perspective of the constituted subject the "I" is more primordial, as exemplified in Husserlean phenomenology; the triumph of superstition wherein the Word takes on a mystical power over the forces of Nature. It is through the gradual increase in

⁷³ G. Simondon, *The Genesis of the Individual*, p. 302.

⁷⁴ P. Coveney & R. Highfield, *The Arrow of Time*, p. 16.

the autonomy that subjectivity enjoys over nature and its material origins that the world has become an inverted image of itself. "How the 'Real World' at last Became a Myth"⁷⁵ should not be understood so much as an 'history of an error', but as a natural consequence of an evolutionary tendency that pursues its own ends and autonomy. However, there does exist an affinity between the field of implication and the realm of explication, an affinity but not a resemblance. The former remains a potentiality within the latter, but through the sensible it is possible to access this power in order to transform and invent Ideas.

One final point needs to be made. In psychic systems the I and the Self are figures of differentiation: the I is the quality of the human being as a species (qualitative), and the Self designates the properly psychic organism-organisation (extensive). The individual is divisible and expresses Ideas in the form of internal multiplicities that are fundamentally determined by pre-individual singularities. Nor is it an I with regard to its expressive character, since it forms a multiplicity of actualisation, as though it were a condensation of distinctive points or an open collection of intensities. However, this indetermination does not indicate something incomplete in individuality, rather it expresses the positive power of the individual and the manner in which it is distinguished in nature from both the I and the Self. Thus, death is inscribed in the I and the Self - the "death instinct" as internal power which frees the individuating elements from the form of the I or the matter of the Self in which they are imprisoned. "There must nonetheless be values of implication in psychic systems in the process of being explicated; in other words, there must be centres of envelopment which testify to the presence of individuating factors.

⁷⁵ F. Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, p. 40.

These centres are clearly constituted neither by the I nor by the Self, but by a completely different structure belonging to the I-Self system. This structure should be designated by the name 'other'. It refers only to the self for the other I and the other I for the self" (DR 260). This Other functions as a centre of envelopment. It is the representative of the individuating factors.

Death is a condition of evolution. "Not death from without, as the result of some accident; but death imposed from within, as a necessity prescribed from the egg onward by the genetic programme itself. For evolution is the result of a struggle between what was and what is to be, between the conservative and the revolutionary, between the sameness of reproduction and the newness of variation."⁷⁶ The death instinct cannot be represented, whereas the Other is the representation of it. The former corresponds to the individuating factors immanent to biological and psychical systems, that is, the differential relations and pre-individual singularities that constitute the organism in a metastable state. The epigenetic structure cannot be represented, since it is wholly other to systems of representation which function through stasis. Moreover, the Other as the representative of the process of becoming individuated, determines the dialectical indeterminacy intrinsic to the I-Self structure. Thus, we locate the Other primarily within our own psychic system; it is first and foremost immanent, only subsequently do we find it reflected in the face or eyes of the other person (Levinas). This immanent Otherness is what Deleuze refers to as the radicality of *alterity*, and what constitutes his notion of the altricide-suicide couple.

In summing up we claim that the primary cause of evolutionary change is not due to mutations in the genetic information structure, but

⁷⁶ F. Jacob, *The Logic of Life and The Possible and the Actual*, p. 309-10.

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⁷⁶ F. Jacob, *The Logic of Life and The Possible and the Actual*, p. 309-10.

rather, is engendered by changes in environmental conditions that effect the epigenetic structure, producing heterochronic variations in embryological and post-natal processes. If the environmental changes are sustained, the effects engendered in the epigenesis can permanently alter or transform the DNA structure itself. Furthermore, prior to permanently restructuring the genetic information system, the changes that the epigenesis undergoes due to environmental effects are hereditary, for at least two or three generations.⁷⁷ Evolutionary change therefore occurs during the embryological and post-natal phases of development under the influence of heterochronic timings in the epigenesis. There are changes that are the result of genetic mutation and recombination, but these are purely homeostatic variations, certainly not enough to account for the widespread diversity found in the natural world. As Lewin tells us mouthing Goodwin: "The genes set the parameter values . . . they produce component parts of the system, within a range of values. [But t]he morphological transitions . . . are consequences of the cycle of dynamics generating geometry and geometry modifying dynamics."⁷⁸ We have also shown the biological beginnings of thought which are grounded in the organism's action. This description of the psychic processes in terms of action, removed from thought the idealistic baggage and reinstates its material, or rather *sum*material primordially. This argument is identical to the one we articulated in the previous chapter, concerning Foucault and the critique of the form-content dualism. Quantity is presented as having both content and expression (structure), and quality possesses both

⁷⁷ Evidence of this has been published in *New Scientist*, *There is more to Heredity than DNA*, 19 April '97. Even though this idea is only tentatively proposed, in the above article, through the auxiliary "could", it nonetheless highlights a growing tendency in the sciences concerned with evolution and heredity to go beyond a merely genetic explanation.

⁷⁸ R. Lewin, *Complexity*, p. 36.

form and expression (behaviour). The expressive or relational order that subsists and is implicit within the two extremes of the single process is that out of which evolutionary order is emergent. This double aspect corresponding to expression is fundamentally irreducible; an affinity is the only bridge connecting ontogeny with phylogeny.

The implicate order is given to sensibility in the form of an intensity. Hence, the answer to the question: "can difference in itself be experienced?" is found in the idea of intensity. Like the Bergsonian idea of the past in general⁷⁹ which is given all at once in its entirety, which is not unlike the Kantian 'manifold', we find difference implicated. This experience is essentially nonsensical; only after expressing a limited portion of the manifold is sense produced and difference in itself cancelled. Therefore, in the experience of intensity itself, nothing has yet been synthesised into linear sequences and logical forms graspable through the intellectual faculties. "We call this ability to perceive everything at once *intensity*. For years we had found it impossible to examine the separate constituent parts of those chunks of experience; we had been unable to synthesise those parts into a sequence that would make sense to the intellect. Since we were incapable of those syntheses, we could not remember . . . The experiences were available to us, but at the same time they were impossible to retrieve, for they were blocked by a wall of *intensity*."⁸⁰

⁷⁹ H. Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, p. 171.

⁸⁰ C. Castaneda, *The Eagle's Gift*, p. 150.

Chapter IV

Ethics

If ethics presupposes both action and knowledge, then, every ethical system must be grounded in a specific historical activity. In the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle distinguishes between 'man as he actually is' and 'man as he could potentially be'. The former is man's actual state; the latter his potentiality for becoming his essence. For Aristotle, life consists in the pursuit of ends, or more specifically the ends toward which humanity ought aim. The purpose of the precepts are to guide man from the untutored state in which he is thrown in the world to the realisation of his true nature, while true nature itself is indicated by well-being. Well-being is an activity desirable for its own sake, and things that are desired for their own sake are *good* activities. Aristotle makes a further distinction between intellectual and practical activity, favouring the former over the latter, and thus concluding that contemplation is the essential part of well-being by virtue of the fact that it employs the best part of man: that is, reason. Virtue, as a state of character is defined in terms of the rule of the 'mean', wherein activities are guided by the intellectual operation of mediating between two possible extremes' - e.g., the mean between confidence and cowardice is courage. On the one hand, liberated from the dangers of the extremes, virtue is experienced as a single unchanging pleasure that issues from the contemplative life. On the other hand, the pleasures corresponding to the extremes lead away from the rule of reason, causing the individual to lose his equilibrium and are thus considered bad. However, we must guard against conceiving pleasure as being in some sense primary, and therefore the end toward which man must strive: Aristotle is not Epicurean. Rather, intellectual pleasure indicates that we are on the right path.

Aristotle therefore attributes a functional value to the domain of activity, since it is only through action that man's potential being becomes actual. This value is that of living 'well'. Well-being is not a feeling, but a practice in which actions are expertly performed. Aristotle tells us that the relation between "man" and "living well" is analogous to that of a lyre-player that plays the lyre well. But playing well does not mean to necessarily play in accordance with a fixed set of rules. An object or act has a function, if it fulfills that task well it can be said to be good. However, the notion of doing something *well* implies some conception of both a practice and a standard that are given in advance. The practice - and the striving toward an excellence in that practice - cannot constitute an ethic, since activity is what produces practices. To put the practice before the activity is to put the cart before the horse, to presuppose modes of behaviour and the authority of a standard for those activities. Moreover, in order to avoid the repressive power of increasing institutionalisation, a theory of excellence must resort to the use of concepts like 'justice', 'honesty', 'temperance', 'patience', 'charity', etc.. Every one being a worthy sentiment, but these are primarily effects of action and are incapable, therefore, of representing the foundation of action itself.

Our time is contemporary with the knowledge of the failure of justifying morality. This is our nihilism, a nihilism that need not be angst ridden but rather liberating. Morality is essentially a belief in a set of ethical prescriptives that are definable only in terms of a set of rationalisations that conceal the fundamentally non-rational phenomena of the *will*. Therefore we substitute the notion of *will* for reason; not the Schopenhauerian idealistic will, but rather in terms of the Nietzschean 'will to power' and the Deleuzean idea of a 'plane of immanence'. To affirm that the good life resides in pursuing a

particular practice to the degree of excellence, involves a sleight of hand that inverts the natural direction in which desire flows. The very idea of virtue versus vice invokes a transcendent law that would subordinate our desires: the "Thou shalt not." However, understanding ethics, in terms of the primacy of desire operative within the plane of immanence, has the advantage of founding an ethics capable of liberating man from a slavish subordination to established practices and the standards they impose.

It is the purpose of this chapter to pursue a line of inquiry that deals with ethics in terms of *liberating* desire from the repressive structures of overt institutionalisation. To this end, it will be necessary to locate the point at which this overturning can be accomplished, which we will immediately identify as the lacuna represented by the phenomenon of recognition. The fragmentary references that have been selected to fulfil this aim approach this problematic from the points of view of philosophy, Buddhism, psychoanalysis, literature, and finally returning to philosophy.

1. The task set before a philosophy which aims toward overcoming both objective and subjective presupposition, finds its inspiration in 'Difference in itself' as foundation and 'Repetition for itself' as ground. Objective presupposition defines a logical reciprocity between concepts; subjective presupposition defines a pre-conceptual understanding of Being by virtue of a natural and innocent capacity for thought. The natural image of thought presupposes an affinity between thought and truth, a good will and a *natural* capacity for thought on the part of the thinker, and a common sense shared by all upright men. However, what is really given by means of this natural image of thought is merely the form of recognition in general. Thus, the true

philosopher is without presupposition, an untimely individual far removed from the generalities of his time, and equipped with an ill will which undermines the morality implicit within the natural image of thought, in the sense of the creation of novel possibilities in the outpouring of becoming. A philosophy without presupposition

would find its difference or its true beginning, not in an agreement with the *pre-philosophical* image but in a rigorous struggle against this image, which it would denounce as *non-philosophical*. As a result, it would discover its own authentic repetition in a thought without image, even at the cost of the greatest destructions and the greatest demoralisations, and a philosophical obstinacy with no ally but paradox, one which would have to renounce both the form of representation and the element of common sense. (DR 132)

The affinity between thought and truth finds its image in a transcendental model of recognition. Recognition rests on the belief that thought is not a single faculty, but rather the unifying principle of all the faculties - "perception, memory, imagination, understanding . . . together relate their given and relate themselves to a form of identity in the object . . . while simultaneously . . . the form of identity in objects relies upon a ground in the unity of a thinking subject" (DR 133). Thus it is the unity of thought in the 'I think' that harmonises all the faculties and brings about the recognition of the same object: by relating perception to memory, memory to imagination, imagination to understanding, and understanding back to perception, thus completing a closed loop in the exercise of all the faculties, the faculties are brought into agreement with each other. "This is the meaning of the Cogito as beginning: it expresses the unity of all the faculties in the subject; it thereby expresses the possibility that all the faculties will relate to a form of object which reflects the subjective identity; it provides a philosophical concept for the presupposition of a common sense" (Ibid). However, the object is always encountered in its

singularity or particularity, and not as a universal object: this instance of green; this particular tree. Thus a good sense is a necessary complement of a common sense in its capacity of distributing, in space and time, the determinate contributions from the faculties within the universal form of the Same. Thereby bringing about the homogenisation of each particular instance within an universal distribution. "[C]ommon sense is the norm of identity from the point of view of the pure Self and the form of the unspecified object which corresponds to it, good sense is the norm of the distribution from the point of view of the empirical selves and the objects qualified as this or that kind of thing" (DR 133-34). Thus, along with the pure Self the World is grasped as a unity. But, by the imperatives of logic it becomes necessary to postulate a foundation for these unities, at which point man creates for himself a transcendent God capable of justifying the primacy of homogeneity over heterogeneity. which constitutes the good and upright nature of thought in general. What the true philosopher seeks is the *beyond* of this transcendental model of recognition, in order to discover a new value, or rather, a revaluation of established values. Therefore, philosophy must begin with a collapse of the harmonious exercise of all the faculties, a veritable disorganised and dissipated functioning not unlike that which we find in the hero of Knut Hamsun's *Hunger*, whose tortured 'inwardness' traces a line in which subjective and objective presupposition is rigorously questioned, culminating in an overturning of 'psychologism'.

Thought without image must therefore begin with non-recognition, that is, with an active forgetting within a transcendental memory. "Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object not of recognition but of a fundamental *encounter* . . . its primary characteristic is that it can only be sensed. In this sense it is opposed

to recognition" (DR 139). Sensibility takes on a primacy, since that which can only be sensed constitutes an 'imperceptibility' in relation to the cognitive faculties. The unrecognised sensible object of encounter shatters the mirror which reflects the image of Sameness and provokes thought to *think*. Non-recognition is a disjunctive use of the faculties and corresponds to a transcendental exercise wherein each faculty is taken to the limit of its singularity and power. "Each faculty must be born to the extreme point of its dissolution, at which it falls prey to triple violence: the violence of that which forces it to be exercised, of that which it is forced to grasp and which it alone is able to grasp, yet also that of the ungraspable (from the point of view of its empirical exercise)" (DR 143). At the extreme limit of its transcendental exercise each faculty discovers its Difference and its Repetition. This encounter has four transcendental aspects or cardinal points: the being of the sensible with respect to sensibility; the phantasm with respect to the imagination; the immemorial with respect to memory; and the aleatory point with respect to thought. Each of these four aspects internalises a dissimilarity that undermines the four-fold yoke of representation, and which correspond respectively to: "difference in intensity, disparity in the phantasm, dissemblance in the form of time, the differential in thought" (DR 145). Between the four faculties there is communication, however what is communicated is not sameness but difference: the difference that perpetuates the violence which awakens each faculty. In this sense, there exists a disjunctive operation of the faculties which establishes, paradoxically, a discordant harmony. The encounter wherein the object is not recognised is articulated by Deleuze in terms of 'stupidity'; not a stupidity in which the false is taken for the true, but rather, a stupidity that opens onto the space of the absolutely new and from which we may 'learn' something

completely novel.

In short, Deleuze aims to free difference and repetition from the subjugation imposed upon it by the natural image of thought and the transcendental model of recognition. He wishes to show difference differing in the movement of the eternal return, where what repeats is not the Same but the Different. The task is to go beyond the form of representation, to uncover or rather experience the transcendental conditions which give rise to representation as such, and to witness first-hand difference in itself. Good sense arranges things in the order of time and space, going from past to future as though from particular to general, thereby revealing the 'right' direction that grounds prediction. Common sense supplies good sense with two qualities: the subjective form of a universal Self, and the objective recognition of a universal and indeterminate object. The experience of difference in itself frees us from the repressive structures which hold us subjugated to orthodoxy. By means of this liberation something absolutely new is allowed to emerge. We could even define this 'something new' as a means of *resistance* to political oppression, moral enslavement, and the monotonous boredom of existence. Thus, resistance is always a question of ethics. The means by which we attain this transcendence is by situating 'ourselves' in the space between conceptual opposites, and affirm not the opposite of a given concept but the difference itself between the opposites themselves. The aim of *true* thought is to think this delirium - to think the impossible at the heart of thought. What is experienced in this encounter is the *unrecognised* object, lacking in self-identity, perceptually differing from past resemblances, and from which no analogy is forthcoming. The absolutely *new* experience constitutive of a state of 'stupidity' rather than error, and from which we *learn* rather than attain knowledge: knowledge as a product of the

learning process. The world may well be illusory in essence, but truth is the void which lies beyond recognition. A void which is intensive, phantasmagoric, immemorial and aleatory; a monstrous truth which paradoxically lacks truth since, nothing or no-thing is recognised. Every moment and presentation constitutes an immediacy or repetition of the absolutely different and new. From such a monstrous perspective we perform the revaluation as eternal task and to which only the overman is equal. Therefore, the revaluation cannot be the establishment of 'new' values which at some future date will require overturning, but rather, what the revaluation inaugurates is a production of newness in itself: unilateral and asymmetrical difference. But the question arises: "How is it possible to draw off something new from that which is essentially disparate?" Such phenomena we call events; spatio-temporal dynamisms which explode within the domain of absolute disparity; flashes of insight that come to us in the form of 'epiphanies'. Let us illustrate further this notion of epiphany by means of an example.

2. There exists an intimate relation between paradox and truth, since all truths that relate to the transcendental domain are essentially paradoxical. A transcendental truth can not be written in the propositional form: 'If p then r ', but rather: 'If p then r and s '. On the plane of immanence a thing is both what it is and what it is not; it is where it isn't and isn't where it is. This seeming nonsense must not be understood as anything *negative*, but rather, as the excess that belongs to the paradoxical entity and the power by which the essence-event is released. The use of paradox finds a supreme illustration in Zen practise, wherein it is employed to drive a wedge into the rational mind in order to release the essences which subsist between the

identities imposed by dialectical thought. Zen is a practice of meditative concentration represented by two essential schools: *Soto* and *Rinzai*. The former seeks enlightenment within the quietitude of monastic life; the latter in the activity of the outside world. Zen is not a tantra employing the physical energies of breath and semen to develop vigour, but only one of the four schools of the *Mahayana*, of which the Tantra is another. SAMADHI-PRAJNA is the enlightened realisation - a direct experience transcending words and things - in a voidness immanent within all phenomenal existence. In most cases enlightenment is indicated or suggested through the use of 'koans', in other cases concurrent causes are employed, such as a sudden shout, a roar of laughter, a gesture, or even a blow with a staff. These 'koans' are nonsense problems that the novice strives to solve, or rather enact its quasi-cause. Since Reason is transcended, the solution itself is formulated not in intellectual terms, but rather through an intuitive contemplation productive of a mimeticism. By simulating an event one *becomes* the solution. To be immersed in the void means to become equally mind and body, to abandon oneself to the intoxication of a pure intensive affectivity.

Plurality and singularity are irresolvable, nonetheless they form a composite like two sides of the same coin. Zen philosophy affirms an experience known as 'enlightenment', wherein all dualities are dissolved. In reality, time and space are one, it is only in our minds that we create the idea of a time separate from an actual place, and by which we give ourselves the idea of free choice. But this idea of free choice is an illusion which generates the added confusion of a morality, since it is always a choice between 'good' and 'bad' alternatives. For Zen it is only a question of doing or not-doing, and since not-doing is also a doing, there is only a doing something in the living moment. "Doing" is

an action that belongs to the surface, lacking in a circumspect consciousness that would judge the exigency from a position of detachment - a pure unconfused *instant* in which the act is spontaneously and indifferently performed.

Enlightenment should not be understood as a unique state of mind attained after years of arduous apprenticeship, but rather in terms of the mind of a novice, who practising for the first time can afford to take nothing for granted, in whom familiarity has not degenerated into contempt, and who thereby applies diligence and awareness at all times and to the minutest detail - conscientious, assiduous and constant attention to the fundamental prerequisites: 'posture' and 'breathing'. Enlightenment is attained very early on in practising Buddhism, the difficulty is to not to allow oneself to be seduced by success and familiarity. Enlightenment dwells within the universal or Buddha nature which all things possess. Enlightenment is the universal coexistence between all things experienced as infinite empathy, wherein the Self finds its dissolution in a relation that is both dependent *and* independent. It is a virtual domain in which all things subsist: not mind and not body, but both mind *and* body; the surface at the limit of bodies *and* the surface at the limit of words. An Event, or in the words of Whitehead, an eternal idea. As Suzuki tells us:

To live in the realm of Buddha nature means to die as a small being, moment after moment. When we lose our balance we die, but at the same time we also develop ourselves, we grow. Whatever we see is changing, losing its balance. The reason why everything looks beautiful is because it is out of balance, but its background is always in perfect harmony. This is how everything exists in the realm of Buddha nature, losing its balance against a background of perfect balance. So if you see things without realising the background of Buddha nature, everything appears to be in the form of suffering. But if you understand the background of existence, you realise that suffering itself is how we live, and how we extend our life.¹

¹ Shunryu Suzuki, *Zen Mind, Beginner's Mind*, p. 32.

It is not that the background universal corresponds to truth and individuality to illusion, but rather both universal and particular are complementary levels, each having reference to the other and existing by virtue of the other. Pure becoming slips in between the folds or invaginations of these two levels, tracing a line of flight upon a surface, and from which enlightenment (the epiphany) is discharged like "spores from a pod." Dying from moment to moment as a little ego, in order to rebirth on the virtual plane against a background of universal being. Zen is neither Platonic Form nor Aristotelian category, but rather Stoic and Zen paradox.

The practice of Zen teaches the student to maintain an awareness of each passing moment, to grasp the essence of each moment and to allow it to pass without disturbing the flow of data. To impersonally and indifferently experience and recognise the contents of one's own psyche and thereby liberate the desire that is held repressed in the unconscious. "The true purpose [of Zen] is to see things as they are, to observe things as they are."² This, as we have seen, is the task set philosophy by Deleuze: the overcoming of both objective and subjective presupposition. It is no surprise to hear Suzuki tell his students: "In this realm there is no subjectivity nor objectivity."³

By overcoming our self-centered ideas and dualistic thought processes we attain a dynamism of mind, whose centre is paradoxically calm - amidst the flux of activity there resides a centre of stillness. It is only by letting go that we actually begin to do something real. Only by ceasing to have purposes and ulterior motive for gain do we begin to practice Zen, and thereby become Buddha nature through expressing our true nature beyond the subjective-objective duality. To efface our

² Ibid, p. 33.

³ Ibid, p. 37.

little egos by losing ourselves completely in whatever we are doing. In this manner we become non-attached and impersonal, renouncing our individuality, presuppositions and prejudices in order to experience things in a completely new light. "When we sit we are nothing, we do not even realise what we are; we just sit. But when we stand up, we are there! That is the first step in creation. When you are there, everything else is there; everything is created all at once. When we emerge from nothing, when everything emerges from nothing, we see it all as a fresh new creation. This is non-attachment."⁴ It is also the 'lightening flash'.

At the heart of Zen practice there resides a supreme affirmation - which is, paradoxically, neither an affirmation nor a negation - to penetrate reality as a direct experience. The direct experience of reality is not attained through intellectual effort, but rather by means of intuitive contemplation. For this reason emphasis is given on practice and not intellectual appreciation. Zen is not a faith but a practice; a practice that focuses on each passing moment without an ulterior motive or project - this describes a fundamental paradox: to attain enlightenment one must give up seeking enlightenment. Essentially, Buddhism affirms the notion that reality is in essence pure becoming.

We should always live in the dark empty sky. The sky is always the sky. Even though clouds and lightening come, the sky is not disturbed. Even if the flashing of enlightenment comes, our practice forgets all about it. Then it is ready for another enlightenment. It is necessary for us to have enlightenments one after another, if possible, moment after moment. This is what is called enlightenment before you attain it and after you attain it.⁵

By adopting the attitude of non-attachment we allow the lightening

⁴ Ibid, p. 87.

⁵ Ibid, p. 86.

flash of enlightenment to pass and, by passing, allow the next to come. The impassive dark sky, unperturbed from one moment to the next, dwells in complete emptiness and observes the procession of inhuman thunder claps: epiphany.

"Something which comes out of nothingness is naturalness, like a seed or plant coming out of the ground. The seed has no idea of being some particular plant, but it has its own form and is in perfect harmony with the ground . . . As it grows, in the course of time it expresses its nature."⁶ In this sense, 'nothingness' corresponds to the virtual plane of immanence. That true natural being comes out of nothingness, moment after moment, corresponds to the active forgetting that liberates sensibility from its subjugation to the autonomy of Reason. Paradoxically, man must *work* at being natural. Thus, "[t]he Buddhist understanding of life includes both existence and non-existence. The bird both exists and does not exist at the same time."⁷ However, the notion of non-existence is an effect of the power of the Negative, in its place we substitute the notion of subsistence or inherence. The bird both exists and subsists, in this manner its substantiality, identity and permanence is problematized - that is, it can be grasped as a real bird and as a virtual bird. The real is constituted by concrete things and ideas while the virtual is conceived in terms of a potentiality out of which both things and ideas are actualised. The state in which both things and ideas are absent is known as 'emptiness; thus truth is emergent from emptiness. "Before we understand the idea of emptiness, everything seems to exist substantially. But after we realise the emptiness of things, everything becomes *real* - not

⁶ Ibid, p. 108.

⁷ Ibid, p. 110.

substantial."⁸ We find the same affirmation in Deleuze: that the virtual is real without be actual (substantial), ideal without being abstract. The void therefore is not a non-existence but a virtuality out of which things and ideas are actualised.

Since things and words are the actualisations of a virtual Reality, Buddhism, like Deleuze, inverts the orthodoxical image of thought. As Suzuki tells us:

we should begin with enlightenment and proceed to practice, and then to thinking. Usually thinking is rather self-centered . . . But if enlightenment comes first, before thinking, before practice, your thinking and your practice will not be self-centered. By enlightenment I mean believing in nothing, believing in something which has no form or no colour, which is ready to take on form or colour. This enlightenment is the immutable truth.⁹

The kind of thinking which proceeds from enlightenment Deleuze names 'stupidity'. Only through stupidity do we experience difference in itself. In short, Zen is called the 'middle path', since it slips in between and beyond the extremes of happiness and unhappiness, pleasure and pain, Good and Evil. Furthermore its goal resides neither in language nor the body, but rather in the attainment of a personal experience of Absolute Mind - lacking in both subjective form and objective content - that lies beyond the faculties: the Buddhist name for the Body without Organs. This Absolute Mind *is* reality; *is* the plane of immanence. However, by defining enlightenment in terms of immutable truth Buddhism betrays its ultimate aspiration; to reconcile the two extremes constitutive of an unity wherein all disparity and polytheism is brought into the fold of originary Being. Moreover, Zen interprets the attachment to Good and Evil, pain and pleasure, in terms of desire: they arise as an effect of desiring, or clinging, to things in the world. The argument is

⁸ Ibid, p. 113. Emphasis added.

⁹ Ibid, p. 118.

syllogistic: the world is an illusion; the world is born of desire; therefore cease to desire. For this reason, Zen rejects the Tantra and prioritises an intuitive contemplation which renders this practice idealistic. The idea of intuition affirms that *the* truth is given to the mind directly. But the coexistence of truth with non-truth on the plane of immanence implies that an intuition can never be true in the absolute sense. Therefore the only true intuition can be the one that directly experiences the essential Voidness in all phenomena - intuition can be true only as an experience of Univocal Being. Like Socrates, Zen's wisdom resides in knowing that it does not know. It thereby tends toward the Socratic rather than the Aristotelian; toward mind rather than body; toward rationalism rather than nominalism. It should come as no surprise that the Buddha, like Socrates (and Christ), taught orally. Aristotle wrote, he was an experimenter who introduced a scientific system of logical classification; the anal retentive. A third system - possessing neither a surfeit of intuitionism nor intellectualism - is therefore necessary that would correspond to the genital stage: perhaps the Stoic sage.

In order to remain in *Samadhi* - the continued experience of Enlightenment - it is necessary to lead a monastic life. However, this withdrawal from activity does not suit the tendencies of many people, since they are inclined toward a practical truth that would bring about social change; a politician, an intellectual, or an activist, for example. This type of individual will have a tentative grasp of Enlightenment, but possess great strength in seeing into the true nature of things: this is called wisdom. One can thus be active in the everyday world and employ this power of wisdom, whose source is *Samadhi*, without necessarily retreating from physical life. Seeing into the true nature of things is grasping them in their virtual state; intuiting a complete and

overall knowledge within the particular activity in which he is engaged: wisdom. Let us pursue this notion of an ethics of impersonality by grounding it within a psychoanalytic model of desire; this has the advantage of combining Zen with the Tantra: dynamism with kineticism.

3. Ethics is a measure of action from the point of view of a judgment: an action is judged, but it also bears within it the mark of some implicit judgment, since that action and no other was undertaken. How do we bring the two faces of judgment into conformity? We will take as a preliminary guide the title of a seminar that Jacques Lacan gave in 1960: "*Have you acted in conformity with your desire.*"¹⁰ If we are to uncover the true meaning of ethics, it will be necessary to examine the actual structure of action and the desire that subsists within action. Lacan uses a distinction between tragedy and comedy in order to open a space in which the relationship between action and desire would show itself. The tragic, we are told, is characterised by a being-for-death that negates a natural exuberency implicit in life, by imposing upon it prescriptions that serve only to limit desire and the scope of action. This limiting tendency is the product of both fear and pity. The comic, on the other hand, corresponds to a different relationship between action and desire, one which does not regulate the latter, but sees in it an essential failure: the impossibility of action to ever catch up with the desire that precedes it. It follows, then, that comedy embraces an essential futility towards life. As Lacan writes:

One must simply remember that the element in comedy that satisfies us, the element that makes us laugh, that makes us appreciate it in its full human dimension, not excluding the unconscious, is not so much the triumph of life as its flight, the fact that life slips away, runs off, escapes all those barriers that oppose it, including precisely those that are the most essential, those that are constituted by the agency of the signifier.¹¹

¹⁰ J. Lacan, *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 1959-1960*.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 314.

Lacan, of course, identifies the signifier of this line of flight with the phallus. This flight, or nonsense structure, defines the nature of real desire and the comic futility at the heart of human action and experience.

Therefore, the foundation of ethics can reside only in desire, or more correctly, in the judgment: Have you acted in conformity with your desire. "It is insofar as the subject is situated and is constituted with relation to the signifier that the break, splitting or ambivalence is produced in him at the point where the tension of desire is located."¹² This essentially open and nonsensical structure of desire Lacan calls *jouissance*. And since it is fundamentally open, no prescriptive could correspond to its structural non-structurality. In this sense, ethics could only condemn an action that gives ground relative to desire, fails to push itself to its limit and excel itself in an exuberant movement. The price to be payed for access to real desire is *jouissance* itself - that is, "crossing [the] . . . limits that we call fear and pity."¹³ However, the paradoxes that constitute ethics are not resolved with the liberation of desire, but rather the flush of exuberance must be tempered with "prudence"¹⁴ if our experimenter is to avoid the dangers of a too risky path ending in premature failure due to rashness. In this operation one must not identify with the overcoming of fear and pity, since they will be overcome as and when *jouissance* is attained. Identifying with fear and pity places an obstacle in the path of the attainment of *jouissance-desire* by constraining the operation to the tragic mode. The futility and excess essential to comedy implies

¹² Ibid, p. 317.

¹³ Ibid, p. 323.

¹⁴ Ibid, p. 323.

'letting go' of the hegemonic rationality characteristic of everyday life. Thus, we celebrate a certain irrationality and intoxication that no intentional project could define.

The limit-experience - Bataille names it *Inner Experience* - corresponds to a thought which is both extreme and free, and is the response to man placing himself radically in question. This radical thought, or radicality at the heart of thought, corresponds to a perpetual movement without reconciliation: what has come to be known as the impossibility at the heart of possibility. It also represents the passion associated with the death drive - a passion that undermines all knowledge and purposive activity and reveals an essential fluidity that "belongs" to man's essence. This belonging is what makes the movement and the desire *for* this movement possible in the first place, or rather, renders the desire for the limit-experience possible-impossible. The limit experience is the excess intrinsic to the death drive, a pure affirmation in which what is affirmed is affirmation itself: a Yes to everything and at the same time to nothing at all. Within this region we locate real desire. In fact, life is always experienced on two planes because it is constituted by a paradox and double bind: that is, the level of possibility, knowledge and empirical memory; and the level of impossibility and active forgetting. The latter is not external to the former, but is rather immanent within it and constitutes its most intimate heart. For which reason it is called the thought from the outside. The outside of thought which can never be thought without betraying its essence, hence it is the impossible which thought aims to think. It can never culminate in a totalising experience that would turn it into an object, since it is "the mode of relating, of holding oneself in relation."¹⁵ Within this experience the mode of recognition collapses,

¹⁵ M. Blanchot, *The Infinite Conversation*, p. 208.

everything is experienced as though it were 'for the first time'. It is not a product of reason, nor is it dialectical, but rather, a pure affirmation of affirmation and thought thinking that which will not let itself be thought: ecstasy. This pure affirmation introduces chance into thought, it puts thought *into play* while giving itself over to the sole thought that perpetuates yet another *throw of the dice*. However, an ontological affirmation of this kind, which is both eternal restlessness and indifference, cannot be sustained and risks falling, or rather eternally falls into the service of reason, self and the "I". Indifference therefore constitutes the element of real desire.

Hegel, in his *Philosophy of Law*, articulates the foundations of the bourgeois state and human organisation through a relation between need and reason. However, this relation is inadequate to account for the process of self-realization expressed in Freud's *Civilisation and Its Discontents*. Reason, which organises the unconscious in a logical manner, is present in the very beginnings of human experience, and in relation to which man must position his needs. But this relation between reason and need incorporates a crack in which the functioning of desire is located. Desire therefore takes on a primary role in the articulation of human development, since it is located in the interstices and the intervals between the structural elements, giving rise to the organisation of those elements. Thus, *Jouissance* is not the satisfaction of a need, but the impetus of a drive that is not a purely biological instinct, but incorporates an historical dimension since it refers back to something that is memorable, or rather immemorial. *Jouissance* must not be understood as a straight forward phenomenon that we capture by focusing an intentional gaze upon it, but rather it constitutes a paradox defined in terms of the dialectic between happiness and Law, Self and Other. In fact, the Law is founded on the

Other, the respect and responsibility toward the Other. This respect mediates between Self and Other and defines what is commonly called universal human rights: altruism is founded primarily on the image of the Other. However, this image of the Other is also the image on which we are formed as ego - that is, the ego and the Other are simultaneously formed, the one does not exist without the other, since both together form a natural whole. On the one hand, this dialectic forms the basis of fear (the respect for God). The prescriptive of the Law that comes from God: "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." On the other hand, the fact that both Self and Other constitute a single structure allows the "I" to identify with the Other, allows it to see itself in the Other. Hence the horror at witnessing the suffering of the Other: this forms the basis of all pity.

But could there exist a language capable of escaping violence, and a thought of the impossible which would be a kind of reserve in thought itself, eluding any appropriative or commanding gesture? Such a thought would be purely other, a relation to the other as other, and not ordered to a reduction of the Same. Thus, impossibility must necessarily be a non-power in which time has lost its hold and wherein we are delivered over to another time, a time as other, as absence and neutrality without possibility, project and redemption. A pure immediacy, the impossible, not as a privileged experience, but as that which hides behind every experience: an *other* dimension. "[I]mpossibility is relation with the outside; and since this relation without relation is the passion that does not allow itself to be mastered through patience, impossibility is the passion of the outside itself."¹⁶ Possibility is merely the power of the No, whereas impossibility is being itself, and which is neither negation nor

¹⁶ Ibid, p. 46.

affirmation but immediacy. Desire is the relation to impossibility; the relation to naked presence: "communication." Poetry, as well as every essential speech, is not there in order to articulate impossibility; it merely responds to it. Every beginning speech begins by responding, an attentive response in which the impatient waiting for the unknown and the desiring hope for presence are affirmed.

By showing that Self and Other are the products of a single structure, the foundation of this structure cannot be established on either element. Therefore, an appeal must be made to a more profound process of individuation capable of supporting both poles of the dialectic. We experience this process through *jouissance*; but the latter contains an unconscious aggression derived from the good object that the superego turns back upon the ego. Herein, the Law and, therefore, altruism is lacking, the limit has been shattered wherein the "death of God" is enacted. This experience Lacan names "perversion." By following perversion we are drawn along the line of flight that constitutes real desire and wherein the distinction between Self and Other can no longer be made. The perversion is genital; that is to say, for Lacan at least, perversion is constituted by a specifically erogenous content that he derives from Sade's writings. The genital aggressivity is a partial object independent from the Self-Other structure, but an independent object that desires reintegration into that whole object-structure. This is what gives desire its directedness and defines it as the fundamental law or death drive, since both Self and Other are pulverised in the flight for the satisfaction it will never attain. The works of Sade and Lautreamont trace this flight, and for which reason Lacan names them 'experimental literature'. As he tells us: "The work of art in this case is an experiment that through its action cuts the subject loose from his psychosocial moorings - or to be more precise,

from all psychosocial appreciation of the sublimation involved."¹⁷ The suicide and altricide implied in the death drive corresponds to the state of absolute zero or the Body Without Organs: a purely erogenous intoxication, the subject's most intimate content determined as a topology of genital zones.

Turning now to Deleuze's reading of psychoanalysis in *The Logic of Sense*, where he defines the developmental process in terms of a dynamic genesis with three distinct stages: the formation of erogenous zones, the phallic stage, and the castration complex. Let us look at each of these stages in turn. The first stage constitutes a pre-individual "abominable mixture" of bottomless depth, wherein fragments are introjected, injuring the body, inciting anger and aggression, which is subsequently projected onto these fragments-objects, or bad objects. This is the paranoid-schizoid position and represents to the activity of the Id during the first year of the child's life. Secondly, along with the introjection-projection process of the bad objects there is an identification with the good object; primarily the breast. The child strives to attain and identify himself with the good object, but the identification is never complete and leads into the depressed and frustrated position represented by the superego. The good object is in essence a *lost* object; from the very beginning it reveals itself as lost and as preexistent. As Deleuze writes;

Coming about in the course of the schizoid position, the good object posits itself as having always preexisted in this other dimension which now interferes with depth. This is why, higher than the movement through which it confers love and blows, there is the essence through which and into which it withdraws and frustrates us. It withdraws covered with its wounds, but it also withdraws into its love and its hate. It gives its love only as a love which was given before.....as a pardoning; it confers its hate only as a recalling of threats and warnings which did not take place. It is therefore as a result of frustration, that the good object, as a lost object, distributes love and hatred. (LS 191)

¹⁷ J. Lacan, *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 1959-1960*, p. 201.

In order to bring about an equilibrium between these two distinct dimensions, it is necessary to posit a third position as represented by the ego. What is opposed to the bad partial objects is not a good object, but rather a body without organs: a perfectly fluid mixture of solid fragments. The BwO equilibrates between the schizoid and depressed positions, extracting a voice in the form of "words-passions," which constitute the beginnings of a purely denotative language, but lacking the organising principle that would make it function as a signifying whole.

But how is the surface as equilibrator-pacifier between the depths and heights constituted? As we have seen, the surface takes the form of a topological structure: pieces connected to one another along a thin membrane of "skin". In order to understand this process let us return to the concept of partial objects as Deleuze describes them:

The word "partial" has two senses. First it designates the state of introjected objects and the corresponding state of the drives attached to these objects. It also designates elective bodily zones and the state of the drives which find in them a "source". . . But the essential difference is that zones are *facts of the surface*, and that their organisation implies the constitution, the discovery, and the investment of a third dimension which is no longer either depth or height. (LS 196-7)

We now begin to appreciate why Deleuze characterises the surface not as subversive nor conversive, but as perverse. The perverse position constitutes a double liberation of the libidinal drives: a liberation from both the preservative drives of oral absorption and the destructive drives of internal sensibility, directly linking sexuality to the surface. According to the Freudian theory of erogenous zones, the surface is given a wholly originary sexual orientation. However, this orientation must be understood as an impersonal sexuality, and not the polarised sexual orientation witnessed between so-called 'normal' adults. To these erogenous zones there corresponds a cause which constitutes

them, these being the secreting orifices and membranes.

Each erogenous zone is inseparable from one or several singular points, from a serial development articulated around the singularity and from a drive investing this territory. It is inseparable from a partial object "projected" onto the territory as an object of satisfaction (image), from an observer or an ego bound to the territory and experiencing satisfaction, and from a mode of joining up from other zones. The entire surface is the product of this connection. (LS 197)

Therefore, the Oedipal complex is not an originary and irreducible position, but the tertiary stage in the process of development, and corresponds, strictly speaking, to genital organisation.

The surface is the liberating organisation which, rather than constituting the desires for murder and incest, invokes them in order to pacify them. In the capacity of pacifier, it is the phallus of the genital stage that heals the wounds of the aggressive depths while maintaining contact with the frustrated heights. It binds all the zones into one surface bringing about integration. The phallus therefore is not the penic instrument of copulation, but rather the paradoxical entity which ensures the connection between all zones as well as the communication between all events in one and the same Event. But the fragility characteristic of the surface has two causes: Firstly, the fact that the Oedipal complex is perpetually threatened by the possibility of being consumed by the pre-Oedipal depths. Secondly, the desire for incest that emanates from the heights instils guilt. And as we saw in connection with Lacan, these two dangers correspond to the price paid for the attainment of *jouissance*: that is, the overcoming of fear and pity.

The castration complex comes about at the stage of genital integration when the good object is cleaved into two parts, represented by the separation of the two parents in the mind of the child and causing the good object to withdraw its benevolence. This split itself is achieved,

Deleuze tells us:

from the two disjunctions subsumed under the good object (unharmd-wounded, present-absent) the child begins by extracting the negative and makes use of it in order to qualify a mother image and a father image. (LS 204)

Thus, in its unconscious the child strives to heal the wounded body of the mother while recalling the withdrawn father. These two aspects constitute the child's 'good intentions'. But why does it all turn out so badly? In the dual process of healing and recalling, the child suddenly realises that the maternal body is not only wounded by the internal penises, but more essentially, it is now experienced as a castrated body. As Deleuze writes:

It becomes therefore true, at this moment, that by wishing to restore the mother, the child has in fact castrated and eventrated her; and that by wishing to bring back the father, the child has betrayed and killed him, transformed him into a cadaver. Castration, death by castration, becomes the child's destiny, reflected by the mother in this anguish he now experiences, and inflicted by the father in this culpability he now submits to as a sign of vengeance. (LS 206)

Thus, the penis, as property of the father, comes to condemn the libidinal drives of the child.

However, an essential distinction arises between the intention and the accomplished action. The *entire* action is projected onto a double screen: Firstly as intention on the sexual and physical surface which corresponds to the healing and recalling desire. Secondly, as an accomplished action it is projected onto a cerebral surface which corresponds to murder and incest. Hence, the passage from one surface to the other essentially bears upon the formation of thought. That is, "the transformation of the phallic line into the trace of castration on the physical surface . . . corresponds to [the] . . . crack of thought" (LS 208) and the pure line of Aion.

The phantasm has its beginnings in this result. However, castration is

concerned with physical surfaces and the corresponding dissipation of images (mother, father), whereas the phantasm is projected onto another surface, the double of the physical surface which we call cerebral. As Deleuze tells us:

There is thus a leap. The trace of castration as a deadly furrow becomes this crack of thought, which marks the powerless to think, but also the line and the point from which thought invests its new surface. And precisely because castration is somehow between two surfaces, it does not submit to this transmutation without carrying along its share of appurtenance, without folding in a certain manner and projecting the entire corporeal surface of sexuality over the metaphysical surface of thought. (LS 218)

Sublimation is the operation whereby the trace of castration becomes the line of thought. *Symbolisation* is the operation whereby thought reinvests with its own energy all that occurs on the cerebral surface. Thus the phantasm, as constitutive of the incorporeal, is a machine for the production of thought by bringing the inner and the outer into contact on a single side or Mobius strip. This process of the birth of thought is continual: the eternal return in the guise of the non-actualizable Event which can only be accomplished by thought and in thought. There is, then, something unique which transcends physical surfaces, addressing itself only to thought - this is extra-Being. This process constitutes the liberation of a non-existent entity from states of affairs, the event as noematic attribute which expresses an eternal truth.

The phantasm recovers everything on this new plane of the pure event, and in this symbolic and sublimated part of that which cannot be actualised; similarly, it draws from this part the strength to orient its actualisations, to duplicate it, and to conduct its concrete counter-actualization. (LS 221)

Let us call the initial resonance brought about upon the physical surface by the phallus, Eros, and the forced movement brought about by the desexualised libido which operates between original depth (good

and bad objects) and the cerebral surface, *Thanatos*. In this dual structure we perceive the perpetual threat of collapse as well as the promise of an extendedness beyond the limits of the physical surface: "We can therefore name the entire forced movement 'death instinct', and name its full amplitude 'metaphysical [or cerebral] surface'" (LS 240). If collapse is avoided and the cerebral surface dominates over original depth, then, "a glorious event enters a symbolic relation with a state of affairs" (Ibid), and a *verb* is inscribed which projects depth onto the cerebral surface, thereby sketching out thought.

The phantasm therefore is the product of the dual process of sexual beginnings and of desexualization, and to this process there corresponds a perpetual resexualizing of new objects. Language and sexuality are therefore co-present systems, this is the meaning of perversion. But this language is unable to capture the purity of its sexual originations, since the former represents a reinvestment and transformation of the primary developmental processes. In short, ethics corresponds to the desexualised castrated line of thought, which is subsequently resexualised upon the equilibrating cerebral surface. The process of resexualization frees thought from the hegemony of reason and from the destructive impulses of schizophrenic mania, thereby liberating it from the repressive model of recognition through a perpetual reinvestment. Ethics represents the pacified and 'prudent' movement of real desire; of *jouissance* and the overcoming of fear and pity/guilt. Real desire is constituted in the interstices between the two levels of depth and height; its foundation is, therefore, essentially ambivalent and paradoxical. This desire does not correspond to the speculative death drive of Freud, but rather the psychic or cerebral death drive of Lacan. Let us now consider this model with respect to the "neuter" in the writings of Blanchot.

4. The neuter is not a third gender; it is a non-generic and non-particular *something* that neither belongs to subject nor to object. "And this does not simply mean that it is still undetermined and as though hesitating between the two, but rather that the neuter supposes another relation depending neither on objective conditions nor on subjective dispositions."¹⁸ Moreover, "one can recognise in the entire history of philosophy an effort either to acclimatise or to domesticate the neuter by substituting for it the law of the impersonal and the reign of the universal, or an effort to challenge it by affirming the ethical primacy of the Self-Subject."¹⁹ Therefore, the neuter is essentially unknown and unknowable, but not as something absolutely unknowable nor the 'yet to be known'; neither transcendent noumenon nor empirical phenomenon. Rather the unknown is disclosed as the unknown and indicated in a manner that keeps it unknown. This experience excludes perspective and critique, since it is neither positive nor negative. The neuter is *aliquid* and bestows value without signalling itself: it frees meaning as a phantasm. Neither affirmation nor negation, but having the closure of an *aliquid* to which no question corresponds, and toward which one may approach only by a series of interrogatives: sorites. Moreover, the neutral is given in advance in memory's immobile present. Memory is the muse that continually repeats herself under the exigency of repetition, each time a first time. Man abides in a great impersonal memory that constitutes the reserve to which no individual has access. Forgetting is the primordial divinity Mnemosyne, mother of the muses. Active forgetting is the vigilance of memory to which the hidden of things is preserved. The most profound

¹⁸ Ibid, p. 299.

¹⁹ Ibid, p. 299.

effacement where the site of metamorphoses is found and the model of recognition shattered. The relation to active forgetting is not dialectical but one of an indifferent difference. The poet returns to presence from his journey of active forgetting and expresses the experience in the most simple of words. Thus, simplicity and clarity are the watchwords of all artistic expression; the simplest of responses to what was experienced as *strangeness*.

Aion corresponds to a vertiginous turning wherein time itself turns. The future expresses the necessity of failure; we are cast back into a past from which we derive a supreme affirmation. Everything is organised around two essential notions: invention and harmony; flight and resonance; fragment and whole. For Blanchot, poetry represents the power to compress a spatial and temporal multiplicity into a unique 'site' or focal point, where in the lightening flash of *illumination* is given. This affirmation therefore is simultaneously a turning toward and a turning away; attraction and repulsion. Hence, the poet's duty is to transform lack into resource. In the words of Nietzsche: "To impose upon becoming the character of being - that is the supreme will to power."²⁰ The poet's concern therefore is not with his individual person, but with thought itself. A veritable "combat between thought as lack and the impossibility of bearing this lack, between thought as nothingness and the plenitude of upsurge that hides in thought, between thought as separation and life as inseparable from thought."²¹ Poetry is an exigency that can never be satisfied, a drive never fully fulfilled, constantly tracing a line of pure becoming that remains virtual, a relational being more real than any presence, an absence that is starkly before us, and a *difference* that is prior to all representation.

²⁰ F. Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, §617.

²¹ M. Blanchot, *The Infinite Conversation*, p. 294.

The *sacred* is the experience of a violent communication that comes to us as both multiplicity and unity; the gods of return and decline; Dionysus and the Crucified. However, what matters is the direction that thought assumes. Bataille experienced the sacred in thought as a decline from the summit of unity toward the depravities of multiplicity. Blanchot and Deleuze, on the other hand, emphasise the fact that the true direction of thought, or *thinking*, begins from the heterogeneous and tends toward the homogeneous.

On the one hand, allegory and symbol relate respectively to the duality of a meaning that is manifest, and a meaning that is latent. The image, on the other hand, is a sudden and explosive flash: epiphany. The very space of the image, the 'reverberation' proper to it, summons us to leave ourselves and traverse its trembling immobility. Herein, man is silent; it is the image that speaks. This space of the image is the most interior exterior, a cruel inside-outside that "is also entirely imageless, an imaginary speech rather than a speech of the imagination, where the imaginary speaks without speaking either of or through images."²² This notion of the image is complicated by Deleuze who sees in it two corresponding aspects. The image has a problem-solution structure and corresponds to the physical surface; whereas the phantasm has a question-answer structure and corresponds to the cerebral surface.

Blanchot informs us that "every language has a structure about which we can say nothing *in* this language, but there must be another language that treats the structure of the first and possesses a new structure about which we cannot say anything, except in a third language - and so forth."²³ The language we use constantly gives rise to enigmas that

²² Ibid, p. 324.

²³ Ibid, p. 337.

must firstly be described and then explained with reference to another language. This is the power of the descriptive: an infinite displacement without place which sets and keeps in motion a redoubling without duplication. To write is to pass from "I" to "he" - and as we saw in relation to Deleuze, from the "he" to the "they" - an uncharacterizable "they. The "they" is the neuter of narrative, no longer anchored in life, but an anonymous speech behind language that constitutes the singularity of narrative. This *outside* is the centre that is also the absence of centre. This *outside* is the distance that language takes from its own lack as its limit. This anonymous speech "is the expanse where, in the presence of a remembrance, there comes to speech the event that takes place there; memory, muse and mother of muses, holds truth within itself."²⁴ The descriptive speech of commentary belongs to the movement of the neutral; freed from the hegemony of value it repeats the Work. Within this lack of value only repetition can establish the Work as unique. Thus, descriptive commentary is a process of translation through which the neutral is given form by a series of interrogations. Moreover, the exigency to which "he" responds is not a transcendent force but an immanent power. But immanence itself must be grasped in terms of neutrality. As Blanchot cautions us in relation to Kafka's Castle:

it constitutes an immanent force. But this can only be an approximate way of putting things. One of the essential traits of the neutral, in fact, is that it does not allow itself to be grasped either in terms of immanence or in terms of transcendence, drawing us into an entirely different sort of relation.²⁵

For Blanchot, then, ethics is a kind of writing that responds to the exigency of the neuter, the indifferent and impersonal drives which subsist in the active forgetting that is Mnemosyne. What is important

²⁴ Ibid, p. 381.

²⁵ Ibid, p. 463 n5.

is the non-subjective and non-objective character of this domain of indifferent difference, hence the name 'neuter'. But perhaps Blanchot's neutralisation goes too far, since the drives which have undergone a desexualization, fail to find in their subsequent reinvestments a resexualization that would restore to them a portion of their erogenous beginnings. For this reason, Blanchot articulates the movement of the neutral in a wholly cerebral style. Thus, he speaks of the reinvestments taking the form of "simple words" that capture the essence of strangeness. There is no talk of a continual process of reinvesting new objects - and every object is a new object, even the old object, because the objects are experienced in the active forgetting that shatters recognition - with desire, albeit an impersonal desire, but one which does not draw any lines or limits except the line of its own disappearance in an eternal flight for satisfaction. One finds in Blanchot an ethics of disembodiedness and cerebral essence, which constitutes his work as a veritable writing machine. But we wish to go beyond this, or rather add to it a supplementary and equally valid level: that is, the body.

5. According to Deleuze,²⁶ three essential themes characterise the radicality of Spinozist thought: i). A critique of consciousness that places the body at the centre of his philosophical system. ii). A philosophy of values capable of overturning morality. iii). And a revaluation of life in terms of the "joyful" passions that arise from a philosophy of affirmation. We will deal with each of these in turn.

A). According to the first theme, Spinoza's philosophy is 'materialist'

²⁶ The reading of Spinoza that follows owes its interpretation to the specific Deleuzean slant, which in many ways is incommensurate with the more traditional interpretations of Spinoza - that is to say, as an exponent of the rationalist school of philosophy: "*amor intellectualis dei*". (F. Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, p. 81).

insofar as it takes the body, rather than conscious thought, as the paradigm upon which to model the *Ethics*. Against Rationalist dogmatism Spinoza, and Nietzsche after him, affirmed that the greater and more important part of activity in general is unconscious. As Deleuze writes; "the model of the body, according to Spinoza, does not imply any devaluation of thought in relation to extension, but, much more important, a devaluation of consciousness in relation to thought: a discovery of the unconscious, of an *unconscious of thought* just as profound as *the unknown of the body*" (SP 18-9).

The argument takes its stand from the perspective of causality: consciousness, it is claimed, knows nothing of causes only their effects. On a causal level, the body and the unconscious of thought are defined in terms of a dynamic field populated by a multiplicity of intensive forces, which when taken as a whole constitute a metastable Being. There are two essential aspects that correspond to bodies. On the one hand, a body is composed of a multiplicity of parts which belong to it only in terms of a certain relation that characterises it. In essence this relation is singular, but this singularity is itself reducible to a multiplicity of relations, orderings amongst parts that are structured upon a hierarchy of levels, which when taken collectively constitute one dominant relation or *form*. These relations, orders, and levels define the numerous ways in which a body can be affected. On the other hand, a Body enters into relations with other bodies; these relations can be either attractive or repulsive to its essence. Joy arises from attractive relations, wherein an enhancement of power is experienced. Sadness arises from repulsive relations in which a decrease of power is the result. Therefore, the relations which constitute a single body are kinetic, while those that exist between the bodies themselves are dynamic. By essence (eternal truth or idea) we

mean the dominant relation that is realised by the parts. Essence is the state of being of the individual and its capacity, as a whole, to be affected. A body's affective capacity is expressed as a quantity of power that varies between joy and sadness. "But this variation does not pertain, as such, to essence; it only pertains to existence or duration, and concerns only the genesis of the state in existence" (SP 40). Consciousness knows nothing of these dynamic polarities which take place on a purely unconscious level. "In short, the conditions under which we know things and are conscious of ourselves condemn us to *have only inadequate ideas*" (SP 19). Consciousness is a process of identification, of fixing sites and erecting boundaries: it calls a halt to the schizophrenic becomings in the name of unity, identity and telos (being). Since consciousness experiences only effects and not causes, it will take these effects as causes, and thereby invert the world through the power of its autonomy. It is at this moment that the transcendental illusion locates identity within the plane of immanence.

The greater part of activity involves an unconscious becoming in which the drives continually extend themselves to the point at which a resistance is met. The actual result of the encounter - that is, whether the resistive force is appropriated by the becoming or the becoming by the resistive force - is determined immanently. As Deleuze explains:

But because this effort prompts us to act differently according to the objects encountered, we should say that it is, at every moment, determined by the affections that come from the objects. *These determinative affections are necessarily the cause of the consciousness of the conatus.* And since the affections are not separable from a movement by which they cause us to go to a greater or lesser perfection (joy and sadness) . . . Consciousness appears as the continual awareness of this passage from greater to lesser, or from lesser to greater, as a witness of the variations and determinations of the *conatus* functioning in relation to other bodies or other ideas. (SP 21)

B). The second theme relates to the system of valuation defined in

terms of 'good' and "bad", rather than "Good" and "Evil". There are two distinct levels on which a system of valuation must be conceived. On the objective level, good is any relation that compounds with our own and results in an increase in the feeling of power; bad is any relation that decomposes our essence and decreases our feeling of power. On the subjective level of an individual, good is that which strives toward extending its system of organisation, bringing under its command other relations that add to its own power; bad is that which tends toward dissolution, wastage and ultimately impotence. "The opposition of values (Good-Evil) is supplanted by a qualitative difference of modes of existence (good-bad)" (SP 23). On the one hand, morality is the law before which man is obedient; it is a transcendent instance that commands obedience, as illustrated in the relationship between tyrant and slave. On the other hand, ethics implies knowledge, toward which man strives by extending his power, and which is *relatively* and *partially* determined by the qualitative difference of modes of existence or *phyla*: immanent rather than transcendent.

C). The third theme, which distinguishes between the sad and the joyful passions, must not be understood in terms of two interpretations of a single thesis, but rather in terms of a discrimination between two fundamental kinds of complex. On the one hand, the "sad passions" manifest both a hatred of life (ressentiment) and a loathing of self (guilt). This complex separates a body from what it can do, and worships the *righteous* impotence that poisons the affirmative essence of life. On the other hand, the "joyful passions" affirm the singular essence that is one's power and being. This essence which manifests itself as a capacity for being affected has two primary modes: action and passion. The former corresponds to the power of acting; the latter to the power of being acted upon which separates us from our actions.

The capacity for being affected remains constant while the relation between the two modes is inversely proportionate. Deleuze further differentiates between two types of passion: when our body enters into a relation with another body, that body's relation can either compound or attract our own body or it can decompose or repel it. The former relation gives rise to joy, the latter to sadness. Actions are wholly unconscious, but the passions enter into the activity of consciousness. The essential problem for the *Ethics* is to show how and in what capacity we may arrive at the power of acting, given that consciousness has access only to the passions. Therefore, how could one ever know what acting in a truly affirmative way is? Relations which are attractive give rise to joy through the feeling of enhanced power. But

[t]his joy is still a passion, since it has an external cause; we still remain separated from our power of acting, possessing it only in a formal sense. This power of acting is nonetheless increased proportionally; we "approach" the point of conversion, the point of transmutation that will establish our dominion, that will make us worthy of action, of active joys. (SP 28)

Deleuze's Spinoza articulates a thesis on power relations; relations that are constitutive of bodies and their parts, and the polarities that exist between bodies within a social milieu. The goal of the ethic is to restore to bodies the power, and the joy in power, that is their's by nature in order to overcome the reactive interpretation that has been imposed upon life. "The entire *Ethics* is a voyage in immanence; but immanence is the unconscious itself, and the conquest of the unconscious. Ethical joy is the correlate of speculative affirmation" (SP 29). Ethics is grounded in immanence, but what does this mean for the individual? Spinoza distinguishes between two matricides: the killing of Clytemnestra by Orestes; and the killing of Agrippina by Nero.

By means of these examples Spinoza illustrates the difference between vice and virtue. However, as Deleuze tells us; "what matters is knowing whether the act is associated with the image of a thing *insofar as* that thing can compound with it, or, on the contrary, *insofar as* it is decomposed by it" (SP 36). By compound we mean a force that extends outward and forms alliances with other forces, entering into sociabilities with them, and appropriating them under the command of a single centre. By decomposition we mean any act that wilfully annihilates a characteristic relation or eternal truth; it does not form alliances but destroys them. "[T]his distinction does not bear on the act itself or its image . . . nor does it bear on the intention. It only concerns the determination . . . the relating of two relations, the image of the act in its own relation and the image of the thing in its relation" (SP 36). Therefore, the murder committed by Orestes is good, while the one committed by Nero is bad. The former acts in the name of a supreme affirmation, the latter a negation. This represents a "hard" ethics, since we detect no redolence of a Christian forgiveness, only a *Roman* Stoicism which knows nothing of self-negation.

Essentially this process involves conceiving the univocity of being in terms of a *common* plane of immanence on which all bodies, minds and individuals are distributed as upon a 'diagram'. The plane of immanence distributes affects; an assemblage of affects defines a body. It is a question of finding out through experimentation what a body can do, since we do not know this beforehand. On the plane of immanence there is no inside and outside, only a single surface. Inside and outside are constituted through a number of foldings, invaginations and envelopments of certain affects that essentially characterise that individual body: there is no *real* distinction between inside and outside - the inside is simply a kinetic act of appropriation. Dynamically it is a

question of 'extensive' relations between individual bodies, and the formation of a social milieu that would constitute a more 'intense' capacity and higher individuality: a socius. Thus a body is not defined by its structure or functions, but by its immanent capacity to be affected. As Deleuze writes:

A body can be anything; it can be an animal, a body of sounds, a mind or an idea; it can be a linguistic corpus, a social body, a collectivity. We call longitude of a body the set of relations of speed and slowness, of motion and rest, between particles that compose it from this point of view, that is, between *unformed elements*. We call latitude the set of affects that occupy a body at each moment, that is, the intensive states of an *anonymous force*. . . In this way we construct the map of a body. The longitudes and latitudes together constitute Nature, the plane of immanence or consistency, which is always variable and is constantly being altered, composed and recomposed, by individuals and collectivities. (SP 127-28)

In short, Deleuze articulates two kinds of relation: a transcendent relation that is fixed between subject and object, sign and signified, gene and function; and an immanent relation that defines an historical desire in terms of a movement infinitely traversing the structure relating subject to object, sign to signified, gene to function. On the plane of immanence there is no supplementary dimension, only a relation of speeds between elements and fragments of elements becoming individuated by means of an anonymous drive that traverses the whole of the structure instantaneously. In its natural state desire constitutes a perpetual process of pure becomings, or what we called in relation to psychoanalysis: reinvestment as a continual process of sublimation and resublimation. Ethics, then, if such a thing exists, can only be situated in an affirmation of real desire. But what Deleuze gives with one hand he takes away with the other. At the point where desire is liberated on to the plane of immanence, he cautions us to experiment with "prudence" (SP 125). No doubt, in this manner Deleuze avoids falling into the black hole that claimed J-F Lyotard during his

Libidinal Economy phase, but it also reveals him, perhaps, to be quite conservative at heart: at least not as radical as some are prone to read him.

6. In Foucault, Knowledge is constituted on an irreducible correspondence between the two forms of visibility and articulation. These formalised strata trace lines of light and articulable curves through quasi-transcendental 'points' or meeting places between forces whose relations define power. These relations of power which are mapped out on 'diagrams' are irreducible to forms of knowledge. Moreover, there is the relation with the 'outside' from which the diagram flows, "but where the outside does not merge with the diagram, but continues instead to 'draw' new ones" (FU 89). A problem arises: it is the *impasse* in which power situates us. Since, if power is productive of truth, where or how may we locate a truth which would resist power and, in turn, give rise to metamorphoses. "This could be resolved only if the outside were caught up in a movement that would snatch it away from the void and pull it back from death" (FU 96). This condition is in fact provided by the outside whose movement is one of spontaneous folding, unfolding, and refolding.

In what way can this movement overcome the *impasse*? By producing an *inside* which is not a subjective interiority, but rather, "the inside of the outside" (FU 97) as the process of subjectivation which is independent from the relations of power and the forms of knowledge. "It is not a reproduction of the Same, but a repetition of the Different" (FU 98). By folding back the outside upon itself by means of a series of practical exercises, the Greeks produced a relation to oneself; "a relation which force has with itself, a power to affect itself, an affect of self on self" (FU 101).

This dimension is the site of resistance as a 'principle of internal regulation'. The subject is neither a pre-given nor a fixed centre within the transcendental field, but rather, a process of perpetual constitution and reconstitution. "The struggle for subjectivity presents itself, therefore, as the right to difference, variation and metamorphoses" (FU 106). It is this dimension of folding or doubling which constitutes the independent relation to oneself that Foucault named 'absolute memory'; a memory beyond that which is inscribed in strata, archives and diagrams. This "absolute memory . . . is one with forgetting, since it is itself endlessly forgotten and reconstituted" (FU 107). Thus: "(t)ime becomes a subject because it is the folding of the outside and, as such, forces every present into forgetting, but preserves the whole of the past within memory: forgetting is the impossibility of return, and memory is the necessity of renewal" (FU 108).

By affirming an irreducible disjunction between the form of visibility and the form of articulation, Foucault distances himself from the likes of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty; the latter carry out a critique of intentionality (being) in order to uncover the ontological fold (being). However, they situate this fold in a dimension which resolves the disjunction between what is seen and what is said. Whereas for Foucault this cannot be the case, since knowledge is constituted by two forms which are irreducible to each other, and where each form has its own object as well as its own subject: there is no possibility of a reduction to the original experience or true object. Intentionality, therefore, as the belief that "consciousness is directed towards the thing and gains significance in the world" (FU 108), collapses in the face of an irreducible problematic. Rather, the objects of knowledge necessarily become a certain phantasmic phenomenon. There is no correspondence between the two forms, only an interlacing which

resembles a perpetual combat within a space where the visible and articulable intertwine and constitute knowledge-Being. Knowledge flows from an informal element constituted by a relation between forces: "This is the strategic domain of power, as opposed to the strategic domain of knowledge" (FU 112). However, neither of these Beings are the true Fold, such a dimension comes about only when the outside forms a coextensive inside. "But as a force among forces man does not fold the forces that compose him without the outside folding itself, and creating a Self within man. It is this fold of Being which makes up the third figure when the forms are already interlocked and battle has already been joined" (FU 114).

It is the conditions and not the conditioned which interest Foucault. Therefore, the true object of our research is the ontological historicity of thought itself, since there are no *real* objects out there that would constitute history. The real question is: What is the process that is called thinking? In relation to knowledge, thinking is carried out in the disjunction between seeing and speaking, that is, thought produces an interlacing between the two forms by pushing them both to their "individual limits such that the two are the common limit that both separates and links them" (FU 117). In relation to power "thinking involves the transmission of particular features: it is a dice-throw. What the dice-throw represents is that thinking always comes from the outside . . . Thinking is neither innate nor acquired" (FU 117). Finally, in relation to the self, thinking folds the outside into a coexisting inside. It is in this manner that thinking is an affect of self on self, a veritable auto-affection that constructs an inside space wherein it finds the outside from which it arises as its own unthought element.

On the limit of the strata, the whole of the inside finds itself actively present on the inside. The inside condenses the past (a long period of time) in ways that are not at all

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continuous but instead confront it with the future that comes from outside, exchange it and recreate it. To think means to be embedded in the present-time stratum that serves as a limit: what can I see and what can I say today? But this involves thinking of the past as it is condensed in the inside, in relation to oneself (there is a Greek in me, or a Christian, and so on). We will then think the past against the present and resist the latter, not in favour of a return but 'in favour, I hope, of a time to come' (Nietzsche). That is, by making the past active and present to the outside so that something new will finally come about, so that thinking, always, may reach thought. Thought thinks its own history (the past), but in order to free itself from what it thinks (the present) and be able finally to 'think otherwise' (the future). (FU 119)

This temporalized self we will call the *ethical subject*. Only a forgetting of the present recovers what has been folded in the past, and in turn allows for the emergence of a future wherein we may 'think otherwise'. Only in this sense is Foucault's ethical subject atonal: purged that is of all moralisms. Herein we uncover its logical cruelty, which is one with an horrific apersonal microphysics, to which there corresponds "the centre of the cyclone, where one can live and in fact where life exists *par excellence*" (FU 122): the ethical process of subjectivation.

In summary, ethics is not deducible from a set of preestablished practices, the aim of the individual being to attain excellence therein. Rather, to uncover the element of ethics it is necessary to go beyond the model of recognition and the form of the same; this is effected by postulating a difference in itself as foundation and repetition for itself ground of action in general. Only in this manner, through the affirmation of an active forgetting, are objective and subjective presupposition circumvented. Novelty, which is the gift of disparity, announces itself in the thunderclap of epiphany in the form of simplicity and clarity. This disparate domain - the void - constitutes a virtual plane of immanence that subsists between the two extremes of objective and subjective presupposition. Moreover, it is on this plane that *real* desire is situated, and the possibility of overcoming

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repression is realised within an act of 'resistance'. A resistance which, paradoxically, is a 'letting go', the consummation of which necessitates the overcoming of a double obstacle: fear and pity. By means of such a *leap* into the ontological plane of immanence is it possible to act in conformity with one's desires, and thereby experience what Lacan named *jouissance*. Even though *jouissance* corresponds to the phallus, it is nonetheless essentially a desexualised energy, or neutrality, traced by the line of flight of the castration complex, which is only subsequently resexualised. Herein, in conformity with Spinoza, a devaluation of consciousness in favour of a materialism is realised. The body becomes the focus of the unconscious passions grounded in immanence, wherein good and bad are understood not in terms of value, but modes of existence. However, the ethical procedure, defined as a resistance to repression, necessitates another process capable of freeing itself from the impasse of power. This requirement finds its design in the process of subjectivation itself: the self-invention of the ethical subject by the folding of force back upon itself, and thereby creating a centre of stability - not unlike the eye of a dynamic hurricane.

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At every step we have been at pains to reveal a domain that is irreducible to either realism or idealism, materialism or rationalism, structure or behaviour, thing or word. This domain is constituted by an intrinsic incommensurability that defines Univocal being: heterogeneous rather than homogeneous. It is neither a question of mediating from the position of a mean in order to actualise a reconciliation, nor is not a question of excluding each perspective as an extreme case, but rather of including them all within a disjunctive synthesis: a *virtualism*. The contribution made by each extreme in each case is always unequal: it is always inequality in life which impels it to progress. There is no tightrope walker who balances himself in the middle between the extremes, but rather a constant 'falling-down' which is simultaneously a 'raising-up'. Man requires both idealism with which he creates a world and a realism with which he faces the truth about *his* world. This virtualism constitutes the real becoming of the world and wherein we locate the potential for creation, invention and metamorphoses that displaces the notions of identity, unity and telos. In fact, the two extremes mark the limits of the pure becoming, without which there would only be chaos. They correspond to the boundaries that define a particular body, a body moreover whose *Will*, or will to power, is continually excelling itself and overcoming those limits. We have applied this instrument to the sciences of linguistics and biology and found in each case that the foundation for each practice could be located only within a virtual plane of immanence populated by pre-individual and impersonal singularities.

To begin with, we located an essential lacking in identity that rumbles below the concept, an irrepressible carnivalesque that subsists between thing and word, denotation and signification, and which it was

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the aspiration of the Modern world to reify through the strict correspondences of an empirical science grounded in reason. Within the postmodern world difference in itself is shown to be the foundation, the ground of which is neither the linear nor cyclical temporality, but rather the eternal return of a wild and pure becoming that representation aims to pacify. This domain is essentially a relational field unrepresentable through the medium of representation. In relation to language, which we articulated in terms of a critique of Husserlean phenomenology, it was found that not sight but the voice is directly linked to consciousness. Thereby the hegemony of the phenomenon is smashed. The eye and the ear are two irreducible organs. By means of the latter a meaningful world is constructed out of phonetic fragments into the morphemes which provide sense and signification. By means of the former a world picture is constructed out of all the partial visibilities into an identical and unified ocular world. Between the two there exists not absolute reconciliation, but only an unequal communication. Thus, from the point of view of psychism, we inhabit two worlds constituted by the separate faculties of sight and hearing. In relation to the body, which was presented as a critique of scientific reductionism within the field of evolutionary biology, it was found that two distinct aspects characterise any organ(ism): structure and function. The former comes under the rubric of behaviour and evolution, that is, the functions of organisms are determined by the purpose for which they evolved. However, there is no strict relation between the two, but rather a continual adaptation to new environments and situations with the organs provided, and in some cases leading to the evolution of new ones. The latter is defined by the biology-knowledge disjunction. Knowledge of the world - which includes any organism's awareness of its immediate environment, not just the human - is

conditional upon the structure and nature of the faculties of that organism. Again, this relation is not reducible to a single correspondence. Take, for example, the world of an organism which is constituted by the two faculties of sight and smell (canine). In this case the disjunction is constituted around visibilities and olfactibilities, there is no complex linguistic network but a highly elaborated meaningful world constructed around scent. For a dog, scent is a morpheme. From the point of view of materialism, then, we inhabit two distinct worlds composed by the biological structure (faculties) of the organism and its knowledge of the world based upon these faculties. This, when applied to the realm of an ethic, articulated in terms of a theory of affectivity founded in *real* desire, was alone capable of grounding the notions of good and bad. The verb 'found' is especially pertinent here, since it itself implies a paradoxical movement: to build and to melt. It is only by losing oneself that one's Self is found: the Not-Self or ?-Self.

The extremes must not be understood as representing a dialectic between a thesis (being) and an antithesis (non-being) that find their reconciliation within a higher synthesis (becoming). This does not correspond to an Hegelianism, but rather represents its immanent overturning. This overturning has at least three aspects: Firstly, from the point of view of Hegel's anthropomorphism, the unending process of becoming moves toward the ultimate reality of total self-consciousness; what he called the Absolute Idea. This prioritisation of self-consciousness defines Hegel's humanism, to which Deleuze applies the Nietzschean unconscious, thereby showing consciousness to be a mere effect of the more primary forces. Within the domain of anti-humanism, qualities such as self-consciousness are adaptational features which the evolutionary motor of Life produces as a local

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solution to a given problem. All adaptational features are just so many responses to environmental conditions, the limits of which are represented by the extremes. The Earth - and the cosmos of which it is a part - is a highly complex and sophisticated holistic machine, in which every single element is as important as the next in the contribution it makes in the production of life. Hence, the second aspect of the overturning corresponds to the rejection of the notion of a teleological power which tirelessly drives onward and upward into higher and higher forms of organisation which ultimately culminates in the absolute aim of the Spirit. The history of this process is defined as Spirit's increasing purification from its material envelope: Spirit is Reason. Here we locate the importance of Nietzschean pessimism and the necessity for an *amor fati* in the face of an inhuman process lacking in 'ends'. Thirdly, the reevaluation of non-being in terms not of a nothingness, but a virtuality teeming with unactualized potential. In fact, being and non-being are not so much dialectically opposed, rather non-being, or what Deleuze names (?) - being in order to emphasise its problematic nature, constitutes the foundation of all being. (?) - being is the potential within every actualised form of being, composing both the source from which it is emergent, as well as the evolutionary drive for metamorphosis. Hence, the disparity at the origins of identity and the impossibility of actualising the Concept or Absolute Idea.

However, another aspect deserves consideration - that is, the relation of ethics to Law. This relation we will articulate in terms of the duality between anarchism and constitutionalism. The constitution, whether defined in terms of mediaeval Pontiff, nation state King, or democratic Law, all extort the same exigency from its subjects: that is, the despotic demand for duty and obedience. These three systems of constitutional law define the developmental progress - at least in

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Europe - of the need for stability and order. Law is beneficial, not only for those who wield its power, but also for the individual subjects who make up the individual elements of the body politic. The reason for this mutual benefit lies in the fact that increasing complexity is emergent not from absolute chaos, but a lower level order poised on the edge of chaos. The direction of evolution in the cosmos flows from simplicity to complexity on all levels of existence: mineral, vegetative, and animal. The explanation for this movement can be given, and has been given since Schopenhauer, in terms of an inhuman *Will* of life that constitutes the motor of the evolution. Moreover, the higher the level of complexity that a system is capable of incorporating, the more extensive is the sphere of behaviour open to that system: that is, with every increase in complexity there is a corresponding increase in freedom. Life desires increasing complexity, since each stage in the development of a system represents an overcoming of its previous constraints. This argument justifies, we believe, the necessity for laws (axioms) not in the service of a morality, but for an ethic of continual creation in the service of life itself. A reevaluation *ad perpetuus*. We do not imply the "art for art's sake" of the Russian nihilists, but an experimentation tied to both an idealism and a realism. However, the dangers of law come about when their decrees become so established and their utility so popular amongst the largest group of the population - the middle classes - that they come to be seen as immutable. Through its relation with absolute right, the law takes upon itself the mantle of the despot, bigot, hypocrite and glutton; in this manner the crimes against life are perpetrated in the name of truth. This identification of the law with a moral conduct sanctioned from above through the dispensations of the Pontiff, reveal the allegiance between Church and State and their common enmity against the process

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of invention which threatens their own security. In this capacity Church and State express a paranoiac repulsion and denial of life. Thus they become inaugurators of the Holy Lie, which they surround with a wall of fire that only a hero, wholly lacking in fear and pity, is capable of penetrating.¹ This penetration has a double signification; on the one hand, it corresponds to the liberation of the Valkyrie *Brynhild* who represents the pure thought and will of Godhead, on the other hand, by taking her as his consort, the hero breeds a race of beings who are themselves capable of free-thought; thereby unleashing upon the surface of the Earth the force of anarchy. Laws are necessary, but we must learn to discard them as soon as they cease to have value in the service of life. This is what is meant by *How to Philosophise with a Hammer*:² not to smash but tap gently against the icons of our value systems in order to ascertain whether they are hollow.

This rapping is neither a revisionism nor a reactionism. There is no Critique on the plane of immanence: we neither revise established values which would continue to exist even after the revision; nor do we enter into a dialectical relation - the negation of their affirmation - with the values to be overturned. Rather, the function of the anarchist is to combat the dogmatism of institutionalisation by pushing the systems of valuation beyond their limits, causing them to 'found', in order to create something other: a metamorphosis into a new individual. Only in this manner can we escape the impasse of critique which always already implies a perspective and presupposed truth - that is, its own dogmatism. As we have said, the overman-anarchist is one who is both fearless and pitiless, a wholly unmoral individual, guided not by law but his own *innocent* passions and desires. This falling-back on

¹ The reference is to the Siegfried of Wagner's Ring Cycle.

² The reference is to F. Nietzsche's *Twilight of the Idols*.

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desire does not lead to a malign chaos and moral depravity, but rather finds therein an ethic far more disciplined than any mechanical obedience to law. There can be no liberation without limit, no anarchy without constitution. The anarchist therefore clears the ground not for the sake of clearing, but only in order to create; this is his own obligation to his highest self. (S)he is primarily a creator; destruction is a mere effect of the affirmative will to life situated on the plane of immanence. Furthermore, one must be prudent and know the right time when to exercise convention and when it is wise to break it. This implies a necessity for becoming skilled in using the rules of the constitution in order to turn them against the very body that they constitute, rather than attempting to overcome them all at once - to become a veritable virus in the system. In the words of Nietzsche:

It is necessary for these men of incomprehensible loneliness to wrap themselves vigorously and boldly in the cloak of external, spatial solitude, too: that is part of their prudence. Even cunning and disguise are needed today if such a man is to preserve himself, to keep himself aloft, in the midst of the dangerous, down-dragging currents of the age. Every attempt to endure *in* the present, to endure the present, every approach to the men and aims of today, he will have to atone as if it were his own special sin; and he may marvel at the concealed wisdom of his nature that, after every such attempt, at once draws him back to himself by means of sickness and bad accidents.³

The anarchist must wear the mask of that which is to be overturned, and from this position of immanence introduces a schism into the system. Unity is thereby shown to be composed of an assemblage of mutually contradictory or inconsistent elements and attributes. This definition characterises schizophrenia, in exactly the same way as the anarchist is himself characterised as a schizophrenic. However, by schism we do not refer to the medical condition, but to an essential lacking in unity, identity and telos characteristic of every system and

³ F. Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, § 985.

body.

It remains to define our understanding of Anarchism and the domain to which it properly belongs in its purest expression. As we have seen, axioms are not simply repressive structures imposed upon the masses by a ruling class, but rather compose an essential structuration of the chaotic substratum, without which there would only be a disorder and simplicity wholly lacking in organisation and development, rendering the constitution of a social milieu impossible. Nonetheless, the axioms themselves must not be understood in terms of immutability, rather the necessity to violate their authority must be continually affirmed if progress is to be realised. States impose laws, individual must obey these laws; there therefore arises an incompatibility between State and individual. One cannot resolve this controversy through an appeal to morality, since we have been at pains to deny its authenticity throughout this thesis. Only an ethics of decentralised desire can serve as a model of the State (politics) and its productive forces (economics). The incompatibility resides therefore between the desire of the individual and the laws imposed by the State which inhibit the free-flow of desire. Is it possible therefore that anarchism, on the material level of the productive forces constitutive of a social organisation, would facilitate the productivity and empowerment of the individual? That is, if everybody were to do their own thing, unhindered by any political regulation, would this solve the problem of exploitation and repression? It is extremely doubtful, since the individual would very soon form partnerships and collectivities as his needs dictate. Those who have little or nothing by way of buying into these cooperatives will become isolated and eventually vanish. Some collectivities will increasingly expand, and before too long, there will exist the same inequalities anarchism proposed to abolish. Quite

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clearly, a pure anarchism released upon the material forces of production - the production and distribution of food, clothing, and housing - will fail to realise the empowerment so dearly sought by the anarchic individual. Therefore, the total abolition of the State is unjustified, what must be limited is its power of intruding upon the privacy of the individual and of imposing on its members an absolute control. State and individual constitute the two extreme limits of a social assemblage which is in the continual process of becoming. It is true that with democracy the majority decide, thus the individual can easily find himself on the outside of society. Nonetheless, the individual will not be excluded on all issues voted through the democratic process, with some he will be in full accord and in this case the individual will constitute one element within that majority he derided on other issues. Thus, the Rule of Law is probably the best means of distributing the maximum equality and empowerment to every member constitutive of the social milieu, bearing in mind that as long as these rules are subject to continual renewal as and when circumstances dictate. It follows that pure anarchism can only be realised within thought, or what Deleuze calls *thinking*. For this reason anarchism encapsulates the spirit of the "internet" as an unregulated system of communication and information distribution; but that is its limit. And even there it fails to find its perfect expression.

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